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**BANGLADESH IN UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

T. A. ZEARAT ALI

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**BANGLADESH IN UNITED NATIONS
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA:	Assembly Area
ACMO:	Assistant Chief Military Observer
AFD:	Armed Forces Division
AHQ:	Army Headquarters
ANC:	African National Congress
BAF:	Bangladesh Air Force
BANAIR:	Bangladesh Air Force Contingent
BEC:	Bangladesh Engineer Company
CASO:	Contingent Air Staff Officer
CBM:	Confidence Building Measures
CCF:	Cease-fire Commission
CCFADM:	Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force
CLO:	Chief Liaison Officer
CMLO:	Chief Military Liaison Officer
CMO:	Chief Military Observer
COO:	Chief of Operations
COS:	Chief of Staff
CORE:	Commission for Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel
CP:	Checkpoint
CSC:	Commission for Supervision and Monitoring
CTNA:	Centre for Troops not Assembled
DFC:	Deputy Force Commander
DG:	Director General
DOMREP:	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic
DPKO:	Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DSA:	Daily Subsistence Allowance
DSCSC:	Defence Services Command and Staff College
EEC:	European Economic Community
FADM:	Mozambican Defence Force
FC:	Force Commander
FRELIMO:	Liberation Front of Mozambique
GD:	Dynamic Group
GPA:	General Peace Agreement
ILO:	International Labour Organization
IOM:	International Organization for Migration
IPA:	International Peace Academy
MINUGUA:	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURSO:	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MNC:	Multinational Company
MNR:	National Resistance Movement of Mozambique
MOD:	Ministry of Defence
MOFA:	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ONUC:	United Nations Operations in Congo (Operation Nation Unies en Congo)
ONUCA:	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOT:	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL:	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
ORCI:	Office for Research and Collection of Information
RC:	Regional Commander
RENAMO:	National Resistance Movement of Mozambique
RSS:	Reintegration Support scheme
SIR:	Information and Referral Service
SRSG:	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TU:	Technical Unit
TUCO:	Technical Unit Camp Officer
UN:	United Nations

UNAMIC: United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance mission in Rwanda
UNASOG: United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAVEM: United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCRO: United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNEF: United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNGOMAP: United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF: United Nations Children's (formerly International Children's Emergency) Fund
UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG: United Nations Iraq-Iran Military Observer Group
UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNIPOM: United Nations India Pakistan Observation Mission
UNMIBH: United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH: United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT: United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOGIL: United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOHAC: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMUR: United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM: United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPREDEP: United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
UNSF: United Nations Security Force (in West New Guinea
– West Irian)
UNSMA: United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan
UNSMIH: United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC: United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES: United Nations Transitional Administration in
Eastern Slovenia
UNTAG: United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNYOM: United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WFP: World Food Programme
WHO: World Health Organization
ZALNA: Zimbabwean National Liberation Army

I. INTRODUCTION

United Nations peacekeeping is a twentieth century phenomenon born out of the ravages of two World Wars. The basic concept of peace was, however, not new. Even before the First World War, countries sought peace, but mostly on their own terms and conditions. Besides, the desire for peace was superseded by their desire for expansion of their empires and politico-economic interests. The horrors of the two World Wars in which about 70 million human lives were sacrificed at the altar of colonialism, power politics and nationalism finally convinced everyone that global peace was a primary precondition for human happiness and progress. Even before the First World War, a mechanism called the League of Nations was indeed created to maintain peace, but it was essentially a formulation of a few that sought to retain their colonial interests under fancy names and institutions. The attempted methods of maintaining peace were the obsolete concepts of alliance building, balance of power and balance of interests. That resulted in inadequate empowerment of the League; and obviously, the League failed to take necessary action in the Manchurian war in the early 1930s. The League's passivity, coupled with rising militarism of Japan, Italy and Germany, completely emasculated the League by the middle of the 1930s. The Second World War and its horrors convinced the major powers that it was time to construct a more effective mechanism to maintain world peace. The United Nations Organization was the result of those agonizing experiences.

The UN officially came into existence on 24 October 1945 when the Nationalist China, France, the erstwhile USSR, the UK, the USA and a majority of its 50 signatories ratified its Charter. Freeing themselves from colonial shackles, many countries became independent subsequently, and became members of the UN. Thus, the number of signatories of the UN charter continued to grow, and there are 185 members today. The founding fathers of the UN, benefiting from the unhappy experiences of the 1930s and the 1940s, attempted to institutionalize peacekeeping actions to achieve justice and universal peace.

Unlike the League of Nations, the UN did not put great emphasis on legalistic approach in addressing international disputes. It also did not relegate economic issues to a position of lesser importance; while, at the same time, attempting to maintain peace through political means. The concept of peacekeeping was, however, not only grounded on ethical considerations, but also on two other factors. First, the end of the Second World War was also the time when the international societies were being globalized, and the impact of interdependence was beginning to be felt. Secondly, technology was at a stage that creation of wealth was no more quite dependent on territory. One had to have the control of technology and favourable terms of trade. For ever expanding tentacles of capitalism, international peace was also necessary. The debate as to how that peace is to be maintained continues still today. The obvious method available to the United Nations to maintain and make peace was the use of military personnel.

The first such opportunity came in 1948 when the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was formed to supervise the truce following the Arab-Israeli war in the same year. Next, the United Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) in

India and Pakistan was established in 1949 following the 1947 Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. Both the missions are observer missions only, and are still in progress. Since these early missions, the UN has undertaken a total of 44 missions as of December 1997, of which 18 are still in progress (Table-1). However, the growth of UN missions has not been a uniform one. In the first 43 years of UN's existence, there have been only 13 missions; but since 1988, there have been 31 UN peacekeeping missions until December 1997.¹ The UN budget for peacekeeping has also been increasing correspondingly. From \$ 230 million in 1987, it rose to \$ 3.6 billion in 1994, which is roughly three times the UN's regular budget.² The number of troops deployed during the early Cold War era was about 2000 at any one time; but in 1987, it rose to 10,000 troops. In 1994 more than 76,000 troops were engaged in UN operations of which more than 19,000 personnel were deployed in Somalia, and more than 36,000 personnel were in Bosnia-Herzegovina area.³ It must be mentioned that in the last two years, the UN involvement in peacekeeping operations has reduced a little.

The recent reduction in UN peacekeeping commitment, however, should not be taken as an indication of retrenchment on the part of the UN in its peacekeeping commitments, but a cautious approach towards undertaking missions. The general trend indicates that the UN peacekeeping commitment has widened both in number,


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1. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Notes", DPI, New York, 1 May 1997, & briefing by AFD.
 2. Unpublished paper by Majid, Jamil (DG, UN Desk, MOFA), presented at the DSCSC on 21 January 1996, p. 5.
 3. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (A), *Building Peace and Development*, Annual Report on the Work of the Organization, [New York, Department of Public Information (DPI), UN, 1994], p. 155.

size and financial commitment. Presently, there are 18 on-going missions, and the cost of peacekeeping in 1996-97 is expected to be around \$ 1.3 billion.⁴ All these indicate not only an increasing confidence in the role of the UN, but also an increased willingness of the world body to commit itself for global peace. In spite of the considerable increase in UN commitment in peacekeeping in the last decade, its overall effectiveness has not been very impressive. There have been more than 100 conflicts in the world since the Second World War, but the UN could intervene in 44 of them only. Even in the ones that the UN committed itself, it did not always come out successful. Reasons for that are varied and complex. In many ways, the peacekeeping process is an evolving process. Because of the lack of a clear guideline in the Charter of the United Nations, the peacekeeping process had to adapt to the changes in the general security perception and security environment. With the changes in global politico-economic scenario, and the changes in the nature of conflicts, the concepts of UN peacekeeping operations have been taking shapes in newer dimensions. What started as an observer mission has now assumed rather complex multidimensional and multidisciplinary operations.

Keeping the recent failures of UN peacekeeping in mind, the question that we have to ask is : Are we ready for such complex operations? If peacekeeping is an evolving process, it is also likely to be more complex in the future. Then the question is: Are we ready for the twenty-first century as far as peacekeeping operations are concerned? Observer missions were something that needed no more than basic skills of soldiers, and the UN forces performed in those missions admirably enough. For multidimensional peacekeeping,

4. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note", *op. cit.*, & AFD.

COMPLETED AND ONGOING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



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soldiers will need special skills and training. Presently, there is no training institution in the world that can provide such comprehensive training. The little training that national governments provide to their soldiers can hardly meet the needs considering the scale of operations that might be needed in the future. Shashi Tharoor has put it succinctly when he said, "We will not be able to face the twenty-first century by remaining firmly rooted in the twentieth."⁵

An introspective look into these issues needs to be taken also by Bangladesh as a major contributory to the UN peacekeeping force. Bangladesh, so far, has achieved great success in all the UN's peacekeeping assignments. But how will it respond to the emerging challenges? This monograph deals with the whole gamut of issues centring Bangladesh's participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Sections II and III review the evolving nature of United Nations peacekeeping, and discuss how it could overcome some of its present difficulties. Section IV deals with Bangladesh's role in peacekeeping, and it examines the reasons of its success. Section V presents a case study of Bangladesh's role in one very important UN peacekeeping mission - ONUMOZ - in which not only Bangladesh contributed the maximum number of troops, but also the Force Commander was from Bangladesh. In the process, the paper assesses the kind of training the future peacekeepers of Bangladesh may need, and how that training can be imparted.

II. EVOLVING NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

2.1 The Doctrinal Dilemma

The term 'evolving' presupposes the reality that peacekeeping was at a rudimentary stage at the beginning, and that it was not so

5. Tharoor, Shashi, "The Future of Peacekeeping", in Jim Whitman and David Peacock (eds), *After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance*, (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 20.

comprehensive as it is now. One of the difficulties the signatories of the Charter of the United Nations faced at the beginning was the lack of clear guidelines in the provisions of the Charter. The signatories of the Charter of 1945 did intend to provide the UN with some capability to maintain world peace, and the concept enshrined in the Charter was meant supposedly to save the successive generations from the scourge of war.⁶ But the Charter is a collection of imprecise words, subject to different interpretations. The Charter also lacks clarity in identifying the kinds of actions that are to be taken in different situations. For example, there is no mention of peacekeeping anywhere in the Charter. The Chapters that somehow relate to peacekeeping are Chapters VI and VII. The main focus of Chapter VI is to 'determine' the level of threat and only 'recommend' measures to be taken. Chapter VII repeats the same terminologies in Articles 39 and 41; and Article 42 suggests actions by the use of terms like 'demonstration', 'blockage', and 'other operations'. However, these are hardly any positive means of taking military actions; and it is not clear as to what 'other operations' include.

For some peacekeeping operations, Chapter VI is invoked despite its vague language. In a few other cases where peace needed to be enforced, as in Congo, Korea and in Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm), Chapter VII was invoked. Operations carried out under Chapter VI are defined by UK as "Operations carried out with the

6. Charter of the United Nations, Article 1, Paragraph 1, cited in Indarjit Rikhye, *The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping*, (London, C. Hurst & Co Ltd, 1984), p. 3.

consent of belligerent parties, in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict".⁷ Operations conducted under the provisions of Chapter VII are defined as "Operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities."⁸ A useful distinction between the two types of operations is made by the word 'consent'. These definitions are only one interpretation - other countries may define these operations differently. Seeing such confusion, Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary General of the United Nations, suggested to evolve a new chapter, Chapter 6½, to fit the wide ranging requirements of peacekeeping.⁹ Behind his light-hearted remark lies the undeniable need for amending the Charter by including clearer directions. Intergovernmental Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations resolve every year that defining these operations will amount to putting a strait-jacket around the evolutionary nature of peacekeeping, thus destroying its flexibility. While that may be true to a great extent, it is also true that without clear guidance, the soldiers in the fields suffer from doctrinal

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6. Charter of the United Nations, Article I, Paragraph I, cited in Indarjit Rikhye, *The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping*, (London, C. Hurst & Co Ltd, 1984), p. 3.
 7. "Wider Peacekeeping", *Army Field Manual: Operations other than War*, Vol. 2, HMSO, London, cited in David Ramsbotham, "The Changing Nature of Intervention: the Role of UN Peacekeeping", *Conflict Studies*, risct, London, August 1995, p.1.
 8. *Ibid.*
 9. *The Blue Helmet: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, (New York, DPI, UN, 1990), p. 5.

confusion and the UN loses credibility.¹⁰ Thus, the advantages of specifying the methods of peacekeeping operations by suitably amending the Chapters outweigh the disadvantages. The best would, of course, be if the operations can be stated clearly enough while retaining adequate flexibility at the same time.

2.2 Changes in the Nature of Conflict and Intervention

The erstwhile Foreign Minister of Canada and the President of the 7th UNGA, Lester Pearson, is generally credited with the evolution of the concept of peacekeeping after the Suez crisis in 1956. The concept that was put forward by Pearson was 'interpositional peacekeeping'. Dag Hammarskjöld further developed that concept into what popularly came to be known as 'traditional peacekeeping'. Most of the early peacekeeping missions have been based on the concept Hammarskjöld developed. According to that concept, the Secretary General, remaining responsible to the Security Council, would exercise command and control of all peacekeeping operations, troops for peacekeeping would be contributed voluntarily by the member states, and the operations would be financed by all the member states. The important criteria of traditional peacekeeping included the provisions that (a) operations could be initiated only with the consent of the belligerent parties, (b) peacekeepers must maintain strict neutrality, and (c) peacekeepers could use force only in self-defence. The main tasks of the peacekeepers were only to monitor and supervise cease-fire, assist in withdrawal of troops, and act as a buffer between the rival forces. Thus, the peacekeepers were also allowed to use only light

10. Tharoor, *op. cit.* p. 26.

armour for self-defence and non-threatening military skills to defuse tensions. Under that concept, it was accepted that peacekeeping was an interim arrangement, and not a final solution of the basic problems. Therefore, peacekeeping served mainly as a confidence building measure. No doubt, with those concepts of limited objectives, the success of peacekeeping also had to be limited.

Difficulties also arose with the basic understanding of 'peacekeeping'. In spite of several attempts, 'peacekeeping' has not been formally defined yet. Confusion arises with different definitions forwarded by different people or organizations. International Peace Academy (IPA) defined 'peacekeeping' as,

"...the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of third-party interventions, organized and directed internationally, using military, police and civilian personnel to restore peace."¹¹

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary General, defined peacekeeping as,

"Peacekeeping is the deployment of United Nations presence in the field hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities of both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."¹²

11. Cited in Rikhye, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

12. Muniruzzaman, (Colonel) [now Brigadier], "Second Generation Peacekeeping - New Factors in Peacekeeping Operations", Proceedings of a Seminar on *peacekeeping Operations*, held at the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Mirpur, on 7 January 1994, p. 1(48).

The IPA's understanding of peacekeeping places the responsibility of peacekeeping on a 'third party', to be organized and directed 'internationally', using multinational forces. It is, however, not clear as to what does this 'third party' mean, and who will direct it 'internationally'. Boutros-Ghali has been more specific in identifying the UN as the primary body to organize the forces, and execute the peace process. However, he sounds rather apologetic when he implies that UN peacekeeping cannot solve global security problems for sure, but can only increase the 'possibility' of preventing conflict and of making peace. Although it is not the official definition of the UN, Boutros-Ghali's definition can be taken as a rough guide for further development of the concept of peacekeeping. Many of the definitional dilemmas originate from the very understanding of the nature of conflicts and interventions. The UN Charter and the IPA's definitions presuppose conflicts occurring essentially between states. This realist view of international conflict could not provide an adequate mechanism for preventing many conflicts. In fact, the UN, its Charter, and its interpretations are the legacies of the Second World War and the Cold War that followed. During the Cold War, some conflicts were resolved or suppressed by the superpowers as seen through the partisan prism of the bipolar world order. At the same time, many conflicts could not be resolved due to lack of consensus of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. Being locked in Cold War structure, peace was, in a way, hostage to a game of veto.

In the post-Vietnam period, when the Cold War was at its peak, both the superpowers used to view the role of the United Nations in maintaining global peace with suspicion. Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign theme was that America, during the Carter era, had gone 'soft'. It was generally viewed in the USA that unchecked

Soviet initiatives had increased Soviet clientele in the Third World¹³, and America had to do something about it.¹⁴ Both the superpowers had a tendency to seek unilateral solution to solve world problems according to their own perceptions. This unilateralism had effectively replaced the UN concept of collective security. Because of the Red Army's remaining bogged down for too long in Afghanistan, and Soviet military assistance abroad was draining its resources, the USSR began to rely more on the UN in the management of world peace. At the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, Moscow called for a 'comprehensive system of international peace'. This was also strongly reiterated by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech at the 1988 General Assembly.¹⁵ Seeing such a change in Soviet attitude, after some of the disastrous consequences of its own interventions abroad, Washington cautiously began to rely more on collective security under UN auspices. This was underscored by Ronald Reagan, in a complete about-face to his earlier unilateral tone, when he said at the General Assembly in 1988 that, "the United Nations has the opportunity to live and breathe and work as never before."¹⁶ This also coincided with the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was no more perceived as a threat and a collegial spirit of maintaining international peace and security was beginning to emerge.

The end of the Cold War, however, solved only one problem, but gave rise to many in turn in the forms of rise of nationalism and many intra-state conflicts of ethno-religious nature. This was characterized by

13. Soviet or Soviet Union, evidently will mean, erstwhile Soviet or Soviet Union.

14. Norton, August R., and Thomas G. Weiss, "Superpower and Peace-keeper", *Survival*, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, May/June, 1990, p. 212.

15. *ibid.*, p. 213.

16. *ibid.*, p. 214.

"A post-ideological world stokes its frenzies in the flames of nationalism, ethnicity, and tribal triumphalism. Old injustices and older enmities are revived and intensified; history becomes a whip with which to flail those who are inclined to compromise. Few rules are observed in these wars, fewer still is the tenuous moments of peace that punctuate them. The techniques of a calmer era, peacekeeping included, seem inadequate to the moment."¹⁷

The problems of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era arose mainly with the understanding of the nature of conflict. Firstly, not all the warring parties are represented at the UN; therefore, they can neither seek intervention of the UN, nor can the UN intervene in their activities even if it wanted to. Secondly, many of the issues are 'internal affairs' of states in the strictest sense of the term. In reality, there may be wars where no clear borders can be identified, thus no cease-fire can be enforced. If the primary goal of the UN is to promote international security by preventing conflicts, then it is morally bound to resolve all conflicts, not only the inter-state ones. This is not only for humanitarian reasons, but also for the fact that many conflicts have a way of spilling over to other areas, creating global problems. Such a situation is exemplified in the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, UN's earlier sacrosanct concept of not interfering in the internal affairs of any state will have to undergo necessary modifications in order that the UN can intervene in any inter- and intra-state conflict. To do that, the UN has to disregard the third problem, that 'consent' of all the parties for the intervention of the UN may not always be available, especially when a stronger community, or a state, is in a clearly winning position.

17 Tharoor, *op. cit.*, p.22.

As mentioned earlier, peacekeeping started in 1948 and 1949 as observer missions with clear consent of all the parties, and with strict neutrality. But events like Israeli non-compliance of the UN mandate in the 1960s questioned the credibility of the UN, especially when the unresolved Middle East Problem resulted in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The instance of how a local dispute can turn into an all-out war ended the taciturnity of the superpowers,¹⁸ especially when the same war unfolded the possibilities of grave consequences on world economy. After a dormant period of UN's involvement in peacekeeping in the Cold War era, the superpowers found renewed interest in the mechanism of the UN. They also felt that the meaning of peacekeeping and the UN's capabilities have to be expanded if international peace was to be maintained. Such thoughts gave rise to the concept of peace enforcement. One extreme form of peace enforcement is found in the example of the 1991 Gulf War after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This was a true peace enforcement action for the first time. Another problem arises from the word 'neutral'. Should the UN remain neutral, so to speak, and watch events go by? Since the UN forces did take sides in the 1991 Gulf War and in Somalia, it should continue to do so when such an action is seen appropriate considering the circumstances.

The example of Korean War reveals the obvious weakness of traditional peacekeeping in solving international security problems. The war may have ended at the 38th parallel and peace sustained ever since, but the UN has not been able to remove the possibility of war altogether. Even after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the end of Cold War, and the end of Socialism, both North and South Korea remain on the verge of war even today. Therefore, it was generally

18. Muniruzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 1(49).

felt that to establish peace in the world, it is not good enough to maintain a semblance of peace by maintaining only a *status quo*. To maintain peace effectively, the UN will have to remove the causes of war. The generally accepted pluralist understanding of today is that conflict does not only occur between states, and that non-state actors can also be equally involved in international conflicts. It is also accepted that war does not only occur from power-political considerations, but environmental, economic and socio-cultural issues can also be the sources of conflict. It was, therefore, felt necessary to evolve a broader concept of peacekeeping that should include not only the resolution of the most obvious issues in conflict, but also addressing the humanitarian, environmental and social issues that go on to create conflict in the first place. Much of these emerging concepts were, indeed, recognized by the then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his position paper *An Agenda for Peace*, published in 1992, and presented on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the UN. He also reiterated these concepts in *Building Peace and Development* when he said,

“Today we have a deeper understanding of where the sources of trouble lie in our world. We now know that security involves far more than questions of land and weapons. We further realize that the lack of economic, social and political development is the underlying cause of war.”¹⁹

In the absence of clear guidelines in the Charter of the United Nations, peacekeeping activities today draw inspiration from two other documents also - *An Agenda for Peace* and *An Agenda for Development*. These two are, however, not UN's official documents. *An Agenda for Peace* does not include “a comprehensive overview

19 Boutros-Ghali (A), *op. cit.*, p. 279.

of the problems of international order in the post-Cold War world.”²⁰ Since its publication, it has received a positive, but limited response. Even Boutros-Ghali considered it a beginning rather than an end of a debate.²¹ The reasons for the limited response received by *An Agenda for Peace* will be discussed a little later in this paper. But first, let us examine the concepts of second-generation peacekeeping developed prior to the publication of Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace*, and how they differ from Boutros-Ghali’s understanding of peacekeeping. The roles and the functions of second-generation peacekeeping may differ greatly depending on the nature of conflict and circumstances. Considering the shortcomings of traditional peacekeeping, the UN Under-Secretary General of Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, who headed the Department of Peacekeeping earlier, identified seven distinct functions of peacekeeping.²²

* *Preventive Deployment*: This means deployment of UN troops, at the request of any one or both the parties, to an intermediate zone before a potentially volatile situation can break out into outright conflict. Obviously, for preventive deployment, it is necessary to identify correctly the potentially threatening situation. Preventive deployment serves not only as a confidence building measure, but can also deter any potential aggressor. The former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev first mooted the idea. The concept was first applied in Macedonia very successfully in the early 1990s through UNPREDEP.

• *Traditional Peacekeeping*: Emergence of second or third generation peacekeeping concepts does not mean that traditional

20. Roberts, Adams, “The United Nations and International Security”, *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 4.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Majid, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

peacekeeping need not be practised anymore. On the contrary, the concept is still operative, and in practice in many missions today including UN operations in Kashmir, Cyprus and Iraq-Kuwait border. Marrack Goulding considered traditional peacekeeping to be only observer missions.

* *Negotiated Settlement* : The concept of Negotiated Settlement evolved in the late 1980s.²³ Its basic aim is to implement a comprehensive settlement between the parties concerned through the process of negotiation. Negotiated Settlement involves not only military arrangement, but also addressing wide-ranging social, political and economic issues. Namibia was the first example of negotiated Settlement in which the UN forces, after a decade of negotiation, supervised a free and fair election, and helped in its transition from South African rule to independence. Some of the later examples include UN operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola and El Salvador.

- *Humanitarian Operations*: To mitigate human sufferings in any conflict, either civil or inter-state, humanitarian assistance is provided as a function of peacekeeping operations. This can be independent of, or in conjunction with the Red Cross or other non-state organizations. Humanitarian aid is provided not only for humanitarian reason alone, but also for the fact that lasting peace cannot be achieved without addressing the human problems. Thus, second generation peacekeeping considers Humanitarian Assistance an integral part of peacekeeping. Humanitarian aid was provided both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. Such aid is being provided in many of the on-going missions also. Such operations, no doubt, involves providing

23. Ramsbotham, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

humanitarian assistance in all its facets; but to do that efficiently and expeditiously, it is also necessary to integrate all the agencies under the banner of UN. Humanitarian operation, however, has its own problems in terms of maintaining neutrality. In certain circumstances it can run counter to the objectives of either one, or both the parties. For example, providing humanitarian aid to the Bosnian Muslims was clearly against the war objectives of the Bosnian Serbs.

* *Assistance to Failed States:* This requires UN personnel to intervene in a country in which law and order and government machinery have completely collapsed. Similar situation occurred in Somalia in the recent past; and the political authority with which to negotiate did not exist. Yet, the UN attempted to provide humanitarian aid, and undertook to bring about national reconciliation between the warring parties. The operation failed not only due to the total lack of consensus on the part of the parties concerned, but also that the UN forces were not ready to accept the risks involved. In general, assistance to failed states aims to put a troubled state to a running order by providing humanitarian aid, establishing minimum infrastructure required, bringing about national reconciliation, holding elections, etc. The UN operation in Congo during the Cold War was launched with similar objectives in mind.

* *Cease-fire Enforcement:* If any of the signatories violates a cease-fire agreement, the UN could intervene with a mandate to enforce peace by taking action against the violator. In such cases, the peacekeeping force would maintain neutrality, but would simply take action against anyone that violates the cease-fire.

* *Peace Enforcement*: This means that the UN forces maintain peace by taking action against the aggressor in a situation where no cease-fire agreement existed. In such cases, troops normally remain under one national command, and are authorized by the Security Council to use force to achieve a particular objective. In the 1991 Gulf War, the primary task of the Multinational Forces was only to evict Iraq out of Kuwait.

Having outlined Marrack Goulding's understanding of second generation peacekeeping, let us now go back to Boutros-Ghali's concept of peacekeeping, and examine how it may differ from that of Goulding. One can forward several reasons for the limited response generated by *An Agenda for Peace*. Firstly, Boutros-Ghali's formulation was a little futuristic in the sense that the world, especially the major powers, may not be ready for it yet. Since the recommendations of *An Agenda for Peace* have the implications of impingement on absolute sovereignty of states, many major powers may not be keen to accept those implications. Secondly, to implement those recommendations, the kind of organization the UN needs to have and the structural network that needs to be built around the world are not yet available. Foremost, it will need a thorough review of the Charter of the United Nations. In his position paper, Boutros-Ghali recognized most of the factors mentioned by Marrack Goulding, but he considered them under different perspectives. Like Goulding, he also emphasised the importance of using the regional organizations not only to cut cost, but also to control the conflicts effectively. Implicit in these measures are also the procedural methods of controlling violence, like arms control, banning certain weapons, etc. In *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali put forward four main methods of maintaining peace in the world - Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making, Peacekeeping and Post-

conflict Reconstruction. These concepts are explained in the following paragraphs:

* *Preventive Diplomacy*: In this concept, the former Secretary went beyond Goulding's preventive deployment. He reiterated that the goal of the UN should be to make peace peacefully. Thus, he considers preventive deployment applicable only when preventive diplomacy fails, or is likely to fail. Therefore, he put greater emphasis on preventive diplomacy. He also divided the range of peacekeeping operations into three broad categories - preventive diplomacy, peace making and peacekeeping.²⁴ Preventive diplomacy means diplomatic actions taken by the UN, any organization, or individuals, so commissioned by the Secretary General. Its purpose is to prevent an existing dispute from turning into outright conflict, or to limit its severity and scope if it does end up in a war. To achieve those objectives, preventive diplomacy may have several approaches. For preventive diplomacy to succeed, the first thing that it will need is confidence building. Confidence building measures (CBM) cannot solve a problem with certainty, but can only give peace a chance to establish itself peacefully. Again, for CBM to succeed, it will need a general confidence in the UN and its efforts in keeping peace. For that, the UN has to maintain moral neutrality, ensure justice and show frequent successes in its peace missions. CBMs will also need a balanced regional order, free flow of information, adherence to treaties by countries concerned, and effective regional arms control mechanism, etc.

24. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (B), *An Agenda for Peace* (Bengali Version), (Dhaka, UN Information Centre, 1993), p. 11.

Preventive diplomacy's success will largely depend on accurate and timely information to the UN about the nature of conflicts that may be brewing anywhere in the world. Accurate and timely availability of information will, however, need a comprehensive early warning system. Boutros-Ghali, therefore, envisioned a dense network of organizations - state, non-state and private - all around the world, providing continuous information to the UN. It may be quoted as an example that the United States did provide valuable information to the UN about the massacres in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Without those information, it would not have been possible to detect the burial sites of the genocide committed by the Bosnian Serbs. This example also shows that high-tech equipment, aircraft and satellites are needed for information gathering. Since such supply of information by a particular state will depend on the stand it takes in any conflict, it would be worthwhile to task a country that is neutral or is in favour of preventing conflict and has the necessary resources. The UN has, to a large extent, already built an information network concerning environmental hazards, natural disaster, nuclear accident, human exodus, epidemic, famine, etc. In March 1987, UN has created the Office for Research and Collection of Information (ORCI), whose main task is to provide early warning.²⁵

One of the components of preventive diplomacy is preventive deployment that was mentioned earlier. Normally, preventive deployment can be initiated only after the parties concerned make request to that effect. Naturally then, consent of both the parties is a desirable criterion; but the former Secretary General recommended that preventive deployment can be made even when one party

25. Renninger, John P., "Early Warning: What Role for the United Nations?", in John P. Renninger (ed), *The Future Role of the United Nations in an Interdependent World* (London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989), p. 210.

declines to offer consent. If so, it may be a sign of ulterior motive of that party; thus all the more reason for wanting to preserve peace by preventive deployment. In such cases, deployment will have to be on the side of the border of the party that offers consent. Preventive deployment may also need to create a demilitarized zone. In a sense, it is preventive demilitarization of a zone. No doubt, consent of both the parties is desirable, but in extraordinary circumstances, as is mentioned above, the Security Council may decide to create an enforced demilitarized zone on one side of the border.

- *Peace Making:* Peace making falls somewhere between preventive diplomacy and traditional peacekeeping. It aims at resolving disputes by bringing the parties to an agreement. Some of the tools available for peace making are re-negotiation, moderation or arbitration of disputes. If all efforts fail, peace enforcement may be necessary in special cases. Holding a successful election in Namibia, and enabling the country's transition to independence is a good example of peace making. For peace making, International Court of Justice may also play important roles in resolving disputes. Another component of peace making is to extend economic, humanitarian, and other structural development assistance. In this regard, the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations can, no doubt, play greater roles. In the post-Cold War period, political, military and economic sanctions have also become tools of either keeping peace, or preventing the spread of existing conflicts. As mentioned earlier, enforcement of peace as a last resort should not be ruled out. No doubt, such measures were taken successfully in a few instances, but the availability of a well trained, well equipped and a homogeneous body of troops cannot always be ensured. Besides, question of finance, delay in

decision making and unwillingness to risk one's own troops abroad in hazardous missions may become stumbling blocks. Therefore, it would be only appropriate to maintain UN's own enforcement units. Recently, the UN has, indeed, taken the decision, not to raise its own peacekeeping force, but UN's Standby Force, units of which will be located within the selected countries, and trained to a common standard. Bangladesh is one of the countries selected to keep a brigade on standby for UN peacekeeping duties.

* *Peacekeeping*: Peacekeeping, in this context, refers to traditional peacekeeping, which was discussed earlier in detail. Traditional peacekeeping takes place only after a conflict breaks out, and both the parties agree to UN's intervention.

• *Post-conflict Reconstruction*: Peace being an interim arrangement, its results can often be transitory. Without establishing minimum required infrastructure and socio-political order, and without the economic machinery being on sound footing, the situation can quickly relapse into chaos. United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-93 had the aim of establishing peace by holding a free and fair election, but the mandate did not address any other problem of the country.²⁶ No wonder, peace is not yet established there. To establish a more resilient peace, it is necessary to adopt the strategy of post-conflict reconstruction. This not only addresses infrastructure building, establishing socio-political order and economic reconstruction, but also issues like disarmament, demining, rehabilitation of refugees, training of the security forces and the administrative staff, etc.²⁷ For an effective

26. Ramsbotham, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

27. Boutros-Ghali (B), *op. cit.*, p. 31.

reconstruction programme, the UN needs to involve not only the concerned governments, but also other UN agencies, the World Bank, IMF, donor countries, any other organization willing to fund any particular project, NGOs and the private sector.²⁸ To coordinate all these activities, the UN will probably need a separate organization within itself.

III. PEACEKEEPING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

3.1 Conceptual Aspects

So far, the paper dealt with the way peacekeeping, its concepts and practice, have been evolving in the last few decades. In sum, peacekeeping has come a long way since the days of cease-fire monitoring missions. Peacekeeping missions have not only saved lives and made the world a little safer place to live in, but they have also spurred development in socio-economic terms. This was reiterated by Boutros-Ghali when he underlined,

“Cease-fires, typically beginning as rather tenuous agreements held together by the courage and dedication of relatively few United Nations personnel on the ground, have made possible the rise of stronger, more responsive institutions of governance, greater respect for human rights, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of devastated countries. In short, peace-keeping operations have made possible the beginnings of development.”²⁹

28. Ramsbotham, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

9. Boutros-Ghali (A), *op. cit.*, p. 160.

It is true that the UN did not succeed in many of the peacekeeping undertakings, but the contribution it has already made is undeniable. It is also undeniable that the UN has a long way to go in maintaining international security as envisaged in its Charter. The obvious question that may arise at this moment is to what direction peacekeeping may take in the coming century, and what preparations we might need to take to face the challenges of the future. Challenges may not necessarily appear anew, because there are already problems even today that the UN needs to address. Problems are perceived both at the highest level, for which the UN itself needs to take measures of reform; and at the field level, the existing or projected problems must be addressed not only for more effective peacekeeping operations, but also for resolving as many international disputes as possible. However, the paper will not address the issues related to reform and reorganization of the UN, unless it directly relates to operations in the field. The first question that may be posed is what is the future of peacekeeping in the coming years.

Peacekeeping has, in the past, undergone several ups and downs; and in the future also such hiccups may appear. However, some of the recent indications perturb the conscience of many. Because of steep rise in the cost of peacekeeping in 1993 and 1994, there is a general tendency of the major powers now to limit the involvement of the UN in peacekeeping. That tendency also speaks in favour of reverting back to traditional peacekeeping - somewhat of a 'back to basics' approach. This is not a cost cutting formula alone, but also that the UN organization is not yet capable of handling many missions simultaneously. Lack of success in many missions bears witness to that. Therefore, the UN will need to reorganize itself if it has to undertake in future many diverse missions simultaneously.

The UN has already taken some actions in reorganizing itself, and some more changes are in the offing. For example, it has created a full-time Situation Centre, an Office for Research and Collection of Information, new units for planning, training and logistics and DPKO has been merged with the Department of Administration and Management. Time will tell how this arrangement works out. One thing can be said that the need for merging of DPKO with the Department of Administration and Logistics has been long felt. It is hoped that there will no more be duplication of command arrangement that dogged peacekeeping operations for long. Military operations need sound planning and sound advice by the staff. Therefore, improvement could be made by re-vitalizing the Military Staff Committee and by re-activating the post of Military Advisor to the Secretary.

Shashi Tharoor likens the present system of peacekeeping undertakings to 'fire-fighting' and the SC to an alderman. Under that situation, the alderman reacts after fire has broken out, first by agreeing that fire needs to be put out, then calling the fire brigade, finding a fire chief, finding the right fire-fighters, deciding on the task, finding the right length of fire hose, finding water, etc.³⁰ What that means is that there is a lot of *ad-hocism* in the present system that delay intervention, lessen the effectiveness of ultimate UN efforts, and increase cost in the end. To make the system more responsive, it is necessary to have better preparedness. As mentioned earlier, the UN has taken a decision to keep selected national units as UN's Standby Force. This is at least a step towards a better direction, and can be considered a move in the evolutionary path of peacekeeping. These forces, no doubt, can be positioned in the

30. Tharoor, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

troubled spots quickly, but how their training, procedures and equipment can be standardized for combined or joint operations is a different matter. Therefore, it would be even better if the UN could raise its own forces of mixed nationalities and station them in selected countries. Such forces could then be trained to a uniform standard with similar procedures and equipment.

As mentioned earlier, one other barrier to expanding the functions of the UN in peacekeeping has been the parochial national interest of many countries. Their response to peacekeeping has been guided by the perception of their national interest. No one denies that national interest is a serious consideration for all the countries, but what is 'national interest' in a wider sense in today's interdependent world must be understood with its full importance. They also contend that the UN should not be involved in every trouble spot, arguing that places like Western Sahara are of little interest to most of the international community. In spite of such attitudes, many peacekeeping missions have been undertaken in remote areas. This was possible by the emergence of information technology. Massacres in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Burundi were shown in CNN in full view. Under such circumstances, it is a moral affront to sit idly by, and do nothing on the plea of national interest. But peacekeeping is not only for humanitarian reasons, but also for the fact that what happens in a remote corner of the world may affect everyone. If so, we should be our "brothers' keepers" for our own good. Because, "No matter how distant they may be, migrants fleeing conflict and social chaos will eventually reach the shores of the rich in numbers too large to be easily absorbed."³¹ In

31. Sutterlin, James S, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security*, (London, Praeger, 1995), P. 139

this interdependent world, societies are interlinked and need common efforts to solve their problems together.

3.2 Finance

Financing UN peacekeeping operations has been projected by many as a serious problem in deciding the number of missions UN should undertake. This means, limiting the scope of each mandate, whether a more permanent peace is achieved or not. They argue that peace cannot be achieved where there is no peace to keep, or the countries concerned do not want peace. Such apologetic argument, as discussed earlier, does not hold much water, because under such a condition, it is all the more reason for the rest of the world to intervene and maintain world peace. In reality, finance is not a serious problem, but an excuse. The problem of finance, as projected by many, is only in their perception and in their lack of 'will to act'. Whatever the problems, they are mainly created. First main problem arises with the non-payment of dues. There was a time when some countries were as much as 8 years behind in payment. Two reasons can be identified for that. Firstly, during the Cold War era, UN budget was, in a way, captive of superpowers rivalry and their perceived political exigencies. Every major power wanted to see a controlling interest in its contribution; and that is true even today. Even though a collegial spirit in UN's peacekeeping operations prevailed since 1988, the financial problem continued to dog the UN. As of December 1995, the member states owed the UN \$ 1.9 billion on account of peacekeeping alone.³² The second reason for UN's financial crisis is due to increasing UN commitment in peacekeeping since 1988. Thus, the cost of peacekeeping in 1995

32. Majid, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

alone was about \$ 3 billion. Because of reduced involvement of the UN in peacekeeping undertaking since 1996, the cost of peacekeeping has come down to \$ 1.5 billion in 1996. In spite of the reduction in annual expense, the outstanding debt to the UN was \$ 1.8 till June 1996,³³ and \$ 1.65 million as of 30 April 1997.³⁴

Increased mission commitment is, no doubt, considered an increased burden for the Permanent Five, and they have generally been wary of committing to peacekeeping operations. There was a time when the UN was almost bankrupt, and on the verge of closing down many on-going missions due to lack of fund. Thus, there has also been apprehension as to the future of peacekeeping itself. This concern has led to many debates within and outside the UN on how to raise fund, reduce UN peacekeeping commitment and cut cost. Costs can be cut by reducing mismanagement and by nipping the problems in the buds. In most recent peacekeeping missions, mismanagement of resources has been occurring rampantly.³⁵ Mismanagement occurs not only for the shortage of field staff in most missions, but also for the fact that most administrative personnel in logistic planning have very little understanding of the military requirement. At the same time, it is also true that most missions had to be launched in a hurry, with inadequate time available for thorough planning and logistic arrangement. Events can sometimes unfold in unpredictable manners; and under those

33. Special UN Report, DPI/1634/Rev-2, March 1996.

34. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note", *op. cit.*, & AFD.

35. Islam, Shafiu (Major), et al, "Problems of Peacekeeping by the United Nations", unpublished research paper, DSCSC, Mirpur, Dhaka, p. 10, and "Strategic Policy Issues", *Strategic Survey*, Brassey's for the IISS, UK, 1992-93, pp. 36-37.

circumstances, tactical exigencies overshadow the niceties of management principles.

One way to reduce cost is to act early, for which the concepts of preventive diplomacy, peace making, peace enforcement, etc., are considered. It is true that too early a UN action can sometimes aggravate the situation; but most often, it can cost less in the long run. For example, reluctance to act early in Rwanda, for which adequate early warning was given, ultimately increased the mission cost fivefold according to one estimate.³⁶ To act early, the UN would need comprehensive early warning and accurate intelligence information, not to mention the will to act by the major powers. Often, it has been seen that missions drag on; and by the time the missions are closed, the expenses far exceed the initial estimates. To avoid that, some people prefer to include a 'Sunset Clause', or a benchmark, in the mandate.³⁷ What this means is that the mandates must specify clear termination dates and clear objectives of what are to be achieved at the end of the missions. This method may, however, help in some cases, but it must be remembered that events in many instances cannot be foreseen. Therefore, closing a mission at a pre-determined date may not serve the true purpose of maintaining international peace. Another way of cutting cost is to use the regional organization like The EU, ASEAN, etc. for maintaining regional peace. The NATO, OAS, etc., have already played important roles in regional disputes. However, regional organizations may have interest in such disputes; therefore, before

36. Barkhalter, Holly, "US might have Avoided Rwanda Tragedy", *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 August 1994, cited in Richard Connought, "Wider Peacekeeping - How Wide the Mark?", *British Army Review*, No. 11, December 1995.

37. Norton and Weiss, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

requesting regional organizations, the UN has to ensure their neutrality.

Is finance really a problem? If cost-cutting measures are taken and imaginative methods of raising fund are adopted, fund should not pose a serious problem. Boutros-Ghali has suggested to create a \$50 million reserve fund for peacekeeping, another \$50 million for humanitarian fund, and to raise \$1 billion from a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions from member states, and commercially from private sector and individuals.³⁸ Fund can also be raised by imposing international tax on exports of states and on profits of multinational companies. However, the idea of raising fund commercially has attracted severe criticism from mainly the Western developed countries. They argue that if the UN begins to raise money commercially and privately, it may be independent enough to start behaving like a World Government. In turn, that may erode the level of sovereignty of the member states, and they may lose some of their power that they intend to exercise in international arena. Obviously, the Western world may not be willing for that yet; but it is a matter of time before those countries will, hopefully, begin to abandon their power political considerations and begin to accept such concepts. It may be noted that, Ted Turner of CNN has already donated \$ 1 billion to the UN recently as a private contribution, and many may follow his footstep. Another way to raise fund is to ask the developed nations to pay for peacekeeping more than their assessed scale of contribution for regular funds, as is done by the Permanent Five.³⁹ The whole scale may even be reassessed considering the emergence of many newly

38. Boutros-Ghali (B), *op. cit.*, pp. 39-42.

39. Majid, *op. cit.*, p.15.

industrialized countries. Finally, with the possible induction of Germany and Japan in the Security Council, they may be willing to pay a higher share than what they pay now. Professor John Tobin has suggested imposition of a fee on speculative transactions in currency market as a means of raising fund for the UN.⁴⁰ UNDP has proposed a '20-20 compact', in which developing countries pay 20% of their budgets and industrialized countries pay 20% of their aid to 'human priority expenditure' for achieving sustained human security development.⁴¹

Considering the contribution peacekeeping has already made to world peace, it is apparent that, instead of being a problem, contributing to peacekeeping is sufficiently rewarding. Where the world's per capita arms expenditure is about \$150, per capita expenditure on peacekeeping is only \$2⁴². In spite of an increase in the number of conflicts in the post-Cold War period, there has been a real reduction in defence expenditure of many developed and developing countries. According to UN statistics, military expenditure of developed countries reduced 23%, from \$ 850 billion in 1987 to approximately \$ 649 billion in 1994. During the same period, defence expenditure of poorer developing countries declined from \$ 149 billion to \$ 118 billion, a fall of 19%⁴³. These indicate to is that peace efforts have paid rich dividend in maintaining international peace and security in the wider sense. Therefore, the countries that benefited by a better international environment, as evident in their lower defence budget, could make part of their

40. Sutterlin, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

41. UNDP, *The Human Development Report*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 32-41, cited in *ibid.*

42. Majid. *op. cit.*, p. 15.

43. Sutterlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136.

savings available to further strengthen UN's peacekeeping efforts. Peacekeeping plays its positive role in a cyclic manner. As mentioned earlier, it not only promotes security, but also that security encourages development; and that in turn improves the security environment. Shashi Tharoor has put it succinctly, "If peacekeeping is to have a future, governments will have to overcome the syndrome under which legislators are always ready to pay for war, but not for peace."⁴⁴ Again, "It would be an enduring tragedy if this new era were characterized by retrogression into chaos because of a failure to perceive that the well-being of societies is interlinked and demands common efforts for international security and human progress. It is time to ensure that resources are made available in sufficient measure to afford the United Nations the credibility it must have if it is to be a major and effective force for keeping peace in the world."⁴⁵

3.3 The Way Out

If peacekeeping is largely restricted due to imagination and the will to undertake necessary measures only limit lack of fund, then raising necessary fund. It is hoped that the future generations will find the means and their commitment to find ways of raising necessary fund to save the humanity from the 'scourge of war', which was the main commitment of the UN. With the changing nature of conflicts and international politics, the concept of peacekeeping will also evolve into a more comprehensive system of peace making. Instead of going 'back to basics', the UN will have to go beyond traditional peacekeeping and expand its role in undertaking many multidimensional peacekeeping in the future, as proposed by

44. Tharoor, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

45. Sutterlin, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

Boutros-Ghali. Many mandates may also be integrated into one mission. While traditional peacekeeping will remain a valid concept applicable in suitable situations, other means of building peace - preventive diplomacy, peace making, peace enforcement, and post-conflict reconstruction - will have to be increasingly undertaken not only independently, but also simultaneously. This takes into the concept that only by keeping the protagonists apart and just by solving territorial disputes, permanent peace cannot be established.

To bring about lasting peace, preventive diplomacy will have to play a greater role, but for that sufficient early warning will be necessary. Therefore, the UN will have to expand its existing network in order to include information on all aspects of possible conflicts. For information gathering, the twenty-first century will see greater use of hi-tech equipment. High technology not only provides early warning, but can also assist the peacekeeping forces on the ground for the successful conclusion of missions. Finally, the use of hi-tech equipment reduces cost. One point must be made about the use of hi-tech equipment that only a handful of countries possess such capability, and they may use or misuse the information gained to further their parochial national interest. Therefore, the UN will have to ensure neutrality either by building its own capabilities, or by distributing tasks widely. When preventive diplomacy fails, peace-making measures, which include holding free and fair elections, and solving the basic problems of territorial, environmental, legal, political disputes, etc., will have to be undertaken. Even if peace making is successful, peace can be transitory. Without establishing a sound socio-economic order and infrastructure, countries can quickly relapse into a state of war. Therefore, most UN missions will have to undertake measures of post-conflict reconstruction for enabling the countries to manage

their newly acquired peace, harmony and development on their own. To achieve that, humanitarian assistance is also extended during all those stages of peacekeeping.

Great result is also achieved by means of arms control and by using the services of the regional organizations, as was done in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina by EU and NATO. All these have been possible, so far, only because of the collegial spirit of maintaining global peace with the concept of collective security that is re-established after the end of the Cold War. In spite of those developments, many problems still remain. One of the problems is national will. Major powers still see conflict resolution in the light of their national interest. For example, there was a prolonged period of inaction in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. In other words, the requirement of unanimity of opinions of the Permanent Five is often the cause of inaction. Secondly, no uniform standard of application of UN forces has yet been evolved. For example, while sanctions may be imposed against Iraq and North Korea, nothing can be done about any conflict in more powerful and favourite countries. In the same vein, sanctions may be imposed against North Korea and India or any other state for explosion of nuclear devices, but nothing can be done about Israel. Therefore, instead of the requirement of unanimity of the Permanent Five, there could be a system of taking action on two-third-majority vote in the Security Council. The size of the SC may even be expanded to include more than 10 members. Finally, it may be pertinent to mention the remark of Shashi Tharoor, "The UN can only be as good as it is allowed to be;"⁴⁶ and in the coming century, people must make it more effective for the sake of humanity. In that likely direction, the UN will continue to involve itself in ever expanding array of missions of multidimensional

46. Tharoor, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

nature, often mixing, civilian tasks with military functions. Those may include, not only holding elections and post-conflict reconstruction, but also tasks like, policing the local police or the military, protect ethnic minorities, upholding human rights standard, overseeing land reform, etc.

IV. BANGLADESH IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

4.1 Background

Bangladesh is one of the few countries of the world that contributes troops to UN peacekeeping operations regularly now. It was only in 1988 that she sent her troops abroad in United Nations Iraq Iran Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) for the first time following the long drawn war between those countries.⁴⁷ When the offer came from the UN, it was considered a question of great honour for Bangladesh. The occasion of the departure of our first contingent was celebrated with fanfare. There was a farewell at the airport, and the event was given extensive coverage in national media. Since then, Bangladesh has participated in most UN missions, including observer missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, fighting a conventional war in peace enforcement, and other second-generation peacekeeping assignments. Contributing more than 2000 military personnel at any given time, Bangladesh had been the largest troop-contributing country for UN peacekeeping operations for several years. Now that the total UN commitment for peacekeeping has reduced in the last couple of years, Bangladesh's

47. Rahman, Habibur (Lieutenant Colonel), "Overseas Employment of Army Contingents: Prospects and Implications", *Mirpur Papers*, DSCSC, Mirpur, Dhaka, Issue NO. 1, 1993, p. 45.

participation has also reduced. Now, Bangladesh has 969 personnel serving in nine out of the 18 on-going peacekeeping missions as of 1 December 1997 (Table-2).⁴⁸ With Poland and Russia maintaining a little more 1000 troops each, Bangladesh is the third largest troop-contributing country now. Nevertheless, it is hoped that she will continue to maintain a high profile in global peacekeeping; and indications are such that Bangladesh will be involved in UN peacekeeping operations and training more than ever before. In this part of the paper, an attempt will be made to discuss the prospects, implications and problems of Bangladesh's role in peacekeeping. Instead of describing every mission, one of the missions that Bangladesh participated in will be taken up as a case study in the last part of the paper.

4.2 Peacekeeping Operations and Bangladesh

UNIIMOG being the first such peacekeeping mission for Bangladesh, there was an element of concern among the military personnel, because Bangladesh had no experience in such undertakings. But fortunately, Bangladesh's performance in the very first mission was a great success. This was highlighted by the appointment of one Bangladeshi brigadier, first as the Assistant Chief Military Observer (ACMO), and later as the Chief Military Observer (CMO) in the same mission. As a result of the UN recognition received, Bangladeshi troops gained a lot of self-confidence; and Bangladesh was next offered to participate in United Nation's Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. This was a new kind of mission. It was the first time in UN's history that peace building was incorporated along with traditional

48. Source: Army Headquarters.

peacekeeping.⁴⁹ It was also the first time when both civilian and military personnel, forming till then the largest single UN mission, were engaged for one purpose - Namibia's transition to independence from South African domination. Bangladesh's participation in that mission also was once again an example of high standard of military-diplomatic skill, leadership, dedication and discipline. It may be mentioned that UNIIMOG and UNTAG are the only two missions that achieved the UN mandates fully and within the stipulated time; and in both the missions, Bangladesh had not only a strong participation in UNTAG, but also the distinction of having the mission commander of UNIIMOG in the person of a Bangladeshi officer.

Since 1988, Bangladesh has participated in most UN missions. This was possible because of Bangladesh Government's policy of active participation in the global peace process. As a result of the Government's positive attitude towards peacekeeping and the commendable performance of the Bangladeshi troops, more number of offers began to be received by Bangladesh since then. Starting with the UNIIMOG in 1988, until December 1997, Bangladesh has participated in a total of 18 missions, of which, 9 are still in progress.⁵⁰ The list of assignments completed by Bangladesh is given in Table-3. It is reported that Bangladesh may also be offered to send an Engineer Company of the strength of 70 personnel in MINURSO in the near future. The proposal is now at the stage of negotiation.⁵¹ Recently, the UN has taken the decision to create a Standby Force, components of which will remain with the national

49. Mehbub, Shafi M.(Colonel), "The Bangladesh Military Contingent in the UNTAG: A Post-mission Assessment", *Mirpur Papers*, DSCSC, Mirpur, Dhaka, Issue No. 1, 1993, p. 17.

50. Source: Army HQs.

51. *ibid.*

Table 2 : Bangladesh's On-going Peacekeeping Operations

Serial No	Name Of Missions	Type Of Missions	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	UNIKOM	Observer	5	-	-	5
		Mechanical Contingent	767	-	-	767
		BANAIR	-	-	35	35
		UNGCI (Guard)	14	3	3	20
2	MINURSO	Observer	6	-	-	6
3	UNTAES	Observer	9	-	-	9
4	UNOMIL	Observer	1	-	-	1
5	UNOMIG	Observer	6	2	2	10
6	UNMOT	Observer	5	1	1	7
7	UNAVEM	Observer	6	2	2	10
		Professional Personnel	3	-	-	3
		BEC-2 (Engr Coy)	90	-	-	90
8	UNSMIA	Staff	2	-	-	2
9	UNPREDEP	Observer	-	-	1	1
Total			916	9	44	969

Data as of December 1, 1997.

Source: AFD and the Services Hubs

Table-3 : Assignments Completed by Bangladesh

SL. NO	NAME OF MISSIONS	OBSERVERS	HQ STAFF	AR-MY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
1.	UNIIMOG (Iraq)	31	-	-	-	-	31
2.	UNTAG (Namibia)	25	-	-	-	-	25
3.	UNTAC (Cambodia)	31	7	965	-	-	1003
4.	UNOSOM I (Somalia)	5	-	-	-	-	5
5.	UNOMUR (Uganda/Rwanda)	20	-	-	7	-	27
6.	UNOSOM II (Somalia)	-	21	1946	-	2	1969
7.	ONUMOZ (Mozambique)	56	84	2328	14	39	2521
8.	UNAMIR (Rwanda)	107	29	854	7	15	1012
9.	UNMIH/MNF (Haiti)	-	39	1901	51	52	2043
10.	UNIKOM (Kuwait)	93	-	3116	3	67	3279
11.	MINURSO (W. Sahara)	35	-	-	-	-	35
12.	UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia)	148	13	1239	12	25	1437
13.	UNOMIL (Liberia)	42	-	87	18	21	168
14.	UNOMIG (Georgia)	33	-	-	6	5	44
15.	UNMOT (Tajikistan)	28	-	-	2	2	32
16.	UNAVEM III (Angola)	30	22	413	7	6	478
17.	(Croatia/Bosnia)	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total		684	215	12,849	128	234	14110

Source: Armed Forces Division (AFD), as of November 1, 1997.

Note: This Table indicates the number of personnel completed their tenures in these missions. Since Bangladesh is still participating in some of these missions, the total number of missions Bangladesh took part in, will not add up accurately.

governments, ready for immediate deployment on UN mission. Being selected as a suitably country, Bangladesh has been offered to keep one brigade on standby. This brigade is likely to comprise 4507 army, 700 navy and 163 air force personnel. The draft contract is now under scrutiny, and it is hoped that it will be signed soon. Until December 1997, including those who are still on assignments, a total of 15079 armed forces personnel participated in UN missions, of which 14664, 137 and 278 personnel belong respectively to the army, navy and the air force. Of this total number, 969 personnel are still engaged in peacekeeping missions. Troops are normally rotated after every year.

In all those missions, the performance and conduct of the Bangladeshi peacekeepers have been eloquently lauded, once even personally by the former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and recently by Kofi Anan.⁵² As a recognition of excellence of their performances, many Bangladeshi personnel received UN medals of honour and high appointments in many missions. One Bangladeshi General was the Force Commander in ONUMOZ (*Operation Nations Unies en Mozambique*, or UN Operation in Mozambique). The fact that Bangladesh was offered the appointment of a Force Commander (FC) in a very important mission was once again an honour for the country as a whole. Several other officers held the appointments of Chief Military Observers (CMO) and Chief Military Liaison Officer (CMLO) also. Other notable appointments held by Bangladeshi officers in other UN missions are Deputy Force Commander (DFC), Chief of Staff (COS), Regional Commander (RC), Chief Operations officer (COO), etc. (Table-4). However, our participation in those missions did not always have happy endings. Many of those missions had many inherent risks. So far, 48 personnel died and 60 were

52. *The Independent*, December 4, 1997, p. 1.

injured in maintaining global peace.⁵³ Seeing the indiscriminate killings of Belgian peacekeepers, our peacekeeping mission in Rwanda had to be withdrawn in April 1994 to reduce the risk.⁵⁴

Table 4. Important Appointments Held by Bangladeshi Officers Until December 1997

SL. NO.	MISSION	APPOINTMENT	RANK OF THE OFFICER HOLDING THE APPOINTMENT
1.	UNIIMOG	ACMO & CMO	Brigadier
2.	UNIIMOG	DCMO	Lieutenant Colonel
3.	UNTAC	CLO	Colonel
4.	UNTAC (UNMLT)	CLMO	Colonel
5.	ONUMOG	FC	Major General
6.	ONUMOG	DFC & FC	Colonel
7.	ONUMOG	RCs	2 Colonels
8.	UNOMIL	ACMO	Brigadier
9.	UNAMIR	COO	Colonel
10.	UNOMUR	ACMO	Colonel
11.	UNOMIG	DCMO	Colonel
12.	UNPROFOR	CMLO	Colonel
13.	UNPROFOR	COS	Colonel
14.	UNOMIG	CMO	Major General
15.	UNPREDEP	CMO	Colonel
16.	UNIKOM	DFC	Brigadier
17.	UNOMIL	COO	Colonel
18.	UNMIH	DFC	Colonel

Source: Armed Forces Division

53. Source: Armed Forces Division.

54. Ahmed, Mueen Uddin (Brigadier), "United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda", Unpublished paper, Army HQs, Dhaka, p. 9.

Bangladesh is one of the few countries of the world that has recognized the Charter of the United Nations in the Article 25 of her Constitution. Thus, Bangladesh participation in UN missions is based on firm legal framework, but not quite on our own conceptual and doctrinal foundation. The present system of our participation is that the UN approaches the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) first when it makes an offer for Bangladesh's participation in any mission. The subject is then discussed with the ministers concerned and the Armed Forces Division (AFD), and the final commitment is given after the approval of the Government. The MOFA looks after the politico-diplomatic aspects of a mission, and the Foreign Secretary does all the coordination.⁵⁵ Once a mission is approved, it is intimated by the MOFA to the AFD; which in turn, coordinates with the Services. The Services then take individual actions in terms of training, logistics, force composition, despatch, withdrawal, etc. Of course, in each phase, the cases are processed through the AFD, MOFA, MOD, etc., as applicable. The Government gives the initial approval, orders withdrawal when applicable, and gives guidance in crisis management. Once a mission is established, the UN can communicate directly with the AFD through our permanent representative at the UN.

Under this arrangement, it does appear that some of the actions are disparate, and the whole process is not adequately streamlined. The forces that proceed for missions, neither receive any briefing from the MOFA, nor any guideline given from the Government. Once approved, the missions are treated as purely military affairs. After deployment, the forces are rendered completely under the command of the UN unless any expected activity of the unit, or any directive of the Force Commander, run contrary to the principles of

55. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

foreign policy of Bangladesh. Judgement in such matters is left to the Contingent Commander, the Services HQs, and the AFD. The MOFA gets involved only if approached by the AFD, or intimated through the Permanent Representative's office. Participation of police and civilian personnel, if any, is processed through the respective ministries. Such arrangement, however, has not created any serious difficulty yet, but many questions remain unanswered nonetheless.

First question is: Who is in charge? The MOFA does the inter-ministerial coordination, and primary correspondence with the UN; and the AFD coordinates the rest of the matter. The problem is that the AFD is not under any ministry in reality, because there is a clear division of functions between the AFD and the MOD, and the AFD comes directly under the Prime Minister. The question that may be asked is whether peacekeeping operations should be brought under one single ministry, either the MOFA or the MOD, thus bringing the affair fully under civilian control. What may again be examined in this regard is whether peacekeeping is mainly military affair with some political content, or is it mainly a diplomatic affair with some military element in it. Or in other words, which element should get the priority - the politico-diplomatic aspect or the military one? The emerging concepts of peacekeeping are definitely less militaristic and more diplomatic. Instead of leaving the military forces to their own devices, there could be a detailed government policy and guideline in the form of a doctrine, starting with the Article 25 of the Constitution, recent developments in UN's peacekeeping concepts, policies of Bangladesh, etc. Once such a document is evolved, the military can go on to formulate its own procedures. Since the number of personnel that proceed on peacekeeping duties from the Navy and the BAF are very few, there is not much problem; but

some problems are seen within the AFD and the Army HQs. There is no dedicated office that look after peacekeeping affairs. Certain officers of the Operations Directorates of those organizations coordinate peacekeeping affairs in addition to their primary duties. In other words, peacekeeping activities do not receive the importance it deserves. Considering the increasing involvement of Bangladesh, independent cells could be created both at the AFD and at the Services Headquarters. At the apex, the functions of peacekeeping could also be centralized under the MOFA.

4.3. Factors Influencing Bangladesh's Participation in UN Peacekeeping

Factors influencing increased participation of Bangladesh are many. Firstly, praiseworthy performance of our forces has received wide publicity in the UN circle. Bangladesh is now considered a highly suitable country for UN peacekeeping. Few factors are noteworthy. Bangladeshi military personnel have been found, in comparison to even many Western forces, highly disciplined. Unlike the forces of a few other countries, Bangladeshi forces do not involve in gainful private transactions and internal affairs of the host countries. Bangladeshi forces, specially the officers, have the advantage of knowing English quite well. Thus, they can communicate with most people of many countries. Bangladesh being a Third World country also has its advantage - the personnel do not have a big power syndrome. Thus, they lack the arrogance that usually run contrary to peacekeeping objectives. Secondly, most officers of Bangladesh forces are well trained on peacekeeping. It may be mentioned that the Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC) is perhaps the first of the staff colleges of the world that incorporated the study of peacekeeping in its syllabus in the early 1980s. Later, many other staff colleges borrowed ideas

from this module of the DSCSC for implementing in their staff colleges. However, it must be pointed out that the training DSCSC provides is rather rudimentary and not comprehensive. Yet, the forces have been performing well, mainly due to their high level of dedication, hard work, innovative arrangements in local exigencies. Considering the direction of future peacekeeping concepts, and complexities that may be involved, such training may not be adequate. Some even suggest providing training to the peacekeepers in an institution dedicated for peacekeeping and peacekeeping research. In January 1998, an international seminar was held in Dhaka on this issue, and it was recommended that such a training institution may be set up in Bangladesh.

Presently, if time permits, the Bangladesh Army provides three-week training for all the officers proceeding on peacekeeping missions. The training includes lessons on handling of computers and motor driving as per the requirement of the UN. Training on computer is also given to the clerical staff. However, the scope of this training could be expanded further. For example, Austria and a few other countries have separate institutions for training the peacekeepers. The fact that most of our enlisted personnel do not know English as well as the officers has its own advantage also. Not knowing good English, the soldiers do not feel encouraged to interact with the locals, thus many possible untoward incidents are avoided. Unlike troops of many other countries, Bangladeshi troops are also kept under strict regulation not to fraternize with the locals for the same purpose. The third factor that influence increased participation of Bangladeshi troops is the religion. Most of our soldiers being Muslims, Bangladesh forces are acceptable to all the Muslim countries of the world. Fourthly, Bangladesh's neutral posture in the global politics is also a contributing factor. Fifth

factor arises out of our participation in the 1991 Gulf War. The decision to send troops in Saudi Arabia was perhaps a bold stroke of foreign policy that has paid many dividends, although some people allege that it was done in contravention to the Constitution.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, it underscored Bangladesh's commitment to preserve world peace. Having participated in the Gulf War, Bangladesh has also earned a few good friends who lobby for Bangladesh's participation in peacekeeping.

The sixth factor is our national commitment to maintain peace even if that involves risk. In comparison, many Western countries are not keen to send soldiers in high-risk missions because of their domestic political compulsions. Seventh, in most missions, the Bangladeshi troops went out of their way to help the locals in terms of sharing UN ration, extending medical facilities, solving local problems, etc. while remaining above any question of misdemeanour. In all the missions, the Bangladeshi soldiers have thus been able to earn the goodwill of all the locals. The eighth factor is the internal pressure from within the military. Having started UN missions in 1988, there is a constant aspiration among the soldiers to go for UN mission because of higher pecuniary benefits. This has played a strong role in military's willingness to commit more troops. Finally, a major factor that influenced in increasing Bangladeshi participation is the appointment of a military representative, of the rank of a colonel, at the UN. Normally, there are strong lobbies at the UN by many countries for participating in UN missions. For examples, having strong lobbies at the UN, Ghana could send, at one time, about 50% of its total army; and Canada

56. Article 63 of the Constitution of the People Republic of Bangladesh states that "War shall not be declared and the Republic shall not participate in any war except with the assent of Parliament".

could participate in many UN missions. Some European countries even keep units on high alert to avail UN missions quickly.

Because of all those factors, the demand for Bangladeshi troops for peacekeeping increased to the level that the Government even had to decline a few missions on several occasions. In the early part of 1994, Bangladesh had cancelled one of its commitments, and did not allow subsequent deployment of one of our battalions due to adverse public reaction arising out of the deaths of several soldiers in that mission.⁵⁷ The general opinion now is that certain level of risk has to be accepted in any peacekeeping. And because of the advantages in participating in UN peacekeeping, Bangladesh should participate in all the missions that she can avail. For that, she should maintain a strong lobby not only through the military representative at the UN, but also through all other diplomatic channels. Lastly, the Government may develop a political support internally for our full commitment to UN peacekeeping if it does not contradict our foreign policy, and does not compromise our security at home.

4.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Peacekeeping

Bangladesh's participation in UN peacekeeping operations has many advantages and also a few disadvantages. The advantages can be grouped under three broad headings - financial, political and military. Financially, it benefits both the soldiers and the Government. Every country has a different system of scale of pay and allowances. Since the UN cannot be troubled with such intricacies, it has a singular standard of pay for all the UN peacekeepers. It pays \$ 988 per month to all the military personnel regardless of rank and status. Each country, thereafter, decides how

57. Source: Army HQs.

the total will be divided among various tiers. The way Bangladesh allocates pay normally follows the ratio of Bangladeshi pay scales closely. The UN pay, allowances and compensations are generous in comparison to the scale of pay of Bangladesh, but not necessarily to that of the Western countries. The UN also pays an additional amount of \$ 291 per month to the people the UN considers specialists. Much of the individual pay and allowances enter the country as foreign exchange. Besides that, the national economy is also benefited by the payment on the depreciation of the equipment the country uses for peacekeeping. Each year, the UN pays in depreciation, one third the value of all the equipment carried by the contingent. However, because BANAIR (a component of UNIKOM) has signed a different contract with the UN, the depreciation payment for the BAF helicopters is little different. The two Bangladeshi helicopters (Bell 212s) that are being used in Kuwait now will be fully paid for in about five years time, while the helicopters will continue to remain with the BAF long afterwards.

The financial benefits that are mentioned above are mostly on paper. So far the UN has not been a good paymaster due to its own financial problems. Until January 1996, Bangladeshi troops earned more than \$ 163.5 million in pay and allowances alone, of which about \$ 13.423million is still due.⁵⁸ Out of that amount, the Bangladesh Government has made a saving of \$ 30 million approximately. The pay and allowances mentioned here are in addition to what the military observers get in peacekeeping missions. However, there is no accurate account of the amount received. The pay and allowances of the military contingents are sent to the national governments, who, in turn, pays the peacekeepers. But since the observers are paid directly by the UN, no one keeps any account.

58. Source: Armed Forces Division.

Rough estimate indicates that the amount received by the military observers will be more than \$ 18 million. Bangladesh also made a claim, as per the UN regulations, of more than a million dollar against death, injury and disability. Of that amount, only 245,000 dollars has been paid. The rest is pending. One of the reasons for the non-payment on account of death, injury and disability is the absence of a national legislature on the subject. UN regulation dictate that payment on such account can only be made in accordance with the national legislature. Recently, the Army HQ has sent a draft legislature, which is formulated largely in accordance with those of the neighbouring countries, to the MOD for the approval of the Government.

For the reimbursement for the country-owned equipment, Bangladesh's total claim will add up to about \$ 30 million. So far, a little over \$3 million has been paid as of 7 July 1996,⁵⁹ and more than \$27 million is due. The Government makes savings from the pay of the troops in many ways. From the observers, the Government takes 10 percent of the pay. When the UN pays daily subsistence allowance (DSA) to the peacekeepers, the Government takes 25 percent of that amount. The Government also keeps the full amount of the maintenance allowance, which is about \$ 70 per month per person. In other cases, the Government retains the difference of what the UN pays in total against pay and allowances, and what the soldiers are actually paid. Incidentally, all these earnings are in addition to the earnings by the armed forces in many bilateral contract assignments in Kuwait. The summary of all the assignments, both UN peacekeeping operations and bilateral contracts, is shown in Table-5.

59. Source: Armed Forces Division.

The most important benefit of Bangladesh's participation in UN missions has been in the diplomatic front. Firstly, her exemplary performance in all the missions has contributed immensely to the prestige and good image of the country. It has now been established, vindicating Kissinger's libel on Bangladesh, that Bangladesh, like many other countries of the world, may need cooperation and assistance in development, but she is not a basket case. In spite of all the internal problems of the country, Bangladeshi forces are out in the world solving world problems with exceptional skill and professionalism. This good image of her armed forces is also a reflection of the good image of the country. Secondly, having willingly participated in those missions, Bangladesh has not only earned a few good friends, but it also had its impact on the economic front. As was mentioned earlier, more windows of opportunity came after 1991 participation in the her Gulf War. Having identified with

Table 5. Summary of All the Missions Completed by Bangladesh

SERIAL NO.	TYPE OF MISSIONS	NUMBER OF PERSONNEL			
		Army	Air Force	Navy	Total
(a)	(b)	(C)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	UN Peacekeeping Operations	13,748	128	234	14,110
2	Operations Desert Storm	2,193	-	-	2,193
3	Operation Kuwait Punargathan	7,548	-	-	7,548
4	Skilled and Technical Manpower to Kuwait	3,775	298	295	3,775
Total		27,264	415	536	28, 219

Source: Armed Forces Division(AFD) as of December 1, 1997.

the Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti and the Western cause, Bangladesh has proved that she is their trusted ally. This has effectively cemented Bangladesh's friendly relations with those countries even further.

Bangladesh's participation in the 1991 Gulf War also has other economic dimensions. Having supported the Kuwaiti cause, there has been an increase in foreign aid from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Some of the earlier loans were also converted into grants. In another instance, Bangladesh's spontaneous acceptance of sending troops to Haiti, along with that of the USA, has a high content of diplomatic dividends. The fact that, when many countries were not keen to participate in Haiti, Bangladesh's spontaneous acceptance of the assignment proved that Bangladesh is a trusted ally of USA. This has effectively earned much appreciation by the US Government and its support for many Bangladeshi causes. Lastly, there have been many advantages in purely military arena. A few of those are highlighted. Firstly, participation in peacekeeping has provided an exposure of many of our military personnel to the outside world that has many benefits, and, no doubt, a few disadvantages. These missions have provided the exposure to many different systems of military management, equipment, different types of conflicts, etc. All these help broaden the outlook of our forces and provide diversified training. Successes in those missions have effectively enhanced the confidence of the forces in their own capabilities. Much of these benefits are expected to trickle down into our Services over a period of time.

One disadvantage of those missions can be that many social evils of outside cultures may be imported. Happily, the usual high standard of discipline has been able to put a curb to that tendency. Another tendency, although very insignificant, is the tendency of leaving the Services on return. Having earned some amount of

money through the UN missions, some of the soldiers did not find military service attractive any more. They were keener to invest that money in business. When it has been seen that, in doing so, many of them became bankrupt due to lack of business acumen, that tendency has slowed down to a large extent. Another problem was shortage of manpower in the units at home, rendering the units less effective. If peacekeeping missions have to be sustained, we will have to live with that problem provided there is no impending security threat. Lastly, since everybody cannot be sent for UN missions, there is a constant frustration among many who have not been sent on UN mission yet. As was mentioned earlier, there is a large amount of dues that are yet to be paid by the UN. One of the problems that Bangladesh is facing in receiving the money is in the absence of contract with the UN in many instances. Normally, whenever there is any request by the UN, Bangladesh just sends its troops without signing any contract with the UN. But when the demand of money is raised, the UN staff often asks for the legal document – a contract. Although urgency of most missions may call for sending troops immediately, but it should always be followed up by a contract, or an agreement for every mission as soon as possible. Another problem that prevents Bangladesh's participation in some of the missions, is its lack of appropriate equipment. Sometimes, the Bangladeshi troops had to depend on other countries. Since the kinds of equipment that are required in most missions are expensive, we will have to live with the problem for some times to come.

4.5 An Assessment

Bangladesh's participation in UN peacekeeping operations is rather a recent phenomenon. It was only in 1988 that she sent her troops to UNIMOG for the first time. Since then, within this short

period of nine years, Bangladesh participated in 18 missions, which are slightly less than half of total UN missions. Out of those 18 missions, nine are still in progress. In total, Bangladesh sent about 15079 personnel from her armed forces. In one mission, some police and civilians were also sent. However, UN missions have their inherent risks. So far, 48 people died and 60 were injured while in UN missions. This extent of casualty is less than that suffered by contingents of many other countries. In 1988, peacekeeping was quite a new undertaking for Bangladesh. In spite of her lack of experience, Bangladeshi troops performed their tasks admirably well. Such high standard of performance continued in every mission. This was acknowledged by the international community and the UN HQs, including the remarks of praises by the last two Secretaries General themselves. Many Bangladeshi personnel are not only awarded UN medals, but also honoured with high appointments including that of the Force Commander. Finding Bangladeshi troops highly suitable, Bangladesh is being increasingly invited to join peacekeeping missions. However, since the UN involvement in peacekeeping has reduced both in finance and sizes of missions, Bangladesh's participation has also reduced correspondingly. For several years, Bangladesh has been in the number one position in troop contribution with more than 2000 personnel engaged in peacekeeping at any one time. For the last two years, Bangladesh has been in the second and third position. Presently, Bangladesh has 969 personnel in peacekeeping assignments.

The reasons for the high level of suitability of Bangladeshi troops for peacekeeping are its high level of dedication to UN duties, high standard of discipline, better training, proper attitude and adaptability. In this respect, the Staff College and pre-mission training contributed favourably in the overall competence of

Bangladeshi troops. Since Bangladesh plays a neutralist political role in the global arena, she is also acceptable by most belligerent parties. Additionally, Bangladesh, being a Muslim country, is acceptable to all the Muslim countries. Although most missions were completed without much difficulty, there are areas in which improvements could be made. Firstly, a peacekeeping institute could be set up to provide even better training. Secondly, all the functions of peacekeeping could be centralized under one ministry, preferably under the MOFA Bangladesh. The AFD, in such functions, could be answerable to the MOFA for overall coordination. For a more effective system, dedicated peacekeeping cells could also be created in the MOFA, the AFD and all the Services HQs. To avail more and more missions, Bangladesh could solicit stronger lobbies both at the UN and at the diplomatic front. The Government could also ensure an internal political consensus to avail more missions, even if those involve high risk and the units at home suffer a little in efficiency due to shortage of manpower. All these are aimed at maximizing the benefits of peacekeeping.

Financially, peacekeeping missions benefit both the state and the individuals. In terms of pay and allowances, the troops earned more than \$ 181 million dollars so far, much of which enters the country as foreign exchange. In addition to the earning of foreign exchange, the government earns in two other ways from the savings of pay and allowances of the troops, and from the depreciation payment of the country-owned equipment. The Government's total claim in these two areas stands approximately at 60 million dollars. Although much of that claim still remains unpaid due to UN's financial crisis, it is hoped that payment will follow in due course of time. The most important benefit of Bangladesh in participating in peacekeeping has been in the diplomatic arena. Not only the Bangladeshi forces

created a good image of itself and that of the country, but she has also earned many good friends in her commitment to maintaining peace competently. She has also earned much appreciation from many countries resulting in increased financial aid and grants. Other benefits include training of the forces in better equipment of the UN and a general exposure to a wider horizon of international conflicts and peacekeeping. There are also some disadvantages, but since the advantages far outweigh those, it is hoped that Bangladesh will continue to commit troops to maximum number of UN missions, and play a leading role. This has been an area in which the military turned to making peace instead of war, played diplomatic roles in many significant ways, and became a source of earning for the country.

V. ONUMOZ: A CASE STUDY

ONUMOZ is just another success story among many peacekeeping missions that Bangladesh participated. ONUMOZ started in December 1992 and ended in December 1994.⁶⁰ Bangladesh joined ONUMOZ in April 1993 and continued till the termination of the mission. The mission was terminated only after holding a fair and free election, leading to peace and democracy in the country. This effectively ended the tribal bush war that lasted for 14 years. Establishing peace in Mozambique gave yet another feather in the cap of the UN, and it was a privilege for Bangladesh, with more than 1300 troops in the first batch,⁶¹ to have been able to contribute in a significant way. In this part, the background, the general outline of the mission and the role Bangladesh forces played therein will be highlighted briefly.

60. *United Nations Peacekeeping*, DPI/1827, UN, New York, August 1996, p. 5.

61. Source: Armed Forces Division.

5.1. Background

The original inhabitants of Mozambique were the Bushmen called Anoes. The Bantus came in before 100 AD.⁶² Then came the Arabs, who firmly established their settlements along the north-eastern coast of Mozambique by the second millennium AD. The Arabs also established trade with many countries as far as Indonesia and China. Initially, they traded in Ivory, leopard skins, tortoise shells, gold, precious stones, and later in slaves. Trade made them prosperous, and they began to dominate the whole country. Kingdom of Munhumutapa first organized some form of government between 10th and 14th century.⁶³ A turning point came in 1508 when the Portuguese invaders defeated the Sultan of Mozambique, and established colonial rule. Under the colonial rule, slave trade flourished; and it is said that by 1820, as many as 30,000 slaves were shipped overseas.⁶⁴ In the beginning, the Portuguese administered the territory through a chartered company. In the 18th century the government took over the direct rule, but gave limited autonomy in 1930. With the decolonization process that started after the Second World War, Portugal turned Mozambique into an 'overseas province' of Portugal on 11 June 1951. This, however, did not satisfy the Mozambicans. Nationalist movements were sweeping across the globe then. On 25 June 1962, the nationalists agreed to join forces with FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique*) under the leadership of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane to carry out a military campaign against the Portuguese rule. Trained in Algeria, the guerrilla forces launched their campaign on 25 September 1964. The vicious guerrilla warfare that was pursued for the next ten years

62. "ONUMAZ: An Insight", Unpublished paper presented at the Army HQs by the Deputy Force Commander in 1995, p. 4.

63. *ibid.*, p. 5.

64. *ibid.*, p. 7.

resulted in the establishment of a transitional government on 20 September 1974 by the Portuguese, but that did not help much either. Even after dispatching 70,000 troops from Portugal, the rebellion could not be quelled. Finding the sustenance of the campaign too costly, Portugal conceded defeat, and was compelled to grant independence to Mozambique on 24 June 1975.⁶⁵

Independence, however, did not bring peace to Mozambique. One form of conflict reproduced itself in another form - now within the context of internal politics. The differences that had earlier been forgotten in order to fight an external enemy found full expression under the banner of self-determination. FRELIMO, being accused of elitism and racism, broke apart. Various rebel groups emerged and violence broke out in many parts of the country. The rebellion took a formalized structure in 1976 with the formation of a political party called RENAMO, also known as MNR (*Movimento Nacional da Resistancia de Mozambique*). Events took another turn in the meantime. In March 1976, Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia as per the UN sanctions imposed after Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in 1965.⁶⁶ Thereafter, Rhodesia began to support RENAMO actively. Three factors influenced Rhodesian policy - Mozambique's closing of border with Rhodesia, FRELIMO's following a Marxist policy and the Rhodesian accusation that Mozambique was supporting ZANLA (Zimbabwean National Liberation Army), a Rhodesian rebel group. Fired by such perceived hostility, the Rhodesian government trained RENAMO guerrillas, and provided with ample supply of arms and ammunition. Bitter warfare followed since then in Mozambique between the RENAMO and the government forces (FRELIMO). In

65. *ibid.*

66. *ibid.*

June 1975, President Samora Machel declared Mozambique a one-party state, and set up *Grupo Dinamizadores* (GD), or Dynamic Group. Harsh repressive measures were then undertaken by the government in an attempt to control the situation. This, however, alienated the RENAMO even further.

In 1980, when Rhodesia became independent from the white rule, and was renamed Zimbabwe, the new government stopped all support to RENAMO. At this juncture, South Africa took over the legacy, and began to sponsor RENAMO activities. By 1981, RENAMO began to talk of multi-party democracy. South Africa's aim was two-fold - remove the Marxist government in Mozambique and set up a multi-party government, and hunt down African National Congress (ANC) supporters. Actively supported by the South Africa, RENAMO continued fighting. Atrocities are labelled equally against both the parties. Seeing no end in fighting, South Africa and Mozambique did sign a non-aggression pact (Nkomati Accord) in 1984, but in the face of allegations and counter allegations, the agreement did not last. Since Mozambique could not provide the guarantee that the ANC guerrillas would not use her territory, South Africa continued supporting RENAMO. Fighting continued in a bitter pitch. The gravity of the situation led the FRELIMO government to seek foreign help. This resulted in two developments. Based on the 1981 Zimbabwe-Mozambique Defence Agreement, Zimbabwe was to guard the Beira corridor, and the 1987 Mozambique-Malawi Joint Security Commission signed an agreement, by which Malawi was to guard the Nacala corridor. None of these, however, made any difference - bush war continued.⁶⁷

In the meantime, under the pressure of heavy government offensive, the RENAMO forces moved interior and started operating

67. *ibid.*, p. 9.

from Malawi. This embittered the relations between Malawi and Mozambique. The war reached its peak in 1987 and 1988. The original cause of the war was almost forgotten, and the war got an autonomous life of its own. By 1988, it became evident that there was no military solution. Thus, South Africa and Mozambique agreed to reactivate the 1984 Nkomati Accord and agreed to cooperate. This time the Accord was largely honoured. Both sides were war-weary by then. Seeing a no-win situation and the fact that such a conflict may even spread to other areas, the presidents of Kenya and Zimbabwe attempted to broker a peace deal in 1989. In April 1989, in order to allow aid movement, RENAMO announced a unilateral cease-fire; and in June 1989, the FRELIMO government offered a dialogue with RENAMO for normalization of relations. This was the first time the government made a move towards a negotiated settlement. A few months later, RENAMO rejected the governments peace proposal, demanding:⁶⁸

- a. Recognition as a political party,
- b. Introduction of multi-party system, and
- c. Complete withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces from Mozambique.

By any standard, those three conditions should have been considered very reasonable, but the FRELIMO government dilly-dallied with the recognition of RENAMO. Thus, the sincere efforts of the two presidents went in vain. After that, RENAMO refused to negotiate further. However, subsequent mediation of the Mozambican church group did pay dividend, and direct talks took place in Rome between 8-10 July 1990 between the Mozambican government and RENAMO representatives.⁶⁹ This meeting resulted

68 *ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

69. *ibid.*, p. 16.

in the protocol leading to the General Peace Agreement (GPA), which provided for the following:

- a. Complete cessation of hostilities;
- b. All decisions will be based on consensus;
- c. Deployment of UN forces to verify, monitor and supervise the cease-fire and the implementation of the GPA;
- d. Demobilization of both the parties;
- e. Withdrawal of all foreign forces; and
- f. Formation of a national defence force with equal representation of RENAMO and FRELIMO.

This protocol was the first positive step taken by both the parties for ending the long-drawn conflict. However, its implementation has not been very smooth. There were many disagreements in the process, but both the parties continued to discuss the problems and seek peaceful resolution of all the contentious issues. In November 1991, there was another protocol signed, which finally accepted RENAMO as a political party. Further negotiation led to the signing of the GPA in Rome by Joaquim Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique, and Afonso Dhlakama, President of RENAMO. The GPA was signed on 4 October 1992, but it was to come into force with effect from 15 October 1992.⁷⁰ Through a Joint Declaration, both the parties accepted the role of international community, especially that of the UN, in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the GPA and the cease-fire, and supervising the electoral process. Thus, on 9 October 1992, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the UNSC on the principal features of the GPA, and proposed a UN role in

70. *United Nations Operations in Mozambique*, UN Information Notes, DPI/1306/Rev. 4. February 1997, pp. 1-2.

Mozambique. As per his recommendations, the Security Council adopted, on 13 October 1992, resolution 782 (1992), by which it approved the appointment of a special Representative and dispatch immediately a team of 25 military observers.⁷¹

This effectively ended the 14 years old war in Mozambique. By then 600,000 people died and 6 million became refugees, of which, 4-4.5 millions were internally displaced.⁷² The country's economy, infrastructure and socio-political order were shattered. Seeing the urgency of the situation, the UN dispatched a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Dr Aldo Ajello, and 21 military observers from the on-going missions in Angola and Cambodia to be deployed in 2 groups. Later, two additional outposts were created to verify the withdrawal of the foreign troops. Under the mediatory role of the SRSG, four commissions were set up. All of which were composed of representatives of the government, RENAMO and other countries. A Commission for Supervision and Monitoring (CSC) was established to guarantee the implementation of the GPA, maintenance of the cease-Fire, and holding the elections within the time schedule. The CSC was chaired by the SRSG. The CSC established four subsidiary commissions – CCF, CORE, CCFADM, and UNOHAC. The Cease-fire Commission (CCF) was also chaired by the SRSG, and was responsible for matters relating to troop movement, verification of troop strength, equipment, etc. The Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilized Military Personnel (CORE) was also chaired by the SRSG, and was tasked for achieving social and economic integration of demobilized troops. Lastly, the Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican

71. *ONUMOZ: An Insight, op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

72. *United Nations Operations in Mozambique, op. cit.*, p, 118.

Defence Force (CCFADM) was to ensure implementation of the GPA in terms of the formation of the defence force, which was to consist of 30,000 soldiers in equal proportion between the FRELIMO and the RENAMO. In spite of the sincere efforts of these commissions, there were many cease-fire violations, and it was viewed that without the presence of a sizeable force of peacekeepers, the GPA could not be implemented. Thus, on 16 December 1976, the Security Council passed resolution 797 (1992) establishing ONUMOZ, and delegating the authority to the Secretary General for its planning and execution. UNOHAC was the component of ONUMOZ that addressed the humanitarian issues.

5.2. Concept of Operation

The Mandate : The contents of the mandate for UNUMOZ were as follows:

- a. To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of the forces, demobilization, and collection, storage and destruction of their weapons.
- b. To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of the foreign forces.
- c. To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups.
- d. To authorize security arrangements for the vital infrastructures.
- e. To provide security for the United Nations' and other international staff working in support of the peace process, especially in the corridors.

Based on this mandate, the UN evolved a four-pronged approach - military, political, electoral and humanitarian. The military aspect

had two major missions - the observer mission and the force level mission. In the ONUMOZ, there were 354 unarmed observers; and the force level mission was authorized to have 6500 military personnel, of which about 1300 were Bangladeshi at the beginning. This number came down to about 900 in the second year. In total, 2521 Bangladeshi military personnel participated in ONUMOZ. The military component was responsible for monitoring and verifying the cease-fire; withdrawal of foreign forces; demobilization, collection and destruction of weapons; separation of forces, and disbandment of private and irregular forces; and ensuring security of vital structures of the country, and that of the UN establishments. The political aspect was tasked to ensure implementation of the GPA, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subsidiary joint commissions. The electoral aspect was to provide assistance in holding and monitoring the elections. The humanitarian aspect (UNOHAC) was responsible for providing relief and rehabilitation to the refugees, displaced people, demobilized forces and all other affected local population.

To achieve the aims and objectives of the mandate in its various facets, as is mentioned earlier, the whole peacekeeping operations were segmented into four components, which were indivisible but yet interdependent:

- a. The Military Component;
- b. The Technical Component;
- c. The Electoral Component; and
- d. The Humanitarian Assistance Programme Component.

5.3 Military Operations

From the operational point of view, the Force Commander, who was a Bangladeshi General, divided the whole country in three

regions – The Southern, The Central and the Northern Regions. Mozambique's neighbours, Malawi and Zimbabwe, being landlocked, had to depend on Mozambique for their external trade. Transportation of goods was channelled through five corridors – Beira, Tete, Route No.1, Limpopo and Nacala corridors. A metal road and a oil pipeline connects Zimbabwe with Beira port in Mozambique's coast. Tete connects Malawi with Beira corridor. Route No.1 connects both Zimbabwe and Malawi with various ports of Mozambique through Beira and Tete corridors. Limpopo corridor provides outlet to Zimbabwe through Maputo. Nacala port connects Malawi with the outside world through Mozambique using the 650-km rail and road connection through Nacala corridor. These corridors were extremely important for ONUMOZ for controlling the withdrawal of foreign troops and monitoring all activities. To achieve his objectives, the Force Commander also established many AAs.

(AA) and Checkpoints (CP). In the Northern Region, where the Bangladesh forces were largely located, there were 13 Assembly Areas - seven for the government and six for the RENAMO forces. These areas are generally selected at places where there were large concentrations of respective forces, and which are easily accessible. At the AAs, the forces were registered and demobilized. At each AA, there were 4 to 5 military observers of mixed nationality, a representative of the Technical Unit (TU), a Mozambican monitor and a representative of any humanitarian organization working in support of the operation. The soldiers of either FRELIMO or RENAMO had to report to an AA with all their arms and ammunitions. They were then registered by the UN representative, and provided with accommodation, food, clothing and other necessities. Their weapons were deposited with the UN. The

Mozambican monitor was responsible for providing necessary liaison between the UN staff and the locals, and for arranging games, sports and recreation for the registered soldiers. A camp commandant was selected from within the troops for their daily administration. The forces were encamped in the AAs until they were either demobilized, or absorbed in the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM).

The military facilities of the belligerents that could not be moved to the Assembly Areas, were turned into Centres for Unassembled Troops (CTNA). In the Northern Region, there were 28 CTNAs. Soldiers staying in those facilities were disarmed in those centres. In total, 50,000 weapons were collected and 44,000 soldiers were demobilized in the northern region alone. However, the tasks of collection of arms and demobilization of soldiers have not been always very smooth. There were a lot of disciplinary problems, near active resistance by many unwilling to be demobilized and general dissatisfaction with the camp life and camp administration. The UN teams, on verification, often found undeclared arms and equipment. Sometimes, false information led the UN observers into blind alleys. After the duties of these military observers in the AAs were over, they were detailed to supervise the elections process. In all, there were 317 incidents of various magnitudes in the Northern Region. Interestingly, most of the irregulars eagerly volunteered to be demobilized as soon as possible and even created trouble if there was any delay.

Force Composition: The military component consisted of troops from 25 countries, of which Bangladesh had a significant presence. Not only was the Force Commander Bangladeshi, but also was the Deputy Force Commander for a significant period. The Bangladeshi forces were in the Northern Region. The Regional HQ was located

at Nampula. The Region had three provinces - Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula. The forces in the Northern Regions were as follows:

- a. One Bangladeshi Infantry Unit,
- b. One Bangladeshi Engineers Company,
- c. One Bangladeshi Logistics Company,
- d. One Bangladeshi Medical Unit,
- e. One Bangladeshi Movement Control Organization,
- f. One Indian Clerical Detachment,
- g. One Indian Military Provost Detachment,
- h. An Aviation Detachment with 7 aircraft, and
- i. 85 Military Observers.

The Force Commander's Directive: The basic objective of the Force Commander's plan included the following:

- a. Deploy armed military contingents and the military observers in each region so as to achieve the UN objectives;
- b. Provide security to important economic infrastructures and activities along the corridors by sending regular patrols, establishing pickets at the critical points, escorting convoys, establishing check points, escorting VIPs, and securing key-point installations important for ONUMOZ;
- c. Provide expert advice and monitor the de-mining operation;
- d. Assist the local authority in maintaining security during the electoral process;
- e. Military observers were to maintain presence and liaison in the AAs, verify cease-fire agreements, maintain liaison between the warring parties, verify and monitor registration of troops, demobilization and withdrawal of foreign troops, and maintain custody of arms and ammunitions.

Deployment: In order to accomplish the tasks of the Northern Region, the units were deployed as follows:

- a. The battalion HQ, the HQ Company and an infantry Company at Nampula;
- b. One infantry company at Nacala;
- c. A little less than an infantry company at Malema, and a platoon at Maruppa. This was later re-deployed at Lichinga;
- d. One infantry company in the Central Region in the Quelimane airport area;
- e. A platoon at Mueda, and another at Montepuez;
- f. One infantry company at Cuamba;
- g. The medical teams were located at Cuamba, Nacala, Malema and Nampula; and
- h. The Portuguese Communication Company and the Indian Contingent at Nampula.

Tasks Performed: Generally, the peacekeepers performed the tasks that were allotted to them, but nothing went as smoothly as it appeared. For example, patrolling the route between Nacala and Cuamba took 12 tedious hours. Therefore, learning from the experiences of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the link patrol system was adopted. Later, patrolling was also done either by helicopters or transport aircraft. Often, the contingent provided escorts to humanitarian elements and UN convoys up to a distance of 300 km at the risk of being raided by the bandits. A Rapid Reaction Team had to be created to quell any trouble in the AAs. The Portuguese Communication Company provided telephone, wireless and satellite communication within the region. The Engineering Company built, or renovated, infrastructure like roads, bridges, installation, etc. For example, in addition to many other things, the Bangladeshi engineers

repaired a total of 12500 road craters, an admirable accomplishment in its own account. Although the task of the medical unit was to meet the needs of the UN personnel, the Bangladeshi medical team often extended services to the local population and hospitals. The weapons collected at the AAs were transported to the central depots and secured. Once, after a train accident, the Bangladesh troops were the first to report to the scene. They quickly evacuated thirty six critically injured persons to the Nampula hospital. For their praiseworthy performance, a local newspaper read, "...The Mozambican society thanks them (Bangladeshis) sincerely and justly".

Aviation Wing: As mentioned earlier, initially there were, in the Northern Region alone, 7 aircraft and helicopters, which were used mainly for transportation and patrolling. Without these aircraft, accomplishment of tasks in Mozambique would have been almost impossible. On an average, ten sorties were flown every day, transporting 45 UN personnel and 20 tons of cargo. At the time of the elections, there were 12 aircraft, and the frequency of use of aircraft had increased considerably. The contingent Air Staff Officer (CASO) was also an officer of Bangladesh Air Force, who, it was reported, accomplished his complex tasks with utmost efficiency. However, as adopted in the subsequent concepts of peacekeeping, aircraft could have also been used for reconnaissance using sophisticated instruments. This was indeed the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Regional Cease-fire Committee: As per the Protocol 6 of the GPA, a Regional Cease-fire Commission was set up. The Regional Commission consisted of 3 members from the government and the RENAMO each, and it was chaired by the Regional Commander. Its principal functions were the following:

- a. To plan, verify and guarantee the implementation of the cease-fire rules;
- b. To set itineraries for the movement of forces in order to reduce the risk of any untoward incident;
- c. To organize and implement mine-clearing operations;
- d. To analyse and verify the accuracy of information regarding troops strength, and quantities and types of arms and ammunitions;
- e. To receive, investigate and give ruling on the complaints of cease-fire violations; and
- f. To coordinate with other activities of UN's verification system;

As it often happens, there were many cease-fire violations, clandestine killings, and many complaints. All the complaints were thoroughly investigated by teams headed by UN observers, along with members of both the parties. Most of the complaints were amicably settled; and those that could not be were referred to the CCF. Ultimately all matters were settled with varying degrees of satisfaction on the part of both the parties.

5.4 Functions of the Technical Units (TU)

The TU concept is the first of its kind in UN peacekeeping history. The soldiers that reported to the AAs were to be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated in the civil society. Each AA was staffed with a civilian TU Camp Officer (TUCO). Overall, the TU was responsible for all aspects of demobilization other than disarming. This included:

- a. Provision of food, medicine, health care and other essential services within the camps;
- b. Reconnaissance and logistic aspect of establishing AAs;
- c. Provision of Civilian clothes and transport when the soldiers left camps;
- d. Maintenance of a database and issue of personnel documents;
- e. Establishing contacts with other districts for the civilian aspect of the demobilized process; and
- f. Provision of information and education in the AAs; and assistance to vulnerable groups.

Demobilization: This is a process by which the members of either the government forces (FRELIMO), or that of RENAMO, transformed from a soldier to civilians. This process occurred in three phases. In the first phase, the soldiers, after being registered in either the AAs or the CTNAs, were either selected for FADM or left to be demobilized. A timetable was always set for their final demobilization. In the second phase, travel and demobilization documents were prepared. In the last phase, the soldiers were finally demobilized. On the day of demobilization, each soldier received his travel card, demobilization document, two dollars as travel subsidy, a demobilization voucher by which he can get next 18 months' subsidy and two weeks' ration. The soldiers surrendered their military uniform and other gears; but received, in turn, two sets of civilian clothes and a pair of shoes. Transported by vehicles arranged by International Organization for Migration (IOM), the soldiers were then taken to their respective places of settlements. Generally, the soldiers welcomed the end of fighting and were happy to go back to their homes.

5.5 Formation of Mozambican Defence Force (FADM)

According to the provisions of the GPA, Mozambique was to form a 30,000-strong armed force consisting of soldiers belonging to each party in equal proportion. The purpose of this is to prevent any of the parties from dominating the other later. Out of this 30,000 men, 24,000 soldiers would form the army, 2000 the navy and 4000 would be inducted in the air force. The initial plan was not to take anyone from the existing forces, but to take everyone fresh from the civilian life. However, because of limited population, and a general unwillingness to join the FADM, 30,000 new soldiers could not be found. Therefore, making a compromise, some selected soldiers were taken from the existing forces from the AAs and the CTNAs. It was also decided that the new defence force would be a non-party, career-oriented, and a professional force. The concept of the formation of the FADM also precluded any shade of racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious discrimination. France, Portugal and the United Kingdom agreed to train the new armed forces.

5.6 The Humanitarian Assistance Component

The sixteen long years of war had virtually shattered the Mozambican economy and the social order. According to the World Bank report of 1990,⁷³ Mozambique was the world's poorest, hungriest, and most indebted and aid-dependent country. There were also widespread famine and 5 million displaced persons. The country needed immediate humanitarian assistance. With those

73. *World Development Report*, Tables. 20, 23 & 28, World Bank, 1990, Cited in *ibid.*, p. 51.

compulsions in view, a United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) was established as part of ONUMOZ in the early stages of its mission. UNOHAC had its office in every Region and province. The guiding principles of humanitarian assistance were first included in the Joint Declaration of the government of Mozambique and RENAMO, which was later included in the GPA. The outline of UNOHAC's programme emerged from the Donors Conference held in Rome in December 1992. The initial estimate for the humanitarian assistance was \$ 560 million, but it was later revised at \$ 616 million. The donor response was excellent, and firm commitments for \$ 536 million were received immediately.

In broad outline, the humanitarian assistance programme included the following:

- a. *Repatriation of Refugees:* From the time of signing of the GPA, until May 1994, 867,000 refugees returned home either voluntarily or in an organized manner. The flow of the refugee's return, thereafter, continued in a steady stream until the elections.
- c. *Demobilization and Reintegration:* The TU; within the framework of the United Nations and its numerous partners like USAID, EEC, IOM, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and Swedish Relief teams, ensured establishment of the AAs, provided adequate food, accommodation and essential services within the AAs and the CTNAs. They also provided supply of water, sanitation, and primary health care services to both the soldiers and civilians. Demobilization also required proper database, registration, provision of subsidies, clothing and other logistic supplies. The final aspect of

demobilization, included social integration of the demobilized soldiers, support for the vulnerable group, and transportation. A total of about \$ 57 million were needed to cover the whole cost of the above-mentioned programme. Of this amount, the Mozambican government provided \$ 22.4 million in local currency.

- c. *Emergency Relief*: Emergency relief, in terms of food and non-food aid, and transportation was provided to the internally displaced persons, vulnerable groups and cyclone victims.
- d. *Restoration of Essential Services*: Generally, the restoration of essential services within the established communities was relatively easy; but provision of services to the areas of resettlement of three million internally displaced people was an extremely challenging task. Some of those resettled areas were even abandoned for more than a decade. Rehabilitation of social infrastructure and essential services included agriculture, health, water, education and social welfare, road reconstruction and mine clearance. During the war, about two million mines were laid which needed to be cleared. UNOHAC coordinated the mine clearance operation. Bangladesh had 6 instructors who imparted training to about 1500 Mozambican de-miners.
- e. *Multi-sectoral Support for Reintegration*: This involved reintegration of internally displaced people, returning refugees, and demobilized soldiers and their families within the communities. This sector needed about \$ 40 million. The programme is still continuing.
- f. *Balance of Payment and Budget Support*: This provided support in terms of payment of balance pay to the soldiers after demobilization so that they can stand on their own.

- g. *Institutional Support.* Emergency response units were set up within the ministries with major responsibilities for the humanitarian assistance for health, education and social welfare. UNOHAC worked closely with these national institutions so that these institutions can continue to function after the withdrawal of ONUMOZ

About five programmes, originating from the peace process, continued long after the end of ONUMOZ. The Reintegration Support Schemes (RSS) provided for the continued payments to the soldiers, and the Information and Referral Service (SIR) took on a role of information dissemination as other program came on line. The ILO led the vocational and entrepreneurial training programme. The Provincial Fund assisted in economic and social integration of the demobilized soldiers by providing apprenticeship, business start-up assistance and community activities. The mine clearance would also have to continue for long. In the meantime, the government and the UNICEF also signed a protocol for donation of a sum of \$ 42 million to be spent in the government's five-year plan in the areas of health, education, water supply and abandoned children's care.

5.7. Electoral Component

As per the GPA, the elections were supposed to be held one year after its signing. However, due to extremely slow process of political negotiations, the elections had to be delayed by one year. Finally, it was held between 27 and 29 October 1994. For monitoring and supervising the elections, the parties invited other organizations and individuals from the start of the electoral campaign until the new government assumed office. The elections included both the elections of a President and that of the Legislative Council. In all, there were 6.4 million voters and 7500 polling

stations. Twelve political parties contested in the elections. This was the first multi-party elections since its independence on 24 June 1975.

The UN supervision of the electoral process primarily aimed at ensuring that the elections took place in a free and fair manner in a favourable political climate of freedom and transparency. Italy, the USA and Norway provided more than \$ 18 million to the Election Trust Fund to assist the National Election Commission. South Africa provided the helicopters to be used for elections monitoring. The first duty of the UN was to verify the neutrality of the Election Commission itself. Second, the UN was to verify the freedom of the parties in their organization, movement, assembly, expression, and free and fair allocation of media time. Third, the accuracy of electoral roll was verified to ensure that no qualified voter was left out. Fourth, the UN was to ensure that the electoral authority properly deals with all the irregularities and complaints. When felt necessary, the UN staff carried out many independent investigations. Fifth, the ONUMOZ participated in the electoral education programme. Finally, it was to ensure that a fair and free election, correct counting and computation, and proper announcement of the elections results took place. To accomplish these tasks, there were only 148 international staff. Besides the HQ staff, there were Provincial Electoral Coordinators and UN Volunteer field staff in each district. The military personnel ensured that the law and order is maintained. In total, there were 400 international monitors and 1200 observers for the elections alone.

Eyewitnesses opined that it was extremely heartening to see the people, who had been fighting bitterly among themselves for about 16 years, stood peacefully together to vote. Not only that, there was a high state of enthusiasm and a sense of celebration among all the

voters, which could only mean that they all wanted to end the fighting. The voter turnout was an unprecedented 88% approximately. However, within that serene electioneering environment, the characteristic seed of infighting did surface at one point when the RENAMO announced that it was withdrawing from the elections due to some alleged technical irregularities in elections arrangement. This was extremely disturbing as it could render all the efforts of the UN and everyone else ineffective if the situation was allowed to take a negative course. Quick diplomatic efforts behind the scene and removal of the irregularities saved the day. Thus, the elections process was complete without any incident. The result of the elections was announced on 19 November 1994, nearly three weeks after the elections. The result indicated that the incumbent president Joaquim Chissano of FRELIMO won by 53.3% votes; and his rival, Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO, received 33.73% of the votes. In the Legislative Council, the FRELIMO mustered 44.33% of the votes, or 129 seats; and the RENAMO got 37.78% of the votes, or 112 seats; and the Democratic Union Party got 5.15%, or 9 seats. Thus, FRELIMO went on to form the new government. Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of RENAMO, however, was not happy. He complained of unjustness of the elections and systematic discrimination against RENAMO since the signing of the GPA. In spite of that, he promised to play an active and constructive role in the opposition.

5.8 Overall Assessment

Peace in Mozambique was not only essential for Mozambique herself, but also for the neighbouring countries, not to mention the global context. Firstly, an internal problem of one country can easily get complicated and spill over to other countries. Secondly, South Africa and Zimbabwe need transit through Mozambique for their

trade. It was a good thing that, after the signing of the GPA, both South Africa and Zimbabwe reduced their support to RENAMO. This was one of the reasons for which RENAMO was forced to participate in the election even after announcing its withdrawal. ONUMOZ, in many ways, was an unique experiment of the UN, and a successful one. It combined all the concepts of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building. To achieve those objectives, humanitarian aid and nation building concepts were intimately integrated. At the end of ONUMOZ mission, the international community pledged about \$ 1.2 billion for the reconstruction of Mozambique. However, release of that fund remained contingent to continuance of peace. Whether peace lasts for long or not is a question that cannot be answered yet, but all the people of Mozambique remain firmly committed. The four-pronged approach of building peace in Mozambique has been a successful one. Its lessons will remain as valuable assets in contributing towards the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations.

The effort to keep peace in Mozambique has cost about 1 million a day. This amount, along with the fund that was in the offing in terms of aid, would be well worth all the efforts of the international staff if peace holds and the country can recover from its abysmal socio-economic condition. So far, except for some minor troubles in the later years, Mozambique is holding on to democratic form of government. The greatest achievement has been in instilling the idea in everybody's mind that peace must be maintained at all cost, and the conviction that one community cannot continue to dominate another fruitfully for long. Bangladesh's role in Mozambique will remain an example of success for a long time to come. Within the overall context, Bangladesh is proud to have played a leading role, earning high appreciation from all corners.

VI. CONCLUSION

Since the hesitant start with the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation following the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, United Nations peacekeeping operations have come a long way today. The UN not only made decolonization possible, but also succeeded in preventing many conflicts in the world, which in its turn made world-wide development possible to a great extent. Yet, one could argue that there were more failures than successes. Of the more than 100 conflicts in the world since the Second World War, the UN could address only 44 of them, that too with varying degree of success. In other words, the tall promise of the UN, saving the humanity from the scourge of war, was not achieved with great success. Difficulties arose not only with the lack of conceptual clarity, but also with the lack of political consensus, financial constraints and management inadequacies. Although the signatories of the Charter of the UN did intend to establish peace in the world, it was not clear to them at that time as how that peace is to be established. Thus, the language of the Charter of the UN not only remained vague and non-specific, but also that peacekeeping was never defined anywhere in the Charter. At the same time, a clearer understanding of the natures of possible conflicts and conflict resolution were also not available. With the passage of time, as more insights into the natures of conflict began to be gained, peacekeeping also continued to evolve from what is called 'traditional peacekeeping' to second and third generation peacekeeping. Some people credit the non-specificity of the Charter's language to allow for the development of the concept and methods of peacekeeping. While, no doubt, there is some truth in it, it is also true that since the soldiers in the fields need clearer guidelines, it is worthwhile, keeping adequate scope for flexibility, to amend the Charter at acceptable intervals as the concepts develop.

Conceptually, it was considered that conflicts occurred only between states, and that conflicts between non-state actors were largely dismissed as internal affairs of states. Since the UN was considered not to have the power of enforcement, and that state sovereignty was considered inviolable even by the UN, many conflicts went unaddressed. Such concepts gave rise to UN's military observer missions and traditional peacekeeping, only when consents of the warring parties were made available. Politically, till the late 80s, the UN's peacekeeping efforts remained hostage to the Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers. The superpowers and the Permanent Members of the SC, rather than conflict resolution, were more interested in furthering their ideological and perceived national interests, and took actions more unilaterally. But even before the end of the Cold War, it was felt by many that if international peace is to be maintained in any credible manner, then state-centric view of conflict and the need for consents of the parties in conflict will have to be abandoned in many cases. Great changes, however, occurred in 1988 when a collegial spirit between the Cold warriors began to appear. This effectively ended the unilateral approach of the superpowers, and they began to rely more on United Nations peacekeeping forces for conflict resolution. This also gave rise to the increased number of UN missions since then. The end of the Cold War also saw a rise in ultra-nationalistic and ethno-religious conflicts. To deal with those intra-state conflicts, the UN had to adopt a different approach. Besides, it was also seen that, merely by keeping the warring parties apart, as was done in observer missions, permanent peace couldn't be achieved, because many countries have subsequently relapsed into warring modes, or are about to do so.

It was also seen that, besides territorial and political causes, other factors such as environmental, water, economic, social, religious, ethnic, etc. can also give rise to conflicts; and the conflicts cannot be permanently resolved unless social, structural, humanitarian and economic issues are also addressed. Thus, with the changing concepts and nature of conflict and geo-politics, the concept of peacekeeping also underwent corresponding changes. Therefore, the second-generation peacekeeping goes beyond traditional peacekeeping by preventive diplomacy, peace making, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. While preventive diplomacy attempts to avert conflicts by diplomatic means, peace making endeavours to end an existing conflict by various means such as diplomatic, judicial and military means, including peace enforcement. Peacekeeping, here, refers to traditional peacekeeping of cease-fire monitoring. Most UN missions now also undertake post-conflict reconstruction so that the countries can manage their newly acquired peace on their own. However, some of those functions are now carried out by different organizations including many NGOs. That makes peacekeeping efforts disparate and uncoordinated. To make UN missions more effective, all the functionaries will have to be centralized under one command. What all these means is that UN missions for maintaining world peace has become diverse and complex. Simple skills of traditional soldiers will not be adequate to manage the multidimensional peacekeeping tasks, which has virtually combined the military and the civilian functions in one package of peacekeeping.

In spite of the great progress made in the concept and the practice of peacekeeping, there are still many problems. Firstly, there is the problem of span of control of the Secretary General himself. Since he supervises peacekeeping affairs along all other

functions of the UN, there is the need to create four departments, each headed by a Deputy Secretary General. Secondly, the Military Staff Committee (MSC) needs to be revitalized; and thirdly, the post of the Military Advisor needs to be reactivated to offer sound military advice to the Secretary General. Fourth of the problems is that there often a lack of national will to commit the UN in peacekeeping undertakings. Major powers still see many cases of conflict resolution in the light of their parochial national interests. The need for unanimity of the Permanent Five is often the cause of inaction. Therefore, instead of unanimity of the Permanent Five, action may be initiated on the majority vote, or two-third-majority vote, of the members of the SC. At the same time, a few more countries may be inducted as members of the SC for bringing about broader consensus.

The final and the most vexing of the problems is the financial problem. In 1995, the cost of UN peacekeeping was about \$ 3 billion. The main problem arises with the non-payment of bills by the member states. In the same year, member states owed the UN \$ 1.9 billion on account of peacekeeping alone. With the increased number of UN missions since the end of the Cold War, it may appear that the cost of peace has increased, but the reality is somewhat different. The reality is that the defence budget of most countries has come down considerably after the end of the Cold War. When the world's per capita arms expenditure was \$ 150, the per capita cost of peacekeeping was \$ 2 only. Yet the members of the SC, who do share the main burden of sharing the cost, are not willing to share burden of peacekeeping. What that may mean is that they may be ready to pay for war but not for peace. A few countries also allege that the UN system is fraught with mismanagement, over-ambitious undertakings and prodigality. However, it is

true to some extent that much can be done to reduce UN inefficiencies in handling administration and logistics. To do so, the UN need to reorganize itself to provide for better chain of command, better training, sound military planning and lesser span of control of the key personnel. Even if these steps are taken, it will still not solve the main problem of raising fund when the major powers are not willing to foot the bill of comprehensive peacekeeping.

Many suggestions have been put forward to raise fund other than from the contribution from the member countries. These include, 'sunset clause', '20-20 compact', taxing the currency market, raising money through commercial ventures, from private donations. Most viable of these proposals is to raise fund commercially and from private donations, as suggested by Boutro-Boutros Ghali. There are many ways that fund can be raised commercially, from tapping the money market to levying tax on international trade and commerce, and the MNCs. Ironically, most Western countries, specially the major powers, are not keen to support those proposals. They are unwilling to give the UN any measure of independence and self-sufficiency, because the major powers not only want to derive a controlling interest in their contribution to UN peacekeeping, but also want to use the UN to further their own interests. But it is hoped that perspective will change for the better as time passes. Last year, Ted Turner of CNN has already donated \$ 1 billion for UN's peacekeeping efforts. Such overtures from other donors may also come in the future. Fund can also be raised by asking to pay the NICs and other rich countries to pay more for peacekeeping. In reality, ways to raise fund are limited only by imagination. And if the UN has to live by its promise to any respectable extent, then it is morally bound to attempt to raise enough fund to address as many conflicts as possible. After all, if we have to make the world a better place to live in, we will have to find ways to pay for it.

Bangladesh began to participate in UN peacekeeping operations since the 1988. Invitation to Bangladesh for contributing troops in peace mission coincided with the end of unipolar dimension of global power relations and beginning to rely more on the UN system for peacekeeping. That, in turn, allowed the UN to undertake more number of missions. Since then, Bangladesh has participated in 18 missions, of which 9 are still in progress. Starting with UNIIMOG, which was an observer mission, she has participated in all forms of second generation peacekeeping missions, including holding a free and fair election in Namibia and Mozambique and peace enforcement in the Middle East. So far, she has sent 15079 personnel from the Army, Navy and the Air Force. In one mission, some police and civilian personnel were also sent. All these indicate that Bangladesh maintains a high profile in UN peacekeeping mission for the last 10 years. For several years, contributing more than 2000 personnel at any one time, she has been maintaining the position of number one troop contributing country in the world. There are many reasons for the increased participation of Bangladesh. Most important ones are high standard of discipline, training and competence of her forces, neutral posture of Bangladesh's foreign policy, and willingness to support UN's peacekeeping efforts and commit her forces even in high risk areas.

However, there has been a retrenchment in UN peacekeeping undertakings since 1995 because of increasing cost of peacekeeping and unwillingness of the major contributors to bear the increased financial burden. Correspondingly, the number of troops from Bangladesh has also shown a downward trend. Presently, 969 Bangladeshi personnel are engaged in 9 UN missions. With Poland and Russia contributing a little over 1000 troops each, Bangladesh occupies the third position. In participating in peacekeeping, there

are both advantages and disadvantages. The greatest risk factor is the casualty. So far, 48 Bangladeshi peacekeepers have died on duty and 60 were injured. With a large number of troops abroad, the units at home suffer from shortage of manpower, and thus, remains at reduced scale of effectiveness. But since there is no immediate security threat, this risk is acceptable considering the benefits such undertakings provide both to the participating personnel, the Government and the country as a whole. Benefits can be both political and financial. Financially, the participants claimed \$ 181 million so far on account of pay and allowances, much of entered the country in foreign exchange. Bangladesh also claimed about one million dollar on account of death and disability. The Government also claimed \$60 million as savings from the pay and allowances and from the depreciation of country-owned equipment. It must, however, be noted that much of all those claims are still pending due to UN's financial crisis. The most important benefit for Bangladesh has been in the political and diplomatic front. Bangladeshi armed forces not only created a good image of itself, but also that of the country as a whole. Having earned much appreciation from international community for identifying with their causes, Bangladesh also received increased amount of financial aids and grants. In turn, Bangladesh earned many good friends for her commitment to maintaining world peace.

Peacekeeping is an area in which the military has turned to making peace, instead of war, played diplomatic roles in many significant ways and became a source of earning for the country. Although there is a trend of retrenchment in UN's peacekeeping undertakings, it is hoped that Bangladesh will continue to play a major role therein. The example of ONUMOZ indicates that her forces are adequately competent in achieving the UN mandate in one

of the most complex and difficult missions. Not only was the Force Commander from Bangladesh, but she also contributed a large contingent of troops involving air force also. The mission included many mandates built into one. This was also a true multidimensional peacekeeping operation. It included making peace, holding a free and fair election, demobilization of troops, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction, etc. Future peacekeeping missions are also likely to be as complex and diverse as that of ONUMOZ, if not more. Although Bangladesh has proved its ability in peacekeeping, she will need to remain flexible and continue to maintain her edge by training the forces in multidimensional peacekeeping as it evolves in the future days. Attempts may be made to implement the recommendations by a recent seminar to set up an international peacekeeping training centre at Dhaka. For better coordination, peacekeeping activities in Bangladesh may also be brought under one ministry, preferably under the MOFA. At the Services Hqs., dedicated cells may also be created to monitor peacekeeping activities. Lastly, Bangladesh should maintain a strong lobby for taking part in most of UN's peacekeeping missions.