EXPLORING NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Chowdhury Hasan Sarwardy
A K M Abdur Rahman
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OPENING ADDRESSES
Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen.

Welcome to PAMS XXXVIII, the rendezvous for friendship and cooperation. I believe, we had enough warmth of interaction to melt the ice. Now, it is time that we start building the dream castle of lasting peace and harmony. Any meaningful collective approach towards a noble mission presupposes that we first identify and agree upon the areas of common concerns and the need for cooperation. PAMS XXXVIII offers us the much sought-for opportunity to discuss such common issues and explore new areas of cooperation. The purpose is to cast a new look on the security environment of the region in search of emerging opportunities and develop a theoretical construct for collective efforts towards surmounting the prevailing and upcoming challenges.

Since the end of the ‘Cold War’, the security concerns of the nation-states have undergone phenomenal changes. Inter-state conflicts have become more of an exception than a trend. New kind of ‘forces’ and the consequent ‘trends’ are reshaping the geopolitical atmosphere. Transnational crimes, environmental disasters, depleting natural resources and many other such non-traditional security threats are gaining momentum in our security discourse. Rising concerns for ‘Human Security’ are often obligating us to think beyond our usual and narrowly-focused concerns over ‘National Security’. We are now facing the kind of threats that transcend the geographical borders. Famine, disease, natural disasters, illegal drug cartels, child and women trafficking, transnational terrorist organisations and the like do not respect national borders. These affect us all. Today, all nations - weak and strong, rich and poor, developing and developed - are facing these common enemies. And of course, no single nation has the unique capacity to deal with all these threats. When threats operate across the border on a global scale, it becomes pointless to restrict the efforts within our own individual national means. There comes the need for cooperation among the nations.

The theme of PAMS XXXVIII appropriately mirrors our collective desire to pursue regional peace and stability. The carefully crafted topics of discussion resonate our will to work together towards a common goal. Nevertheless, while emphasising on the need for developing appropriate strategies to deal with non-traditional security threats, we have not ignored the need for maintaining required capabilities to deal with the traditional threats either. Rather, a separate topic has been dedicated towards generating ideas for balancing the requirements of traditional and non-traditional security threats. The topics also offer a space to accommodate thoughts on more intimate civil-military cooperation and spotlight the need for enhancing environmental security. I am confident that the attendees will be able to harvest maximum professional, intellectual and ambassadorial benefits from the Seminar.

This Seminar includes speeches by the selected speakers, small group discussions, and cultural and networking activities. A separate programme has been organised for the accompanying spouses to make the event equally rewarding for them. Beside the Seminar, a good number of extra-curricular events have also been planned to orient you with Bangladesh’s rich culture and heritage. I am quite certain that you will be amazed with our traditional hospitality.

Thank You.
General Vincent K. Brooks

Ladies and Gentlemen, Excellencies and fellow General Officers

Good morning! As salaamu aleikum! And Aloha!

It is my honour, as Commanding General of the United States Army – Pacific, the perennial co-host, to formally open the 2014 Pacific Armies Management Seminar. I would like to begin by thanking Bangladesh, and especially the Chief of Army Staff, General Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan, for organising the PAMS opening ceremony in Dhaka.

Furthermore, I want to thank my co-host for this Seminar, Lieutenant General Mohammed Mainul Islam, for the professionalism that has gone into the preparations for this year’s Seminar.

General Mainul, we are starting in an excellent condition, thanks to your leadership. I am confident that this Seminar will be highly successful for all. I am sure, I speak for all here in saying that we greatly appreciate your professionalism, hospitality, and graciousness, and we look forward to enjoying the wonders of Dhaka and Bangladesh.

I would also like to recognise our plenary/key note speakers. I look forward to your presentations and appreciate your participation. Your perspectives reflect tremendous experience and I know all present will benefit from what you will bring.

Finally, I want to thank the spouses who have joined the delegates for this year’s Seminar. Your presence adds to the quality of our interactions with one another and I am sure, we will find great commonality in the experiences you will share with one another on the life experiences of being married to, and loving, a soldier.

The Pacific Armies Management Seminar has become the premier annual forum in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region for promoting security cooperation, enhancing dialogue and cooperation among the nations, and contributing in many ways to the shared goal of regional stability and prosperity.

This is the 38th PAMS, a testimony to the value that all participants, over time, have come to appreciate. The attendees here represent the current and future senior military leadership of our respective countries. The work we do here, over the next few days, will have impacts in the years to come as participants move into the most senior military positions in their countries.

Most importantly, the relationships that are renewed here for some, and initiated for others, will form the channels of communication that will help to avert crises among us. Most importantly, that will enhance military cooperation when we find ourselves responding to an international crisis where we find common interests.
This year’s theme – “A New Focus on the Asia-Pacific Region: Opportunities and Challenges for Land Forces” – speaks to what all of us here should aspire to do by the end of this week – that is, to return to our countries with an increased understanding of each other’s priorities, expectations, concerns, and intentions. More than ever before, our nations and our interests are connected, overlapped, and related.

The Land Forces we represent are called to do many things from internal security within our sovereign borders to external participation in multinational collective responses to events well beyond our sovereign borders.

Our countries look to us to be examples of disciplined professionals who can be turned to, with confidence, when the need arises.

Our work as Land Forces may often include working with other agencies of our governments, or with international bodies, or even with non-governmental groups who are trying to make a difference. Moreover, the contributions of Land Forces to work done by other military branches – air, naval, special forces, and security forces, may be the key to collective success.

Each of our nations has a stake in the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific and should welcome closer partnerships that enable us to achieve enduring outcomes. We should work together to address common threats that confront us, such as:

- International terrorism and violent extremism;
- Cyber crime;
- Infectious diseases; and
- Environmental changes that threaten the safety of human populations.

During this Seminar, we will open some of these topics for discussion. And our interactions beyond the structured presentation agenda will provide a tremendous opportunity to exchange ideas even further.

It is my hope that from our encounters over the next few days will come real mechanisms for cooperation that are beneficial to all involved and to our sense of security and prosperity in this region. Take advantage of this extraordinary forum to get to know one another better, and on both professional and personal levels.

Thank you for your participation as delegates. Thank you for your attention. And many heartfelt thanks, again, to Lieutenant General Mainul and the Bangladesh Army for co-hosting this wonderful event in your beautiful capital city. I look forward to a terrific week of enjoyable professional exchanges and sharing of viewpoints and ideas.
was to make a final voyage to Mecca.4

Emperor Zhu Di halted all the sea voyages and forbid foreign travel following the destruction

The contrast between the voyages of discovery of the Chinese and those of the Europeans cannot

process that I call subaltern globalisation.5 When there is a summit of global leaders on the

The Murakamian dystopia, while posing a challenge, also creates opportunities for the Land

products being not pristinely ‘national’ but rather post-national and global.

world came to witness the internationalisation of production. Consequently, the compulsions

parading to her friends that she has bought an American brand name computer! Indeed, for

Business Machines (IBM) computers. Some parts may be built in Singapore, some in

or two more countries could be lined up for some other inputs, and then the value of stitching

European Union of 27 states. But this should be clarified because what is labeled as ‘Made

now the world’s third largest producers of ready-made garments after China and the

Columbus (1492), Zhang He, a devout Muslim, got back to China to display the things for

The voyages of Zhang He in the fifteenth century were not so different either. Now reputed

contributed to the civility of humans.

tea culture in Japan. What would Japan be without

him a few bags of tea leaves and that is what had contributed to the growth of an enormous

the past century or two. But what held them together, indeed, with supreme sacrifices and

case with the people of the Asia-Pacific region. Politically, they got colonised and battered

often the contributions of the latter outshine and outlive the former. And, this is precisely the

homo economicus

homo politicus

(as John

implied is that without human beings, without people, there

The implication of this debate, particularly Tagore's position on the centrality of human

menace of the 'Little People' in this region.

and Pakistan bilaterally, then there is no reason for them not to do collectively. This would

The reach of the Murakamian dystopia, however, is complex and comprehensive, and the

'Little People,' also convene a summit, probably in and around the same locality! After all,

Challenges for Land Forces

KEYNOTE PAPERS on

A New Focus on Asia-Pacific Region: Opportunities and Challenges for Land Forces
Imtiaz Ahmed

The theme on which I have been asked to speak has quite a long title, and each word is wrought with complexities and multilayered meanings. I will not venture into discussing all of those but will concentrate on the words 'new focus,' for that is where, I believe, limitless possibilities lie.

Let me begin by referring to a debate between a physicist and a poet, incidentally both were noble laureates. I am indeed referring to the Tagore-Einstein debate, where the question debated was whether ‘beauty,’ ‘truth,’ or ‘table,’ or, for that matter, the moon could exist without humans? Tagore answered in an emphatic ‘no’! The debate, however, is worth recollecting:

Einstein: Truth…or Beauty, is not independent of man?
Tagore: No.
Einstein: If there would be no human beings any more, the Apollo of Belvedere would no longer be beautiful?
Tagore: No.
Einstein: I agree with regard to this conception of Beauty, but not with regard to Truth.
Tagore: Why not? Truth is realised through man…. Science has proved that the table as a solid object is an appearance, and therefore that which the human mind perceives as a table would not exist if that mind were naught…. There is the reality of paper, infinitely different from the reality of literature. For the kind of mind possessed by the moth, which eats that paper, literature is absolutely non-existent, yet for Man's mind literature has a greater value of truth than the paper itself. In a similar manner, if there be some truth which has no sensuous or rational relation to the human mind it will ever remain as nothing so long as we remain human beings.
Einstein: Then I am more religious than you are!1

This is somewhat paradoxical because Einstein, the theoretical physicist, who throughout his life professed and preached the existence of an objective reality independent of human consciousness, failed to convince Tagore, the mystic poet, of the existence of the real devoid of human beings. Tagore had a point. What would ‘beauty’ or the moon, for instance, be without humans? We are yet to know how ants or dogs look at the moon? Or, for that matter, whether insects and animals look at the moon just like humans? That is, whether they are able to look at the table functionally or the moon aesthetically? But then, save humans who would provide answers to such queries! Not for nothing did Tagore locate human beings at the centre of life and living. Even at the end of his life at the age of eighty, Tagore went on proclaiming unflinchingly: “Manusher proti biswas harano paap, shey biswas shesh porjonto rakkha korbo (I shall not commit the grievous sin of losing faith in humans).”

The contrast between the voyages of discovery of the Chinese and those of the Europeans cannot
be overestimated. The only interest of the Spanish and Portuguese was in gathering sustenance, 
gold and spices, while warding off attacks from the natives. The great Chinese fleets [captained by
Zhang He] undertook scientific expeditions the Europeans could not even begin to equal in scale or
scope until Captain Cook set sail three and half centuries later.\(^3\)

No less importantly, Zhang He had to return home and abandon all his expeditions when
Emperor Zhu Di halted all the sea voyages and forbid foreign travel following the destruction
of the Forbidden City from a thunderbolt, thinking that the voyages had angered the Gods!
Emperor Zhu Di’s successor, however, later granted Admiral Zhang his last wish and that
was to make a final voyage to Mecca.\(^4\)

\(^2\)Ibid, p.83.
But then, things began to change. In the last and this century, humans came to face two dystopias, one Orwellian and the other flagged by Haruki Murakami, both incidentally creating opportunities while posing challenges for Land Forces across the globe, including in the Asia-Pacific region. This can be explained in the following way.

The first dystopia relates to the Orwellian world of ‘Big Brother is Watching You,’ so insightfully depicted by George Orwell in his novel named 1984, published at the end of the World War II in 1949. Critics in the beginning thought that Orwell was reflecting on the totalitarian regime of Joseph Stalin. Orwell, however, made it clear that he got the idea while working at the BBC news during wartime, where he always felt that the ‘state’ - the ‘Big Brother’ - was watching him! The Orwellian state, otherwise, could range from being totalitarian to electoral authoritarianism. In the Asia-Pacific region, instances of Orwellian state are too many, indeed, of a kind where the freedom of the person is increasingly being restricted. And this creates space for dissension and conflict, with the Land Forces often restoring the law and order, but occasionally, and with the baggage of Orwellian state, also contributing to lawlessness and disorder!

But then, the Orwellian dystopia far from scaring and making humans timid resulted in the creative reproduction of newer dystopias. Indeed, another novelist, this time of the twenty-first century, came up with yet a further equally frightening dystopia, interestingly not by challenging Orwell but by taking a cue from him.

Having lived through the Orwellian world, Haruki Murakami (born in Kyoto in 1949) comes up with a startling, somewhat terrifying, dystopia in his trilogy titled 1Q84, published in 2009-2010. Murakami ingeniously turns Orwell’s dystopia into an open-ended one by inserting the letter ‘Q’ in place of ‘9,’ now that the year 1984 is no more. It may be mentioned that the number ‘9’ in the Japanese is pronounced as ‘Q,’ and so Murakami, in the light of the changing circumstances, reproduces the spectre of a newer dystopia without displacing or belittling the Orwellian world. And, there lies his brilliance! Indeed, taking cue from Orwell, Murakami now warns us that the ‘Little People are Watching You!’ And one is instantly reminded of the terrorists, smugglers, narco-dealers, women traffickers, suppliers of illicit weapons, even thugs or mastans, often with dubious names, like the ones found in Bangladesh, ‘kala Jahangir (black Jahangir),’ murgi Milon (chicken Milon), pichhi Hannan (little Hannan) and many more. Indeed, the spectre of the terrifying ‘Little People’ got added to the Orwellian spectre of the terrifying ‘Big Brother.’ These two-fold dystopias are now haunting the humans, practically robbing the latter of their ‘rights’ to secured life and livelihood.

Both the dystopias predictably pose challenges to the Land Forces, indeed, with the latter often limited to the task of either containing or reproducing them. And that is where, somewhat ironically, opportunities for the Land Forces are created. The Orwellian state, for instance, can no longer secure itself alone, now that state-centric capitalism has transformed into globalisation. This can be analysed from a closer look.

Globalisation in the final outcome meant that in place of competition and isolated path of development, the countries could now engage in a win-win relationship not merely by
trading but also by producing collectively. An example or two would suffice. Bangladesh is now the world’s third largest producers of ready-made garments after China and the European Union of 27 states. But this should be clarified because what is labeled as ‘Made in Bangladesh’ is actually a finished product of several countries. Bangladesh gets 35 percent of its cotton from Uzbekistan, 20 percent from India, spinning and dyeing machines from Germany and now increasingly China, design from Milan, Paris or New York, and one or two more countries could be lined up for some other inputs, and then the value of stitching is added in Bangladesh to make the product what it is! Not so different are the International Business Machines (IBM) computers. Some parts may be built in Singapore, some in Thailand, and then assembled in Malaysia or China, the buyer, however, goes gleefully parading to her friends that she has bought an American brand name computer! Indeed, for the first time, in addition to the internationalisation of trade, capital, finance and banking, the world came to witness the internationalisation of production. Consequently, the compulsions of cooperation displaced competition and rivalry. And, if this is the case with global economy, then there is no reason not to have global cooperation among the Land Forces, including in the Asia-Pacific region, precisely for the reason that the supply and demand lines cannot be secured by one state alone; nor would it make sense, particularly in the backdrop of the products being not pristinely ‘national’ but rather post-national and global.

This also would be the case with the onslaught of nature, that again largely ‘man-made’ and what is now referred to as environmental insecurity, whether arising from climate change, cyclones, typhoons, floods, earthquakes or tsunamis. Crisis arising from human displacement and the dismal state of living as climate or environmental refugees can no longer be underestimated. Land Forces, if and when called, are bound to do a better job when facing them collectively, and instances of such cooperation in securing the environment are now on increase in this region. But then dubious forces take this as an opportunity and end up ‘fishing’ in troubled waters. I am, of course, again referring to the ‘Little People’!

The Murakamian dystopia, while posing a challenge, also creates opportunities for the Land Forces, but then again not so much nationally as much as regionally and globally. This is mainly because the ‘Little People’ are also globalised, indeed, becoming active agents of a process that I call subaltern globalisation. When there is a summit of global leaders on the state of economy or security, perhaps, the smugglers, narco-dealers, women traffickers, the ‘Little People,’ also convene a summit, probably in and around the same locality! After all, they too must know what the global leaders are up to and what steps they must undertake to hoodwink them.

The reach of the Murakamian dystopia, however, is complex and comprehensive, and the Land Forces alone, I am afraid, will not be able to contain them fully. Cooperation among the Land Forces in the region would help but this too requires a qualitative transformation. One quick example would be to replace the current bilateral military exercises with multi-country regional exercises. Indeed, in South Asia, if the US military could do with Bangladesh, India and Pakistan bilaterally, then there is no reason for them not to do collectively. This would indeed go a long way not only in changing the divisive mindset but also in containing the menace of the ‘Little People’ in this region.

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But then, as has been indicated, the two-fold dystopias have come to haunt the humans, making them, what Derrida once said, hauntological beings. If this is the case, then humans must now find a way to nurture fearlessfulness and make a difference. Human potentials, however, come to life only when the person is able to display his uniqueness and this could only come about when his 'rights' are ensured. Or, as the Mahabharata would remind us: 'It is only in freedom (or moksha) that one can be fully human.' This ‘freedom,’ however, is to be ensured in every sphere of life and living, keeping in mind that humans are not only political beings, that is, they do not only have inherent political rights but as economic beings they also have inherent rights to work and prosperity; as cultural beings they have inherent rights to food, music and dress; as technological beings they have inherent rights to technology; as ecological beings they have inherent rights to fresh water and livable environment; and, of course, as psychological beings they have inherent rights to think freely. If those rights are violated there will be dissension and conflict. Freedom must therefore be ensured so that each and every person can acquire those rights, indeed, in all those spheres. Land Forces in the Asia-Pacific region can certainly join and take up the task of ensuring such freedom.

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Christopher Snedden

We are all currently sitting in the region where Land Forces are large. It is interesting to think that, 70 years ago, the British used to rule where we are sitting today. They had established the largest empire ever seen on the Indian sub-continent. Indeed, for the first time ever, this empire included all areas and regions of the subcontinent, from north to south and from east to west. And, appropriately in terms of this gathering today, the British essentially achieved, and controlled this empire using the Land Forces.

Given that, I am a civilian with a defence background, given that, I have been involved professionally analysing South Asian affairs since 1981, and, given that, we are here in the eastern part of some of these former British-controlled lands, I would like to focus on a twenty-one year period of the British rule and see if this offers any insights for us today.

During this period from 1837 to 1858, the British-controlled Land Forces in India endured a debacle. They enjoyed two major victories that consolidated their empire. And, they defeated a major uprising that almost cost them their empire. This dramatic time has prompted five thoughts or concepts that I would like to share with you. All of them start with the letter ‘I’: Information, Intrigue, Income, Interoperability, and Innovation.

Some or all of these matters relate to the challenges and opportunities for Land Forces that you will be pondering at this Seminar. Most are at the tactical level. But, I will finish my talk with a couple of thoughts at the strategic level.

I start in 1837 because, in that year, Victoria ascended the throne as Queen of Great Britain and Ireland. Concurrently, she also became the head of the British Empire with its possessions and territories spread around the world. This included the entity then known as India. Modern Bangladesh and Pakistan were part of this entity. Indeed, before 1947, all of the people living in these modern states, while first being Bengalis or Punjabis, etc., also would have been called the Indians.

By 1837, things were going well in India for the ‘Britishers’, as sub-continentals call them. They pretty much—but not totally—dominated this ancient entity. A few areas remained outside their control, chiefly Sind and Punjab in the west, and Gwallor in central India.

In 1839, concerned about the so-called ‘Muscovite Menace’, or Russian expansionism, the British decided to invade Afghanistan and impose a pro-British ruler of their choice on this unruly nation. Initially, the British succeeded. Within two years, however, xenophobic Afghans had expelled all the British and the Indians from Afghanistan, killing some 15,000 soldiers, retainers, and women in the process. A British Army of Retribution later took revenge, but the imperial might of the British had been severely challenged—and found wanting.
This prompts my first thought represented by the letter ‘I’-I for ‘Information’. Surprisingly, the British knew almost nothing about Afghanistan before they invaded in 1839. There was almost no English language material available about it. Few British had ever been to the place. It was far beyond the north-western edge of their empire. Indeed, they had to cross Punjab, ruled by the Sikh Empire, to get to Afghanistan.

Coupled with some overconfidence—or arrogance, if you like—this ignorance caused the British major problems. They had little idea who they were fighting, where they were fighting, or how to deal with their opponents in any culturally-sensitive way. The British quickly lost the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in Afghanistan—if, indeed, they had ever tried to mount one. Later, the British became excellent foragers and collectors of information, but in the 1839 Afghan campaign, their ignorance was a palpable shortcoming.

Thinking contemporaneously, we know that one of the great challenges for Land Forces will be fighting the so-called ‘Information War’. This will involve collecting, storing, protecting and disseminating information in a timely manner, including in real time to high-tech mobile soldiers located in the field. Like the British, another important aspect for a modern force could be an ability to operate and fight with limited or even degraded informational capabilities. A further issue will be winning the misinformation, disinformation or propaganda war where perceptions are as important as facts. The Land Forces might consider they have won, or lost, a war, but it will be the people and their perceptions, ill-informed or otherwise, who ultimately confirm this.

Back to the British. Despite getting a hammering in Afghanistan, their own Land Forces soon came back for more. In 1846 and 1849, they contested and won two hard-fought wars against the once-powerful Sikh Empire. It had quickly fallen into disarray after its major figure, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, died in 1839. The Sikh Army, or Khalsa Dal, was a serious rival to the British. It was well armed, well trained, and well led, including the forty-two seniors and capable foreign soldiers of fortune. Amongst these 42, there were twelve Frenchmen, three Americans, one Russian, one Scot, and five unknown others. Given how much Australians love a fight, I am claiming that these five almost certainly would have been Aussies!

How did the British forces win these two campaigns? All wars involve some luck, and the British were lucky. They also were tough, tenacious and prepared to incur two thousand deaths under the leadership, and I quote, of a “general whose bravery was only matched by his stupidity”.

Most importantly, the British were clever, even cunning, which leads me to my second ‘I’-I for ‘Intrigue’. Out of information comes intelligence; out of intelligence, particularly—but not necessarily—secret intelligence, comes the possibility to influence or to engage in intrigue. In 1846, the British were able to convince the most influential and senior generals in the Khalsa Dal to remain neutral in the forthcoming Anglo-Sikh War, a battle that the expansionist British had been contemplating since Ranjit Singh’s death in 1839.
This man was a ruler called Raja Gulab Singh from the Jammu area located immediately north of Punjab and which was then part of the Sikh Empire. His neutrality gave the British two advantages. First, it seriously weakened the already-divided Sikh leadership, particularly as they had asked Gulab to lead the Khalsa Dal against the British. Second, it kept Gulab’s capable army of tough ethnic Dogras out of the fight, which also helped the British.

Thinking contemporaneously again, Land Forces do not necessarily need to be cunning—except perhaps when you are dealing with your ultimate bosses, comprising politicians and senior bureaucrats. But you also need to have excellent intelligence and the ability to use this intelligence to engage with elements from varying backgrounds and with diverse skills and agendas. This is an important pre-battle skill because, to mix up an old saying, forewarned is forearmed!

After initially defeating the Sikhs in 1846, the third ‘I’ came into play—I for ‘Income’. The British-led Land Forces fighting in India were actually employed by a trading company, the East India Company. Its main focus was to make money, not to spend it. The Afghanistan debacle cost the company considerable money. Thereafter, its leaders in Calcutta, located just down the road from here on the western side of Bengal, were keen to make some money. The victorious British financed this war by compelling the defeated Sikhs to make reparations. Some of this was made in cash; some in land. This paid for the war.

However, the moral of the story is that the British generals were regularly asked to ‘do more with less’ and to account for their costs. While this does not make your current budgetary challenges any easier, please take heart from the fact that having tight, even shrinking, budgets and being financially accountable are not new things.

Now, for this important point aside, part of the Sikhs’ reparations included giving the Kashmir to the British. As with Afghanistan, they knew little about this relatively wealthy region and promptly sold it to Gulab Singh. It then became part of the prestigious Indian princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, commonly called ‘Kashmir’.

Had the British retained and directly ruled this entity, we might not have the Kashmir dispute as they would have decided this area’s fate in 1947, not the state’s indecisive ruler. Most probably, the British would have partitioned the region into Muslim-majority and non-Muslim majority areas, as they did with Bengal and Punjab in 1947.

After defeating the Sikhs for the second time in 1849, the British amalgamated this area into their own domain. They also did something quite profound that shortly after proved to be of great benefit to them: they encouraged defeated members of the Khalsa Dal—Sikh, Hindu or Muslim—to join their forces. These Punjabis quickly became the ‘sword arm’ of the Indian Army.

This suggests my fourth ‘I’—I for ‘Interoperability’. The British were masters at blending and melding people of different races, ethnicities and religions into a viable, capable and resilient fighting force. Most Land Forces in India comprised so-called Indian ‘natives’, with these
soldiers coming from all parts of India, from all castes, and from all religions. Often, the
British officers led them, but, at the important subaltern level, Indians were in charge. These
forces generally were tough and tenacious; they could operate throughout India and
overseas; and, importantly, they would happily fight other Indians. They were an early
example of an interoperable force.

Similarly, we know that one way for Land Forces to confront the challenges of the future is
to be interoperable. Creating joint ventures with the civilians, other armed elements, NGOs
and other nations could help solve the challenges such as: undertaking urban warfare;
acquiring the right technology and know-how; and, coping with enemies employing dual-use
of technologies such as drones, 3D printing and robots. Such cooperation could also
provide efficiencies and possible force multipliers.

Returning to the British, while they did suffer setbacks in India on occasions, they generally
learnt from these. The biggest challenge to their rule occurred in 1857-58 in northern India
when disgruntled Indians led by sepoys, or soldiers, attacked them. There were many
causes for the sepoys’ disgruntlement. One was a major fear that the British were trying to
Christianise them. If successful, this would have made the Indians lose their caste or religion
and, putting it crudely, they believed that they would ‘go to hell’.

After much violence and brutality on both sides, the better-organised and motivated British
defeated all of the disgruntled, but disunified, elements opposing them and secured their
empire. The fighting involved some early examples of urban warfare, particularly when the
British forces relieved the besieged city of Delhi. Significantly, new recruits from the defeated
Khalsa Dal played an important part supporting the British. With relish, these Punjabi Sikhs,
Hindus and Muslims helped the British to brutally suppress the rebels and take revenge.

This brings me to my fifth ‘I’, I-for ‘Innovation’. After the sepoys’ uprising, the British made
some major administrative and cultural changes. Essentially, these innovations ensured an
efficient and effective administration that left the Indians to their own religious and cultural
devices. The East India Company was disbanded and London, via Calcutta, took direct
control of India. Militarily, the Indian Army was restructured to allow Indians to progress
through the ranks—although the British also removed all artillery from all Indian units and
redeployed this to British units, just in case of another uprising.

Significantly, the British also imposed two new technologies throughout India: the telegraph
and the railway. While these benefitted the Indians, they also enabled the rapid movement
of troops to troubled parts of India as and when required.

Thinking contemporaneously—and I do not need to tell any of you this—innovation to allow
more mobile and capable and more robust armies is a significant factor that all Land Forces
are seeking to achieve. It is also a process that never really ends.

From 1858 until mid-1890s, the British enjoyed the high point of their Indian Empire. After
1900, it was all downhill as Indian nationalism and the concept of Indians ruling themselves
slowly but surely pervaded the national psyche. This nationalism ultimately triumphed on 15
August 1947 when the British quit from India.
They left for three reasons: first, they were exhausted after the World War II and simply wanted out; second, the Indians had finally—and irresistibly—got their act together; and, third, by 1947, the British essentially had become irrelevant. The time for sub-continental to rule themselves had come.

Thinking strategically, this suggests one of the major challenges that Land Forces confront—being, or remaining, relevant. For me, it is indisputable that Land Forces are relevant. You do things that other forces cannot, do not, or will not do. You also do many things better than maritime or air forces—if only because you usually operate on the ground itself.

For example, you mount ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, which necessarily must be done among the human beings, not remotely. You build capacity, for example, with the Afghan National Army and Police. You support civil authorities by providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as the Indian and Pakistani armies have been doing in flood-ravaged northern areas of the subcontinent.

A further important factor and opportunity for Land Forces is to build constructive coalitions, expeditions or joint operations with other nations. This offers a great strategic advantage because almost all the nations have Land Forces to interact with, whereas they may not have air forces and, at least in the case of landlocked states like Afghanistan or Nepal Navies. This is a critical difference.

Undertaking coalition operations on land is also your area of expertise and excellence. It offers synergies; it can be cost effective; it is inclusive; it involves positive cooperation; and it builds capacities and nations. Most of all, it is a major opportunity which, if used for beneficial purposes, will ensure that Land Forces remain relevant.

The associated challenge for Land Forces in the Asia-Pacific will be to sell this relevance, particularly in the current security environment where maritime and air forces are hogging the limelight. The actions and words of Land Forces therefore must seek to convince the public, your politicians and sufficient taxpayers, that Land Forces too are relevant. The Bangladesh Army’s motto offers a very useful guide: “In War, In Peace, We are Everywhere for Our Country”.

I wish you good luck. Thank you.
SEMINAR PAPERS

Practising Cooperation: Developing Interoperability of Concepts for Non-Traditional Security
AG Hughes MBE

Introduction

It might appear strange that a small island in the North Atlantic would have any interest or influence in the Asia Pacific region. Alone amongst the countries represented at the Pacific Armies Management Seminar, the United Kingdom has no direct geographic links to the area. However, there are many reasons why the United Kingdom and the British Army wish to continue to be involved in this part of the world.

As a maritime nation, 95 percent of the United Kingdom's trade moves through the world's sea lanes. As a member of the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, the United Kingdom is represented in the only multilateral defence structure in the Asia Pacific. As one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the United Kingdom recognises that with 60 percent of the world's population, the balance of economic power is shifting towards the Asia Pacific. All these are reasons why the United Kingdom has a stake in ensuring the stability of the region.

Within the United Kingdom, 'Defence' is undergoing a significant transformation and the British Army is changing more than the other two services. With the drawing to a close of campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, in support of the governments of those two countries, and which have lasted more than a decade, the United Kingdom is looking at new and better ways of employing military assets while they prepare and train for contingent operations, which remains their core focus. Included in this is a rebasing of almost all of the British Army in the United Kingdom for the first time and the permanent allocation of units to brigade headquarters, which will lead to an unprecedented period of stability and continuity in the Army's command and control structure.

Structure of the British Army

Under the future structure of the British Army, known as Army 2020, there are three principal roles that will fall to the Army. These are:

- Contingent Capability for Deterrence and Defence;
- UK Engagement and Homeland Resilience; and
- Overseas Engagement and Capacity Building

The last of these roles refers to the United Kingdom government's new strategy for International Defence Engagement. This is part of a whole government approach to Building Stability Overseas which is co-owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence.
The British Army of 2020 will comprise two main elements: the Reaction Force, which consists of three high-end war-fighting brigades, held at readiness; and the Adaptable Force. The latter contributes to all three key roles for the Army of 2020, providing lighter-role and flexible forces at readiness for contingent operations, and taking the lead for the homeland resilience mission. The Adaptable Force is also one of the principal actors in the area of ‘Overseas Engagement and Capacity Building’.

It is important to note that not all Defence Engagement is carried out in the Army by the Adaptable Force. Rather, the ongoing commitment to Army to Army Staff Talks, support to Defence Sections and International Defence Training goes on as before, but this is a new element and a new approach which will allow the British Army to extend its reach. Adaptable Force Brigades have been given different regions of responsibility with the aim of developing relationships and brokering increased opportunities for exchange of ideas, joint training at home and abroad and deepening the Army’s corporate understanding of the culture and politics of the regions to which they are aligned.

However, it is conducted, whether through high level international engagement between Chiefs of Armies or through the Adaptable Force, Defence Engagement seeks to tackle instability and non-traditional security threats in a way other than combat operations. The ability of the Adaptable Force to develop a deep understanding and a continuity of engagement is unprecedented. In time, it could see a newly commissioned lieutenant in one of the Adaptable Force brigades pursue a career that allows constant exposure to and contact with a region which might culminate in him or her becoming a consummate Defence Attaché in future years.

**Defining and Measuring the Threats**

Non-traditional threats to the Asia Pacific region could include security threats such as the spread of Islamic extremism from the Middle East and Africa into South East Asia. For example, Al Qaeda has already declared messages of support to “our brothers in Bangladesh” on the internet. Another type of security threat could be the emergence of piracy in the straits of Malacca or elsewhere in a region where shipping is constrained. Other types of threats include natural disasters such as Typhoon Haiyan or accidents such as the loss of flight MH370. These types of threats have the ability to affect much more than the immediate region in which they occur. Assessing the scale of all these different types of threats is difficult but there are other parts of the world which have witnessed their rapid emergence and their unpredictable outcomes. In Ukraine, the Russian hybrid approach to support for the separatist has given a different character to a situation that otherwise would have seemed to be a fairly traditional force on force conflict. The rapid emergence of the Islamic State, arising from the turmoil of internal politics in two neighbouring nation states has given rise to another particular difficulty. One actor, Kurdistan that might help to stem the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has itself aspirations of statehood which is in conflict with some of the existing nation states in the region.
Addressing the Threats and Exploring Cooperation

As mentioned already, the United Kingdom has chosen a whole government approach to produce its strategy for International Defence Engagement. This strategy encourages bilateral engagement, but is mindful of the interactions between nations within regions and seeks to address regional effects as well. Engagement is not just an away game either. There is as much effect to be had by the deployment of Short Term Training Teams to partner nations as there is in hosting individual officers and soldiers on courses run in the United Kingdom. However, it is important to note that not every nation has the same regional understanding and the United Kingdom’s regional approach may not mesh entirely with that of the United States and United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), for example. Cooperation is a key element to ensure maximum effect. For the United Kingdom, it starts with the three services within the Ministry of Defence, extends across government and then into the process of interacting with our allies in order to avoid duplication of effort and to enhance effect. Working alongside allies to build capacity in other countries is one of the key aspects of the British Army’s plans for regional engagement as is building the will of partner nations to contribute collectively to regional security.

There is a nascent process of working in conjunction with allies with whom the British Army already has strong interoperability links in order to enhance the capacity of other countries. This year saw the first time that the British Army has worked with its Australian counterparts, on a very small scale, on a capacity building exercise with Papua New Guinea. A pilot scheme is now being developed which seeks to coordinate the United States Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces with the British Adaptable Force Brigades to deliver capacity building effort in the most efficient and effective way. An example of avoidance of this type of duplicated effort was the British contribution to the international response to Typhoon Haiyan, which was coordinated through the United States Pacific Command (PACOM).

The key to success is not about meeting traditional threats head on with high-end, and heavy-metal war-fighting capability. That capability firmly remains within the British armoury, but what the new approach seeks to do is to deliver simple measures to increase understanding, like the project to develop an English Language Training programme at the Chinese Peace Keeping Centre.

A constant drumbeat of engagement will help to keep lines of communication open and demonstrates the United Kingdom’s commitment to global security to those who would capitalise on any perceived weaknesses. The increased footprint of Defence Sections in the region in Burma, Vietnam and Thailand is recent demonstration of the United Kingdom’s commitment in this area and it is also worth noting that there is a permanent presence in the region through the Gurkha Battalion based in Brunei.

The generation of Short Term Training Teams will help partner nations for developing niche capabilities in areas where the British Army has gained hard won expertise in Iraq and Afghanistan such as Counter-Improvised Explosive Device skills or best practice in military medicine. The willingness to support humanitarian aid and disaster relief as well as other emergencies, for example, the search for flight MH370 is another important part of the United Kingdom’s commitment to the region.
Concluding Remarks

The adoption of non-traditional approaches to engagement and capacity building is the best form of insurance against the emergence of non-traditional threats, for, in the words of General Sir Peter Wall, the former Chief of the General Staff of the British Army: “the only thing that is certain is uncertainty.”
Civil-Military-Police and Multinational Cooperation: Essential Elements for Future Stability
Greg Elliott

Introduction

This paper offers an Australian perspective on the essential elements of civil-military-police cooperation. For definitional purposes, police have been included because Australia’s experience over the last decade has highlighted the integral assistance that police provides in addressing instability and rebuilding fragile state infrastructure and rule of law.

This is not to suggest that other countries need to adopt an Australian approach. The nature of crisis response—whether to disasters or conflicts, or post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction—is that every situation is unique: there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution. Each country will approach civil-military-police interaction in a way that suits their political, socioeconomic, military and cultural circumstances. Nevertheless, the challenges that all countries face in the ‘global commons’ invite an appreciation of different national approaches, that we might find utility in the experience of others.

This paper addresses three key questions:

• Why do we need a civil-military-police coordinated approach?
• What are the challenges/implications in achieving this?
• How do we build civil-military-police capability?

The paper concludes with some implications for Land Forces.

The world faces a range of strategic and environmental challenges. Borderless issues confront many nations, across the full spectrum of operations. Whether dealing with state fragility or other non-traditional threats, contemporary problems are multi-dimensional, including issues of security, governance, development, diplomacy, law and justice, humanitarian, and other domains. These are also complex, the so-called ‘wicked’ problems, for which there is no easy solution, and which no agency alone can solve.2 Wicked problems exist at the boundaries across and between the departments and therefore, demand for a ‘collective’ and coordinated approach involving militaries, government and non-government organisations, and increasingly the private sector.3

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1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Australian Civil-Military Centre, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government.
2 Dr Keith Grint, former Professor of Defence Leadership at Cranfield University, UK, developed a management-leadership typology that distinguishes between ‘tame’ and ‘wicked’ problems, where the latter are inherently uncertain, intractable and complex rather than complicated, and for which no clear relationship exists between cause and effect. See, Keith Grint, ‘Wicked Problems and the Clumsy Solutions: The Role of Leadership’, Clinical Leader, Vol. I, No. II, 2008.
Why the need for a Civil-Military-Police Coordinated Approach?

The trend toward a coordinated inter-agency approach is as much driven by the need to find smarter solutions to vexing international problems. Hilary Clinton introduced the term ‘smart power’ in 2009 during her confirmation hearing as Secretary of State, in referring to the need to use the full range of national tools—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural. The application of collective civil-military-police action is the effective leveraging of broad national power.

Collective action also represents a sensible application of Strategy - spelt with a capital ‘S’ to denote that ‘big picture’ policy approach, which is comprehensive, coherent and top-down. Good strategy demands a synchronised application of both military and non-military means to effect goals, which are ultimately political. Emile Simpson, as a young British infantry officer in Afghanistan, observed that civilian diplomats and development advisers often pursued the same political goals at the tactical level as their military counterparts, fusing non-violent means with violent. Only a coordinated multi-agency approach enables full consideration of the problem, and a comprehensive—not isolated or ‘stove-piped’—approach to solving it.

Sometimes, the best solution may be non-traditional. The influential Chinese strategist and General Sun Tzu knew that to attack by military force was not always the most appropriate solution. Similarly, President Barrack Obama in his oft-quoted 2014 West Point address reminds us that military restraint is often necessary in approaching global problems: ‘Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.’ Conventional wisdom associates leadership with decisive action and we may be tempted to treat a problem through a familiar institutional framework as though we have dealt with it before. But wicked problems are not readily solved, and seldom through a single institutional approach. President Obama appears to remind us of what Sun Tzu had learned eons before—that the military solution often poses itself as the ‘neatest’ solution—but can detract from considering what were ally want to achieve in strategic terms.

But, even if the best response is initially military, the complexity of contemporary problems means they can seldom be solved by military means alone.

We need to ‘think beyond’; beyond traditional threats to non-traditional solutions. Global computer company, Apple, is well known for its marketing slogan in the late 1990s, ‘think
different’, featuring iconic 20th century personalities as examples of people who had influenced change. In a similar way, if we are to project the utility of civil-military-police cooperation into the future, we need to ‘think beyond’ traditional institutional frameworks for crisis response to a comprehensive, multi-agency and even integrated approach to regional and global problem solving.

Today’s world faces a ‘new reality’—that is, many actors spread over even more tasks. The ‘circle of intervention’ is expanding to include non-traditional, non-military players, beyond joint services and multinational coalitions. This includes government departments, regional intergovernmental bodies (such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, commonly known as ASEAN), numerous United Nations agencies e.g. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), police (local, national, and the UN), NGOs (e.g. Oxfam, World Vision), and increasingly the private sector.

This is not a ‘new’ phenomenon. Australia’s experience over two decades has seen an almost constant range of regional crises that have demanded a coordinated civil-military-police response. These demands have covered the full spectrum, from disaster to conflict and stability operations, post-conflict and nation building. While it is an accepted axiom that military forces lead combat operations, this is not necessarily the case in all operations. Police led Australia’s contribution to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervention, with military in a supporting role. Australia’s response to the Pakistan floods in 2010 saw a dual military (ADF) and civilian (AusAID) lead working side-by-side. Civil-military-police interaction can be likened to the three legs of a stool—none of which can fully stand without the other.

Australian civil-military-police cooperation has approximated a ‘comprehensive’ approach. This term is used variously. Australian Army doctrine defines ‘comprehensive’ as the achievement of a level of integration across several activities or lines of operation, including: warfighting, stability operations, reconstruction, counterinsurgency, security and humanitarian issues. Where multiple activities occur concurrently, they need to be synchronised, not only between the activities but also among the various actors and lead agencies. The Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) leans on a definition similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) understanding in describing the comprehensive approach:

*All actors working together coherently, in a way that promotes interaction, information sharing, increased knowledge and cooperation between civil-military-police.*

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1. ‘Think different’ was an advertising slogan for Apple Inc. created by Los Angeles advertising agency TBWA/Chiat/Day in 1997.
2. Citing reports from the Congressional Research Service and Government Accountability Office, David Francis notes that there were 108,000 contractors employed in support of military operations in Afghanistan in June 2013, which was 1.6 contractors for every US soldier. See, David Francis, “Pentagon Has No Idea What 108,000 Contractors Are Doing”, The Fiscal Times, 03 June 13, available at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/06/03/Pentagon-Has-No-Idea-What-108K-Contractors-Are-Doing.
4. Dr Alan Ryan, “A comprehensive approach to crises”, ACMC, 2014, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51633.htm. This definition was built from discussions during Exercise VIKING, a multi-agency desktop exercise involving NATO intervention in the UN Chapter 7 scenario. NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010 defines the ‘comprehensive approach’ as ‘all actors contributing in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.’
In practice, the level of interaction is shaped by 'context', as the ability of military actors to cooperate with non-military, and particularly humanitarian actors, declines towards the warfighting end of the operating continuum due to risks around concerns of 'perception' and being seen as working too closely with the military. As shown in Figure 1, ACMC recognises a range of strategies of interaction, from co-existence to cooperation and ultimately collaboration, each denoting successively higher levels of practical coordination.\(^\text{13}\)

In a conflict scenario, co-existence may be the best that can be achieved between actors who occupy the same geographic space but do not work together. At the other end of the continuum, in a disaster context, higher levels of cooperation are expected between responders and can be achieved in practical ways through secondments or liaison officers, joint working groups, and co-led meetings. In practice, many missions tend to operate somewhere in the middle, or this may be contextual and vary with time and space. Certainly,

Figure 1: *The Interaction Model*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coexist</th>
<th>Communicate</th>
<th>Coordinate</th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Collaborate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupy same space</td>
<td>Liaise and share</td>
<td>Liaison Officers</td>
<td>Direct communication</td>
<td>Secondments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deconflict via</td>
<td>updates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interlocuter</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hold joint meetings</td>
<td>Co-locate, co-chair, joint</td>
<td>Ongoing joint working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>working groups</td>
<td>groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Co-plan work and exercises</td>
<td>Share assets, resources,</td>
<td>Interoperable systems and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>training</td>
<td>language</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agree on shared outcomes</td>
<td>Ownership of shared</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>outcomes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Co-funding, Mou arrangements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conflict scenario ⟷ Disaster Response scenario

ACMC Model for more effective civil-military-police interaction during conflict and disaster responses

Source: www.acmc.gov.au

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\(^{13}\) The Coordination spectrum is based on the UNCM-Coord strategy, which states that information sharing, task division and joint planning between civilians and military should always be pursued to the extent possible depending on the risks of perception for humanitarians. In the UN typology, strategies vary from coexistence to cooperation, UNOCHA, Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook, 2007, available at [http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do-coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview](http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do-coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview).
one behaviour to be avoided is ‘competition’, which detracts from mission success for everybody. Integration is a concept often talked about but seldom built into organisational design outside of specific UN arrangements.\textsuperscript{14} Integration, as the highest order of collaboration, is as much an ‘effect’, which can be achieved through good leadership, understanding, trust and mutual respect—even in the absence of a formal ‘wiring’ diagram. Whatever the level of practical interaction, good civil-military-police coordination is a key to operational success.

Australia’s national security arrangements are founded on whole-of-government coordination of defence, development, law enforcement, intelligence and border protection capabilities. Australia, like most of the countries, defines a clear operational architecture for how these agencies interact to manage a crisis, including defined roles, responsibilities and reporting arrangements.\textsuperscript{15} In general terms, domestic crises beyond the resources of individual states are led by the national disaster management agency (Emergency Management Australia). Military forces only get involved as a last resort because there is adequate capacity at a local level. For domestic crises involving national security, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet will lead. For a crisis overseas, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has the lead. The military will often respond early because they have strategic lift and a range of assets ready to go—but they will take a supporting role.

However, as recent experience with the loss of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 demonstrates, every situation is unique, and organisational arrangements need not follow a particular rulebook. Inter-agency cooperation is neither a finite nor perfectible process—success is largely built on relationships.

The ‘wiring’ diagram depicting the agencies and organisational structure involved in the MH370 response is a case in point. This was a very complex ‘noodle’ diagram, which included actors not traditionally involved with national security issues, for example, the Department of Infrastructure. These also performed non-traditional roles, e.g., the Australian Maritime Security Agency was more accustomed to searching for ships, not planes. These agencies needed to interact at multiple levels (state, federal and international). The dynamism of the response demanded a new level of coordination, for which the government established a Joint Agency Coordination Centre (JACC), led by Air Chief Marshall (retd.) Angus Houston AC AFC as the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy and Coordinator. As a former Chief of Defence, ACM Houston had the credibility needed to operate across multi-agency levels, including working with the Malaysian government.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Integration as an organisational concept for maximizing coherence was introduced by the UN in 1997 and became formal policy in 2008. The UN integration arrangements continue to evolve, but many humanitarian agencies remain concerned that integration blurs the distinction between humanitarian, military and political action. On the other hand, others in the UN community highlight the positive experiences of integration for achieving greater coherence. The debate remains polarised and will demand continuing effort across the political, peacekeeping and humanitarian communities to ensure benefits are maximised and risks are minimised. See, Victoria Metcalfe, Alison Giffen and Samir Elhawary, UN Integration and Humanitarian Space: An Independent Study, Commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group, 2011.


This was an unprecedented event that demanded a new approach to coordination, but all accounts to date indicate that the multi-agency aspects worked well (although tragically, the aircraft is yet to be found at time of writing).

Another recent example of successful multi-agency coordination in Australia’s experience is the Joint Agency Task Force (JATF) established under Operation Sovereign Borders to combat people smuggling and protect Australia’s borders. The JATF coordinates a whole-of-government effort, which includes the Australian Federal Police, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS), the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP). The JATF, currently led by Lieutenant General Angus Campbell DSC AM, reflects Australia’s unique multi-agency response to a complex, non-traditional problem.

The demands in leading such diverse agencies as the JATF and JACC are many and for military officers accustomed to command may even involve a different style of leadership, where tools such as influence and persuasion become stock of trade in coordinating multiple agencies.

The evolution to complex, large-scale, whole-of-government operations represents a longer journey for the Defence organisation, from single service to joint operations to multi-agency. Considering that Defence has re-positioned to a joint style of operations over some 30 years, this new inter-agency journey is still in its early days. The demands of inter-agency will require us to continue to ‘think beyond’ traditional military responses, and we are still contemplating the challenges involved, culturally, organisationally, and in terms of preparedness.

The Challenges/Implications in Achieving a Civil-Military-Police Approach

The challenges to civil-military-police interoperability occur at several levels: including institutional, cultural, and behavioural. The agencies involved naturally share some similarities and values, but invariably there are differences in mandates, culture, operating language, priorities, planning processes, information systems, and so on. Organisations also experience ‘churn’ i.e., the regular turnover of people, which means that those with multi-agency experience move on and may be replaced by others with less experience, so there needs to be a process of continual learning in multi-agency skills. Bureaucracies also face some natural tension in their propensity to operate in a ‘stove-piped’ manner, not readily sharing information. Overcoming these various obstacles to cooperation is paramount to inter-agency success. Effective civil-military-police interaction requires that we replace pre-conceived perceptions about ‘other’ groups with informed understanding. Just as militaries have journeyed to overcome a sense of tribalism in evolving a mindset of ‘jointery’, so we need to build more shared understandings of inter-agency roles, responsibilities and processes in order to achieve a more whole-of-government effect. A key to establishing interoperability is building a ‘culture of cooperation’.

17 For more on the JATF structure and approach, see http://www.customs.gov.au/site/operation-sovereign-borders.asp.
A salient point made by Dr Alex Bellamy at last year’s Pacific Armies Management Seminar reminds us that this is not an easy journey:

*Working together is easier said than done.*

Some barriers may never be overcome, particularly at the level of principles and values. Christophe Fournier, International President of ‘Doctors Without Borders’, addressing a NATO conference in 2009, stressed that his organisation could never be part of a military humanitarian coalition, but the best outcome that might be pursued together was in working towards a ‘mutual understanding’ between warrior and humanitarian issues.

This highlights that in a multi-agency environment, cooperating towards a unity of purpose may be a bridge too far for some actors, but it is still important to understand each other’s differences, develop mutual respect and manage some level of deconfliction.

So what has Australia learned in building civil-military-police interoperability?

**How to Build Civil-Military-Police Capability for Conflict and Disaster Management?**

It may seem counter-intuitive, but our studies at the ACMC indicate that we do not need to all be the same. Nor do agencies involved in crisis response need a unified planning process, such as a whole-of-government Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP). On the contrary, agencies involved in crisis management already have well-developed processes that meet their requirements. Adoption of a single unified or tightly integrated approach would reduce individual capacity. Success is built on good relationships. Agencies do not need to adopt the same planning processes; rather, they need mutual understanding, trust, shared communications, and to identify interfaces where these occur. The comprehensive approach is about learning to work with diversity, not seeking uniformity.

In Australia, the publication *Same Space – Different Mandates* provides a basic reference guide to inform multi-agency policy and planning, and is a pocket guide for practitioners deployed to international disaster or conflict response. The booklet makes a virtue of diversity, highlighting that planning processes from one agency rarely suit other professional cultures or systems. What is important is that practitioners accept the relative strengths of different approaches, rather than trying to fit these into a single paradigm.

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18 Paper presented by Dr Alex Bellamy on ‘Unity of Effort’ in the Pacific Armies Management Seminar at Auckland, NZ, in September 2013.  
19 “MSF can never be part of a military humanitarian coalition...we don’t believe in a unity of purpose, we believe in a mutual understanding with all warring parties that allows for the deployment of aid to contain the devastations of war...we think that the more recently promoted ‘unity of understanding’ would be closer to reality.” In a speech by Christophe Fournier to NATO at Rheindahlen, Germany on 08 December 2009, available at http://www.msf.org/article/nato-speech-christophe-fournier.  
Australia has identified five ‘Guiding Principles’ to help direct the priorities of departments and agencies involved in crisis response, to assist effective leadership, and to promote coordination and cooperation. The principles result from a collaborative consideration of Australia’s experience in conflict-affected regions, including Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste, as well as civil-military assistance to disaster-affected regions. The ACMC reviewed these principles this year and has republished them as follows: 22

- Clearly define strategic objectives
- Engage proactively
- Share knowledge and understanding
- Leverage organisational diversity
- Commit to continuous improvement.

These principles provide a management mechanism for enhancing collaboration between agencies, enabling outcomes to be achieved in a more comprehensive and coordinated manner, with more effective use of resources, whilst avoiding duplication. They address the ‘trust’ area, which is a key principle in informing understanding across civil-military-police actors.

The ACMC operationalises these principles with stakeholders through four key work streams, designed to build inter-agency interoperability:

- Exercises
- Lessons learned
- Education and development
- Research

Together, these activity areas build a greater understanding among responders of respective roles and responsibilities, inform continuous improvement on the basis of experience, and develop advice to support policy and decision makers engaged in conflict and disaster management overseas.

The process of building national civil-military-police capability to prevent, prepare for and respond more effectively to conflicts and disasters overseas is never complete. It requires an ongoing commitment and resolves across government to work more collaboratively, to break down institutional barriers, and to drive towards a more integrated approach to crisis management.

We cannot afford to rest on past successes. Strengthening whole-of-government capability demands constant preparedness and that we continue to ‘think beyond’ current paradigms. This raises some considerations for Land Forces in how to take civil-military-police cooperation forward.
Possible Implications for Land Forces

Beyond Military Networks
Transitioning to an inter-agency mindset requires thinking beyond traditional mil-mil networks. It is becoming more important in career streaming to build a wider network of relationships and influence, including with other government departments, NGOs and international organisations (e.g. the UN, ICRC). Staff courses and traditional service training do not always provide broad non-military exposure. Greater exposure to multi-agency actors should be given to young officers and NCOs at an earlier stage in their formal education. Early opportunities for cross-agency exposure should also be sought through secondments and liaison roles.

Beyond Current Force Generation
The future inter-agency domain requires thinking beyond traditional force generation concepts to as yet undefined inter-agency capabilities. The next generation of amphibious ships will create opportunities for co-locating defence and non-military assets, whether in the context of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief or complementing other missions, from shaping the environment to force projection.

Beyond Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
CIMIC - defined as ‘the coordination and cooperation with civil actors in support of the operational commander’s mission’ - has a justifiable place in operations. However, we tend to look at this through a single service (and predominantly the Army) institutional lens. Our training of military practitioners for the civil-military environment is often short on participation from civilian agencies themselves, including the police. It needs to be remembered that other agencies, civilian authorities and international organisations have a stake in civil-military relations, and the outcomes sought can be quite different. They may even subscribe to a contrasting narrative (e.g. the UN perspective on civil-military coordination or CM-Coord). CIMIC training will always be lopsided without considering broader partners. Doctrine and training need to posit CIMIC in the broader context of civil-military-police operations. If we only understand this interaction from an Army perspective, then we have already limited our perception.

Beyond Military-Military Training
In our military training and experimentation, we need to think beyond current paradigms to include inter-agency partners in scenarios that provide mutual training benefit. Australia continues to evolve the Exercise Talisman Sabres series, which includes some 100 civilian

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24 UNOCHA defines CM-Coord as the ‘essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize in consistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals’. The two are similar, but not the same; the perspective depends on where you stand. For more, see, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview.
25 In fairness, Australian Doctrine ADDP 3-11 does posit CIMIC in a broader context of Civil-Military Operations (CMO), which nest military planning within a comprehensive whole-of-government approach. However, in practice, tactical level planning and operational implementation often tend to undertake this wider context; there is too little involvement by non-military participants (civilian government agencies, police and international organisations) in training and exercises; and too little understanding of respective roles, responsibilities and guidelines. CIMIC is also underdeveloped at a ‘joint’ level. A new doctrinal publication is in development within the Australian Executive ADDP series, likely to be published under the title ‘Multiagency Coordination’. 
representatives working alongside 30,000 military in a live, virtual and constructive training environment.\(^{26}\) The ACMC contributed to the desktop simulation Exercise Viking this year, where the proportion of civilian participants was perhaps among the highest of civil-military-police exercises globally, at nearly 15 percent.\(^{27}\) Multi-agency exercises build a shared understanding of the roles, responsibilities and expertise that civilian organisations bring to complex security challenges. This enhances civil-military-police collaboration and strengthens whole-of-government preparedness. There is a need to continue to ‘think beyond’ current exercise paradigms to leverage simulation technology in generating truly transformative whole-of-government learning environments. This may require us to push the boundaries of existing simulation models and create a joint synthetic training environment that enables Land Forces to train within a whole-of-government context.

There are some risks in this. Thinking beyond joint and multinational military to multi-agency operations invites vulnerability, in terms of subjecting institutional interests to those of a wider (non-military) group. This invites an element of reliance on external partners for their effects. Inter-agency participation in exercises may even result in some direct inconvenience to Army, as exercise objectives and scenarios need to be shaped for mutual benefit.

### Beyond Current Leadership Paradigms

In leadership, it is important to ‘think beyond’ the science of military command and mastery of tactical skills to comprehend the ‘art of the possible’ in achieving joint inter-agency objectives. This is not so much about developing new competencies but it does represent a shift in the relative importance of core leadership skills, from focusing on the leader as an individual motivator, to seeing him/her as a collaborator and network builder.\(^{28}\) Leaders in the inter-agency domain need to be able to build teams and alliances beyond the military, to apply indirect leadership to strategic problem solving, and to adapt to strategic ambiguity and non-linearity.\(^{29}\) They also need to be capable of indirect influence and persuasion in dealing with those who are not undercommand. Multi-agency networks are dynamic and influenced by multiple stakeholders. Leaders in this environment need to create a climate supportive of collaboration and knowledge sharing. This demands a well-informed, personable and practical approach, in balancing traditional directive styles with indirect leadership—which is counter-intuitive and can be unsettling for those accustomed to working in a traditional formal authority role.

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\(^{27}\) Exercise VIKING is a multidimensional, multinational computer-assisted desktop exercise, designed to prepare civilian agencies, military and police for international peace operations and crisis management. VIKING 14 involved over 2,500 participants, approximately 15 percent of whom were civilian or police. The Swedish Armed Forces and Folke Bernadotte Academy implemented the activity, in close cooperation with representatives from 50 countries and 90 other organisations, including the UN and NGOs. For more information, see, [http://folkebernadotteacademy.se/en/Activities/Training-and-Exercises/VIKING](http://folkebernadotteacademy.se/en/Activities/Training-and-Exercises/VIKING).


Conclusion

Australia’s experience in responding to international crises highlights the importance of building national cross-agency, cross-domain capability before a deployment is necessary. We have learned to invest in building inter-agency relationships and understanding at all levels to enable a civil-military-police ‘culture of cooperation’ based on trust and mutual respect, undergirded by an agreed set of guiding principles and reinforced through constant preparedness training. This is a work-in-progress. The future strategic environment presents both traditional and non-traditional challenges, but also opportunities to move closer towards an integrated whole-of-government effect in our crisis management response. Building the essential elements for civil-military-police cooperation represents the continuation of a journey that has already begun, from single service to joint, and beyond.
In addition to these, non-traditional security challenges are also emerging including energy challenges. Any claims by claimants in potentially resource-rich areas, as well as in some cases threats to major sanctions. Threats by the non-state actors can be no less severe and may comprise terrorist situations in which a state actor somewhere along the supply chain deliberately attempts to confrontations among the people due to scarcity of resources. This would certainly require more. Conflicts would not be limited within only warring factions but would transcend to the region.

The discussion in this article shows that Land Powers around the world are still devoted owing to the changes of time, especially those arising due to global environmental problems. Moreover, understanding and interpretation of these terms often differ between soldiers, land forces, and land warfare somewhat synonymously, they convey different meanings. Preponderance of Land Power, the terminology is often prone to misunderstanding. Thus, about new security challenges and potential misconceptions of threats.

A Land Power needs to acquaint itself with this new emerging trend where the traditional escalation to, a conflict in order to establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by bringing about such situations. It is in this context, that the realization that environmental issues need much more co-ordination to resolve than other kinds of crises unfolding in different arenas, without which a global solution cannot be found. The events of the earlier part of short-term or long-term degradation in environment. It is in this context, that the environment has long been a silent casualty of war and armed occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and economic development; indeed, this raises the question of whether the concept of Land Power is not leading to an over-concentration of power in the hands of those with it.

One can denominate the Land Power as the one that is pre-eminently a power which by definition is based on land. It is through the land that a state is able to assert its dominion over its people, and thus political power is exercised. This is one of the reasons why Land Power is pre-eminently a national power which by definition is based on nation. It is through the nation that a state is able to assert its dominion over its territory, and thus political power is exercised. This is one of the reasons why Land Power is pre-eminently a national power which by definition is based on nation. The discussion in this article shows that Land Powers around the world are still devoted owing to the changes of time, especially those arising due to global environmental problems.
Rashed Uz Zaman

Introduction

The environment has long been a silent casualty of war and armed conflict. From the contamination of land and the destruction of forests to the plunder of natural resources and the collapse of management systems, the environmental consequences of war are often widespread and devastating...Let us reaffirm our commitment to protect the environment from the impacts of war, and to prevent future conflicts over natural resources.

Ban Ki-Moon
UN Secretary General¹

Military conflict has changed and we have been reluctant to recognize it. Defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle is not the task for the 21st century. Odd missions to defeat transnational threats or rebuild nations are the order of the day, but we haven’t yet adapted.

U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni²

War leaves a distinct carbon foot print on the planet, a fact that has long been unnoticed in the discourse of war and environmental security. Environment has generally been one of the many casualties of war and armed conflicts as efforts have been taken to make wars humane, but not green. Very few studies have analysed the impacts of any given armed conflict on the environment as a whole. Instead, the concept of ‘green war’ in environmental discourse denotes to conflicts caused due to the competing access to environmental resources. On the other hand, any conflict has some kind of—major or minor—impacts on the environment that is carried out by the conflicting parties and need overhauling at the end of the conflict. It is in this context that armed forces not only need to be acquainted with the conduct of environment during a conflict and peace time but also develop its capability to address looming environmental crises.

The article argues, taking into account of rising environmental problems globally, that a Land Power requires to specially recognise such new challenges. Land Powers across the globe have to deal with not only traditional security concerns but also distinct kinds of challenges that may emanate from disruptions caused due to environmental problems. This would require both changes in the pattern of engagement of Land Powers and new kinds of knowledge related to disaster management issues. Having said so, the article also points out that as the crises of the new century are multi-faceted, overreliance on the security sector as the sole security provider may not be a wise policy for a state. The article begins by defining Land Power. It then moves on to discussing global environmental challenges which would pose new kinds of challenges for Land Powers across the world. In the next section, it concentrates specifically on the Asia-Pacific region, its distinctiveness in terms of security and environmental challenges. In conclusion, the article points out that while Land Powers’ role and activities should be diversified due to newer kinds of challenges, overdependence on the Land Powers to mitigate these issues may significantly alter its primary duty.

Defining Land Power

While the official definition of the term Land Power is a recent phenomenon, this situation may not be as odd as one may think of. For many military practitioners, especially soldiers, the concept of Land Power is so deeply ingrained that seldom, a definition of it is required. It has existed ever since early human beings used fists, rocks and rudimentary weapons to defend themselves from attacks by foes. As a result, a several millennium-long understanding of land warfare exists. Indeed, key military theorists and strategists like Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Niccolo Machiavelli, Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini would not have thought of war as anything other than the application of Land Power. In spite of the overwhelming preponderance of Land Power, the terminology is often prone to misunderstanding. Thus, while military and non-military professionals tend to use the terms - Land Power, armies, land forces, and land warfare somewhat synonymously, they convey different meanings. Moreover, understanding and interpretation of these terms often differ between soldiers, sailors and airmen. In fact, even within large segments of Land Forces, understanding will vary considerably depending on whether one has a strategic, operational or tactical bias; is from a maneuver, operational support or force sustainment branch; or serves in a particular unit or theater. Still, a definition of Land Power is required before proceeding with the article. In 2005, Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army, a U.S. Army document, offered the first official definition of Land Power: “Land Power is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.” Several years later, Army Doctrine Publication 1, The Army, another U.S. Army document, held on to the original definition from FM-1, but slightly broadened the definition of Land Power to include:

- Impose the nation’s will on an enemy, by force if necessary;
- Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in any operational environment;
- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development;
- Address the consequences of catastrophic events – both natural and man-made – to restore infrastructure and re-establish basic civil services; and
- Secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.

Whatever the definitional range of Land Power, there is no doubt that the concept will continue to have tremendous relevance in war, crisis, and peace and across the conflict spectrum from peaceful competition to general war. Undoubtedly, Land Power will continue to play a vital role in the fundamental purposes of military power: defeat, deter, compel, reassure, shape, and support nations. For the purpose of this paper, it should be noted that in spite of the fact that future will pose challenges different from the 19th and early 20th centuries, armies across the world will often be called upon to engage in domestic support...
operations in their respective countries. Such missions may include but not be necessarily be limited to, traditional disaster relief and support to civil powers to combating transnational criminal organisations; to dealing with population movement across international boundaries; to assisting in the rebuilding of national infrastructure; and to facing and mitigating ecological disasters. In the next part, the traditional concerns relating to environmental problems and how a Land Power can address these interlocked challenges have been addressed.

Global Environmental Concerns and Land Power

Environmental issues are multi-faceted and complex, too say the least. It is because the connection of the atmosphere is not bounded by the human constructed laws of sovereignty and this brings the basic concern for states—"pollution does not respect frontiers". The realisation that environmental issues need much more co-ordination to resolve than other forms of international co-operation even amongst apparently friendly countries came with the unfolding of the acid rain issue in West Europe and - Canada. On the other hand, Africa’s problem on desertification or the loss of Amazonian Rain Forest in Latin America could apparently be seen as geographically distant problem for the rest of the world whereas these have tremendous implications for the global economy and security as a whole. Environmental issues, therefore, directly impinge on the core issues of international relations between states—“sovereignty, self-sufficiency, the national interest and economic growth”. The complex interlocking nature of environmental issues clearly dictates that nation-states cannot act alone and independently to resolve its own environmental issues or security-related threats emanating as a result of those. One state would be less reluctant to change its own environmental behavior without receiving the assurance that the other stakeholders would also follow suit. An International Future (IF) model representing demographic, economic, energy, agricultural, socio-political and environmental sub-systems shows the following pattern of interaction for 183 countries in the global system:

1William T. Johnson, op. cit., p.31.
4Peter Hough, op. cit., p. 137.
It is significant, therefore, to connect and act on ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ sphere of activities of states on matters pertaining to environmental problems and security, where analysing how a Land Power can be useful is integral.

The duty of a Land Power is not only to provide protection and defense to a given state, but also to create adaptability to the changing scenario of the threats facing the state. As discussed earlier, environmental challenges do not yet feature verbally in the strategic futures of Land Power. A National Defense Research Institute (RAND) study on the preparedness of militaries of China, France, the United Kingdom, India and Israel concludes that these countries identifies internal and external threats required for their militaries to get acquainted with. It rather refies the security environment as the prime consideration for the Land Power to address. Therefore, the threats identified for the Land Power to address do not explicitly discuss challenges emanating from either internal or external environmental threats that the militaries might need to develop preparedness for. On the other hand, a contextual analysis of the strategic vision of preparedness of different militaries can show how tackling environmental strife is a part of overall strategy of a Land Power to meet future challenges.

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While traditional role of the Land Power remains unchanged, the security and strategic environment reveals emerging five interconnected meta-trends for the Land Power, as the Australian Beersheba Plan identifies: “crowded, connected, constrained, collective and lethal”. These reveal that the emerging demographic challenge is a vital area of concern for a Land Power owing to the revelation of new research that predicts the Earth to home of 9.6 billion people by the year 2050. Although the Worldwatch Institute considers this number as a ‘low projection’, the critical area of concern for a Land Power is the global population hotspots. The report predicts that the increase of population would take place in some conflict prone developing countries of Africa and India and China, mainly. The 49 least-developed countries where this increase is expected to double are already situated in high-risk regions of intra- and inter-state conflicts. There is a need not only to contain the spread of conflicts—social and military in nature, to neighboring regions, but also a massive rise in population would impact upon the existing resources available in these countries. The nature of conflicts in such cases would be complicated due to a conglomeration of security and environmental aspects, the resolution of which would also be complex. This assumption leads to the idea pronounced by the British General Sir Rupert Smith, who has pointed out how the nature of warfare has been changing in modern times. Smith argues that instead of military forces preparing for ‘long wars’, the changing nature of war demonstrates that conflicts are more taking place ‘amongst the people’. In his words, 

\textit{We do not intervene in order to take or hold territory... instead we intervene in, or even decide to escalate to, a conflict in order to establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other means and in other ways.}\footnote{17}

A Land Power needs to acquaint itself with this new emerging trend where the traditional wars would increasingly be replaced by civil strife or as Sir Rupert and Michael Howard term it as a ‘confrontation’. These situations would not require a direct military intervention as such; instead as Betz points out that it would require a ‘paradigm shift’ for the Land Power to switch from a heavy infantry to a light infantry division. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the ensuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly challenged the perception about the nature of warfare. Particularly, the American way of war, which lies in its exceptionalism in advanced military technology, regular and large-scale warfare\footnote{20} came to be challenged as war experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan showed how the concept of ‘deep fight’\footnote{21} cannot
ensure a win in the long run. The world, therefore, witness a radical shift in the Cold War patterned hierarchical concept of warfare shifted to the winning of ‘the hearts and minds’ of the people.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, reducing the size and task of ground forces is also the order of the day as evident in the West Point Speech of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who boldly announced: “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa, should have his head examined.”\textsuperscript{23} Betz points out that it is not only the size of the ground forces that is being reconsidered rather emphasis is being put to improve the average quality of the standard units in the US, UK and Australian Army while developing a formidable light infantry.\textsuperscript{24} It also focuses on the concept of ‘the soldier as a system’—investing on increasing the capacity of each soldier and if need be, to keep a mobile infantry ready to respond to emanating challenges quickly.

Tied directly with this paradigm shift in Land Power’s adaptability to this new challenge are the issues of economic development and the sharing of the global commons that would be directly affected due to exponential growth of population. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on the US Army’s preparedness argues that the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the US Pacific Command Area of Responsibilities (USPACOM AORs) are assigned with this specific task of keeping the functioning of the global economy particularly by monitoring a safe passage of energy resources and tackling the threats emanating from the transit of the global commons.\textsuperscript{25}

Protection of the environment must be seen as a comprehensive and ongoing process. While major Land Powers of the world are more concerned about safeguarding the key strategic resources, making Land Power adaptable to the changing environmental threats have been generally understated. In recent times, the First Gulf War highlighted the potential of environmental damages during conflict situations. Despite this recognition, states are more inclined to familiarise their Land Power to tackle internal environmental problems, instead of initiating programmes for Land Powers to deal with international environmental threats. It is evident in the response of Land Powers to address environmental calamities and catastrophes like the Cyclone Nargis (in Myanmar), Tsunami (in Indonesia), and Cyclone Sidr (in Bangladesh). The Land Power capacity is increasing to respond to disaster management than responding to international environmental threats that might occur due to population growth, carbon omission or other environmental threats of such global nature. Domestic concerns generally overpower international concerns when it comes to tackling environmental threats. As discussed earlier, time has come to train the Land Power to face the challenges of the coming years when the nature of conflict would change. Land Powers would require engaging more in small scale confrontations that may be induced as a result of short-term or long-term degradation in environment. It is in this context, that the challenges of the Asia-Pacific region are discussed in the next section.


\textsuperscript{24} Betz, op. cit., p.228.

\textsuperscript{25} Stephanie Sanok, Jacqueylin Guy, Curtis Buzzard, Errol Laumann, Steven Niccolucci, J.P. Pellegrino, Sam Eaton and Megan Loney, "Beyond the Last War: Balancing Ground Forces and Future Challenges—Risk in USCENTCOM and USPACOM", CSIS Report, April 2013, p.25.
Sources of Tension in the Asia-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region has emerged as a vital epicenter of global economic prosperity and of strategic concern to the international security agenda. Precariously balanced between aspirations to construct a rule-based Pax Pacifica or Pax Indica and fragile security realities, the vast region displays tendencies of robust economic growth with tense and lagging security concerns. The key regional players such as China, Japan, Korea and India, coupled by the presence of an array of regional organisations, in particular, the important role played by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States of America (USA)'s involvement, are all interlinked in a complex web of interests, power games and cooperation. The emergence of China and increasing importance of India as the key players, both of whom harbour great power aspirations, pose serious challenges for the Asia-Pacific security order.

The Asia-Pacific Security Complex refers to the security relations of inter-dependence between regional states, by taking into account the confluence of their geopolitical interests alongside the involvement of other great powers such as the USA in the regional security dynamics. The Regional Security Complex (RSC) in the Asia-Pacific presents an interesting case of regional interaction that goes back to age-old geopolitical rivalries and tensioned historical legacies between the main regional players. It should be mentioned here that the concept of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSC) was coined by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver so as to allow for the cases of more autonomous regional level security, without the interference of superpower rivalries after the termination of the Cold War. RSC differentiates between the systemic level of global power interplays and the subsystem level of interaction between lesser powers with invested security interests in their regional architecture. The theory posits that since security interdependence is usually patterned into regionally based clusters or security complexes, it is worthwhile to analyse the common trends of trust, cooperation and conflict at a regional level.

It is worth to mention, the Asia-Pacific region is undergoing a strategic shift in a period of global uncertainty. China is emerging as a confident and powerful actor while doubts are often voiced about the role, the USA may play in future. The region’s geography - a predominantly maritime continent composed of several semi enclosed seas means, that the Asia-Pacific is afflicted undefined maritime boundaries at a time of growing state interest in resources garnered from the sea. Notwithstanding its economic prosperity and potential for growth, the Asia-Pacific region confronts a number of challenges which may emerge as threats in future.

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These include,

- Increasing militarisation of the region and a danger of slipping into unanticipated conflicts;
- Disputed territories and maritime space; and
- Legacy of the Cold War confrontation.

In addition to these, non-traditional security challenges are also emerging including energy and food insecurity, diseases and the possibility of large-scale humanitarian crises caused by a climate catastrophe.

**Increasing Militarisation of the Region**

Mistrust is deeply ingrained within the Asia-Pacific region and the regional historical interactions between major players, especially resulting from the militarism, imperialist tendencies, and extreme nationalism of the nineteenth century. The events of the earlier part of the twentieth century namely, Japan's policies towards both China and Korea have left a lasting legacy of deep mistrust in the region. The current rise of nationalism and militarism in north-east Asia is redolent of such unresolved historical frustrations and could bring about new security challenges and potential misconceptions of threats.

The first strategic shift that has been the Asia-Pacific is the rise of China and its concomitant foreign and security policies. Years of trying to assuage regional concerns about its rise have given way in recent times to a China that is less willing to tolerate perceived slights to its "core interests." Concern over China's rise relates to two issues: the pace and perceived lack of transparency in its military modernisation and the perception that its pursuit of "core interests" could cause one of Asia's many territorial flashpoints to escalate. In fact, China's emergence as a power with potential for worldwide influence has the likelihood of triggering off a classic instance of security dilemma. It can be safely argued that Japan's re-militarisation and more assertive foreign and security policies can be attributed to the same feelings of mistrust and perceptions of envy and anxiety concerning China's rise as a global power. Ever since her military defeat in 1945, Japan has been constitutionally constrained to use its naval forces solely for the purpose of defense operations, but at the same time, it possesses cutting-edge defense technologies and is developing naval capabilities. For Japan, it is imperative to surpass the post-World War II Self-defense Force and move towards regional and global power projection as a normal military power. A Sino-Japanese security dilemma can have adverse impacts upon the security of the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, such a security dilemma has the potential of drawing in other rising powers like India into the picture. India has been watching China closely and has steadily increased her military potential with the Indian Navy getting special attention. The concern about China's rise has meant that the Indian Ocean is also turning into an area where future confrontation between competing navies cannot be ruled out.
Disputed Territorial Claims and Maritime Space

A second source of instability is the existence of disputed maritime claims that divert rising regional defense spending to navy and coast guard platforms. The region comprises numerous overlapping maritime boundary disputes, a product of the geographical makeup of the region, with numerous semi-enclosed seas, disputed claims of sovereignty over rocks and islands, and the widespread adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The entitlement to make claims to maritime space is driven by the material importance of rent from the oceans in the countries' national development goals including oil, gas, minerals and fisheries exploitation. The region is also home to numerous territorial disputes over islands and rocks. These issues are further exacerbated by the negative images that many states hold of their territorial rivals as a result of unsettled historical grievances relating to perceived injustices suffered at the hands of other states. The political salience of nationalism throughout the Asia-Pacific region has hardened state postures, prevented accommodation between claimant states and even been a source of escalation. Disputes over resources have led to rationale for a greater allocation of state resources on the military and coastal enforcement vessels. While surface ships complete with advanced air-defense capabilities and technologically advanced war-fighting capabilities have been acquired by many states of the Asia-Pacific region, it should also be borne in mind that a number of states have invested considerable funds in the development of civilian coast guard authorities. While these “white-hulls” are nominally less provocative than their military counterparts, it should be noted that the bulk of the tensions at sea have occurred when these civilian coast guard forces enforce maritime jurisdiction in contested areas.

The proliferation of armed government ships at sea could be problematic for a number of reasons. First, and most obviously, maritime jurisdiction within maritime East Asia is generally contested, so all parties exercise maritime jurisdiction against those that claim the same right. Coastal states also differ over the degree of authority that can be exercised in coastal waters. Secondly, despite the growth in activity, there is little transparency between regional navies and coast guards, which has led to numerous confrontations on regional seas. It is thus only a matter of time before a maritime accident turns deadly, which risks escalation between claimant states and the possible involvement of extra-regional powers. Tragically, the role of these agencies in maritime boundary disputes distracts from the potentially important role that coast guards can play in improving political relations while addressing urgent security issues like piracy and human trafficking.

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Legacy of the Cold War Confrontation

In addition to the above security concerns, the continued tensions and mistrust in the Korean Peninsula have been endemic and they remain a somewhat enduring feature in the Asia-Pacific Security Complex. While conflict on the Korean Peninsula is not inevitable, war is possible. The presence of nuclear weapons in the Peninsula and the proliferation of rocket technology are causes of concerns not only for the immediate region but may have implications for regions situated further away.

Non-Traditional Security Threats

In addition to these traditional threats, a plethora of threats exits which directly affect the interest of regional states: energy and food insecurity, diseases and climate catastrophes. Over the years, Asian countries are consuming more and more energy, which, due to the region's relative scarcity in primary energy sources, is met with imported supplies. To ensure smooth flow of cheap energy to the region and thus ensure both energy security and economic growth, the specter of supply disruption is disturbing to policy makers. Supply-side threats to the Asia-Pacific region's energy security are vast and may be divided into two categories: state-based threats and non-state threats. The former includes situations in which a state actor somewhere along the supply chain deliberately attempts to disrupt the flow of energy. These may include but not necessarily limited to, politically motivated market manipulation by supplier states, disruption or blockade of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) by a hostile state in the midst of a political crisis or imposition of sanctions. Threats by the non-state actors can be no less severe and may comprise terrorist attack which causes disruption in the supply chain, piracy, natural disasters and demand fluctuations in energy-importing states. Interestingly, although a large number of Asia-Pacific states import energy, the common interest in preventing a supply disruption to the region has not resulted in the creation of institutional mechanisms to meet such threats. Rather, such fear has helped drive resource nationalism among regional governments. Such nationalism incentivizes states to build naval forces capable of deterring rival claimants in potentially resource-rich areas, as well as in some cases threats to major maritime energy transport corridors. As energy security becomes a more important driver of regional arms procurement, it is critically important for states to understand that the high-probability threats to maritime energy security cannot be addressed by energy nationalism.

The Asia-Pacific region also faces a number of sources of food insecurity including declining agricultural production caused by the rapid urbanisation and industrialisation associated with economic development. Rising standard of living has triggered a shift from a diet based on carbohydrates and vegetables to one based on protein and fat. Protection of dwindling agricultural sectors has led to a decrease in food production in Asia. This, in turn, has resulted into increase in food prices, and reduced access to cheap food among the

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vulnerable segments of society including the poor, children and the sick. The high price of food in 2008 caused partly by the price hike of petrochemicals, use of food grains to produce fuels like ethanol and by growing frequency of extreme weather which adversely affected food producing areas have further aggravated the condition.33

Health issues are also an important focus in the Asia-Pacific region’s security agenda. Originally coined as part of a human security agenda, it took a long-time for the securitisation of health issues as an international security issue.34 As the twenty-first century proceeds, there is considerable international anxiety about a host of potentially lethal ‘rogue’ viruses circulating the planet—including relatively new ones such as H1N1 swine flu, the highly pathogenic strand of avian influenza and the corona virus responsible for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Ebola. Other infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria remain endemic in many countries and have made devastating comebacks - often in drug-resistant forms.35 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)’s defined scope of health security comprises:

- HIV/AIDS
- Infectious diseases
- Environmental change
- International crises and humanitarian emergencies36

The recent Ebola crisis afflicting West Africa has underlined the severe power of diseases to wreak havoc among societies and that such outbreaks may lead to the emergence of failed states as governments try and fail to stem the multi-pronged affects ranging from food and social crises to economic collapse.37 The impact of such outbreaks in densely populated and urban conurbations of Asia is a possibility which security analysts may ignore only at their own peril.

Food, energy and health insecurity are tied up with issues of how states mitigate and adapt to global climate change. Global warming will exacerbate already strained agricultural conditions in some parts of the Asia-Pacific, while energy consumption patterns in the region may, in time, be influenced by renewable energy sources. Climate change has already had pernicious effects on agricultural yields and fresh water levels across the region. The fact that a large number of the Asian populations and, by extension, their economic infrastructures including energy installations, are concentrated on coastlines increase the possibility that they will be damaged by the storms that afflict the region. As a product of industrialisation and urbanisation, the material cost of natural disasters has

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35 Ya-Wei Chiu PhD, et al, ibid, p.680.
increased and exacted heavy human and financial tolls upon states. Natural disasters threaten energy security in two ways. These can cause price hikes, increasing the cost of energy, and can damage critical infrastructure and circumscribe the ability of governments to distribute energy, including electricity. This was tragically brought home by the powerful earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan in March 2011. The impact of natural disasters is not limited only to high death tolls and the high costs of reconstruction but may also lead to increase in the number of people displaced, which in turn has implications for nearby cities and countries and the region as a whole. Low-lying countries like Bangladesh and Philippines are particularly vulnerable and it is no surprise to note that climate-related disruptions are increasingly identified as the most probable security challenge in the Asia-Pacific region.38

The patterns of enmity and friendship, rivalry and alliance, competition and cooperation among the countries of Asia-Pacific region and challenges faced by them from both traditional and non-traditional security threats will require increased diplomatic effort, cooperation and thinking-outside-the box so as to manage the fluctuating nature of security dynamics in the region. Both prevailing and emerging security considerations mean that the new security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region is being rewritten and it requires innovative solutions that consider the distinctiveness and diversity of the Asian way of settling disputes and meeting the challenges.

Conclusion: Land Power — A Panacea to Environmental Problems?

American historian T. R. Fehrenbach observed,

*You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.*

As Fehrenbach pointed out, the significance of a Land Power is timeless. The discussion in this article shows that Land Powers gradually need to develop a distinct kind of adaptability owing to the changes of time, especially those arising due to global environmental problems. The discussion in this article shows that Land Powers around the world are still devoted primarily to address hardcore security issues. There has not been much emphasis given on developing adaptability of Land Powers to mitigate challenges arises from non-traditional sources of security threats. On the other hand, the contextual analysis of policies of different countries’ Land Powers show that addressing the challenges emanating from the non-traditional sources of security is delineated; perhaps not in a such pronounced manner as done in case of traditional security issues. The analysis also reveals that with the changing nature of conflict, instead of a long war, perhaps time has come to recognise that wars would rather take place in the manner of confrontations, which will involve civilians more. Conflicts would not be limited within only warring factions but would transcend to confrontations among the people due to scarcity of resources. This would certainly require

developing light infantry divisions than providing traditional emphasis on a heavy infantry. Similarly, as pointed out at the beginning of this article that the Land Powers increasingly need to be familiarised with environmental issues, rules and regulations so that these are applied during resolving a crisis or the Land Powers’ involvement during a small-scale confrontation. Without the concept of a ‘green war’, that is transcending the adaptability of a Land Power from merely disaster management issues to an overall protection of the environment, a Land Power’s adaptability cannot be comprehensive.

Above all, as developing response capability of Land Powers has been talked about, it needs to be understood that the crises that are unfolding in the contemporary time are deeper. The interlocking nature of global environmental crises, constrained by the principle of sovereignty, demands a holistic approach for its resolution, which cannot be addressed only by using a Land Power. The US President John F. Kennedy reminded the limits of military power in 1961 by pointing out that strategy, tactics and logistics of a military must be supplemented by the lessons of economics, diplomacy and history and added, “You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been solved by military power alone.” This situation is compounded due to the lack of a holistic understanding of global problems as the typical analysis of international relations compartmentalises environmental crises into different subfields of strategic studies, international political economy or governance, among others, while studying Land Power is considered as a forte of security studies only. It is because of such fragmentation, global economic crisis and global environmental crisis, for example, are treated as matters of different subfields—disregarding the interdependent nature of the both. Ahmed calls it ‘the crisis of international relations’ which must be able to identify the relationship of different types of crises unfolding in different arenas, without which a global solution cannot be reached. As developing adaptability of a Land Power has been discussed to address environmental challenges, the Land Power cannot be separated from this holistic approach of knowledge to ensure its effective performance.
Non-Traditional Security Threats of Bangladesh: Scope of Responses and Challenges for Its Land Forces
Few issues are more important than the roles and missions of the Armed Forces in the post-Cold War era. We are in the midst of major changes in the structure of the international system and of serious challenges to national security.

Samuel P Huntington

Samuel P Huntington, a renowned scholar and author of the book, *The Soldier and the State*, made the above statement to exemplify the roles of the Armed Forces in the volatile environment following immediate aftermath of the end of Cold War, although, the relevance of the same in contemporary times can hardly be over-emphasised. In the 21st century, following the ‘Contemporary Accelerated Globalisation (CAG)’ and the vivid transformation in the composition of ‘security threats’ emanating predominantly from the ‘non-traditional’ sources, only the traditional role of the Armed Forces in maintaining and safeguarding peace, security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the nation-states, no longer remains tenable. In recent times, Armed Forces in the developing countries are increasingly seen to go beyond their conventional role of external defence. They, now perform numerous unconventional roles ranging from disaster relief, fighting against terrorism, and managing internal security to carrying out some developmental roles as well. A transformation in the role of Armed Forces especially, in developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region is therefore, clearly evident. However, among the three services of Armed Forces, the Land Forces remain the dominant actor and institution that are principally involved in performing various unconventional roles. The two other services, i.e., the Navy and Air Forces mainly perform the supporting tasks to the Land Forces in successfully carrying out their various non-traditional roles. Accordingly, this paper restricts itself within the purview of analysing the scope of responses only for the Land Forces and the accompanying challenges they are being faced with. Focusing on Land Forces alone has also put a limit on the scope of the paper thereby, making it expedient to have a more in-depth discussion of the issues and concerns.

A number of factors can be held responsible for changes in the roles of Land Forces. Foremost is the emergence of non-traditional security (NTS) threats as preeminent security concerns in many countries of the region instead of traditional security threats that are
usually posed by another nation-state undermining one’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Secondly, in many instances, Land Forces in developing countries are particularly deemed as an essential institution to assist the civilian authority in managing and responding to natural disasters and internal security concerns. In fact, in some circumstances, such as maintaining law and order, responding to disasters, and carrying out specific developmental roles, (e.g., construction of infrastructural mega projects) the Land Forces appear as proficient actor or institution in many countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The usual characteristics of the Land Forces i.e., professionalism, discipline, institutional integrity as well as their logistical superiority make them the best alternative and plausible solution to some crucial problems of the society. However, performing non-traditional roles by the Land Forces have divulged some new challenges for the professional army. Are the Land Forces in the developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region including Bangladesh adequately prepared to undertake these non-traditional roles? Do they have adequate training and resources? What would it mean for civil-military relations? And most importantly, what would it denote for the traditional roles of the Land Forces in managing and responding to traditional threats. These are the pertinent questions that need to be addressed before responding to NTS threats by the Land Forces of the developing countries including Bangladesh. It is also important and essential to work out the way forward.

With the emerging NTS threats encountered worldwide, Bangladesh also faces severe NTS threats in terms of natural and urban disasters, terrorism, transnational crime, climate change, piracy, illegal cross-border movement, drugs and small arms trafficking, cyber security threat, health epidemic or hazards, and religious-ideological extremism, etc. Bangladesh Land Forces have frequently been called upon to assist the civilian authority in managing and responding to natural disasters, such as floods, cyclones, earthquakes, urban disasters, large scale industrial fire, and maintaining law and order as well as participating in the developmental activities. Given the organisational limitations, logistical shortfalls and inadequate training of various civilian apparatus, and mostly, due to the professional and logistical superiority of the Land Forces, they stand as the viable alternative in a situation of national emergency. And, in performing various NTS roles, Bangladesh Land Forces are also presented with the same challenges that Land Forces in any other developing country in the Asia-Pacific region are confronted with as highlighted through the questions raised above.

Against this backdrop, an attempt has been made in this paper to explore: the scope of responses of Bangladesh Land Forces in addressing the NTS threats; the nature of the challenges faced by the Land Forces in performing such roles; and the ways forward. The paper, at the outset, briefly discusses the concepts of traditional security and NTS in general. It also lays out the traditional and NTS threats of Bangladesh. It then identifies the scope of responses for the Land Forces of Bangladesh in addressing crucial current and future NTS threats. Challenges faced by the Land Forces in performing such roles are then analysed. Finally, the paper reflects on the ways forward indicating the measures needed to engage and deal with the challenges faced by the Land Forces of Bangladesh.

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Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threats of Bangladesh

Intense debate continues to persist among the scholars of ‘security studies’ regarding “the boundaries of the field and the range of its appropriate subject matter”. Since the “golden age” of security studies, realist and neo-realist schools of thoughts dominated the discipline of international relations and security studies. Consequently, security has been defined solely as the security of the state in terms of securing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state. The definitions of security propounded by renowned scholars during the period are testimony to the state-centric understanding of security. Scholars like Walter Lippmann and Arnold Wolfers emphasised on protecting the ‘core values’ of the state from external threats as the central objective of national security. ‘Core values’ or ‘acquired values’ in the context of national security have essentially been interpreted as the independence and territorial integrity of a state that must be protected and preserved from external military threats and mainly through military means. Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz (1979) and Robert Keohane (1986) in the later periods uphold more or less similar understanding of security and in fact, this traditional security model (TSM) continued to dominate the security discourse till the end of the Cold War.

In early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the accompanying monumental structural changes set in motion a new wave of rethinking regarding the meaning and goals of security. The end of bipolarity, on one hand, dramatically decreased the traditional security threats to most of the states, on the other hand, many countries mostly the developing ones have been confronted with a series of intra-state violent conflicts, large scale atrocities, and even genocide. According to one research, during 1990s, out of 103 wars or conflicts, 97 have been fought within rather than between states. The traditional security paradigm appeared inadequate in subsuming and addressing these newer types of threats to nation-states. Consequently, the new security agenda came to include a whole gamut of diverse issues like, intra-state conflicts, ethno-religious violence, terrorism, democratic deficit, human rights violations, gender discriminations, economic underdevelopment, poverty, hunger, deprivation, inequality, disease and health hazards, human development, economic security, market, water, energy, environmental degradation and so on. The meaning of security has been widened and deepened to incorporate the extended ‘sources of insecurities’ and, with this, an epistemological advancement has purportedly been achieved under the rubric of ‘NTS’ construction. As one scholar remarked, the diverse issues that followed the departure from the traditional meaning of security came to be broadly defined as “non-traditional security”. Moreover, a significant advancement in the thinking about

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2 While the first decade since the World War II can be regarded as period of the formation of security studies as an academic discipline, the second decade is regarded as the “golden age” of security studies. For a brief but succinct discussion on the emergence and evolution of security studies, see, A K M Abdul Sabur, “National Security of Bangladesh: The Traditional Context”, in M R Osmany and M Ahmed (eds.), Security in the Twenty First Century: A Bangladesh Perspective, Dhaka: Academic Press and BILSS, 2000, pp. 62-68.
security has ushered with the adoption of ‘human security’ approach, i.e., inclusion of ‘human being’ as a ‘referent object’.11 State has no longer remained as the only objective of security, rather, the security of an individual in terms of his/her physical safety, human dignity, development opportunity, and socio-economic and politico-cultural rights and choices have also been considered as important as the security of a state. Therefore, in contemporary times, recognising the linkages between NTS and human security, NTS for a particular country involves a wide array of issues encompassing political, economic, societal, health, and environmental security as well as cross-border security.

Bangladesh, due to its geopolitical environment and state of economic, political and societal developments, encounters both traditional and NTS threats. Traditional security concerns emanate predominantly from the distinctive geographical location of the country, i.e., being surrounded by India, the dominant power in the region, on three sides of its border. The other neighbour, Myanmar, also remained at distance due to limited connectivity between the two countries. Therefore, immediate traditional security concerns of Bangladesh, like any other developing country in the Asia-Pacific region, stem mainly from the neighbourhood of the country. As for NTS threats, shown in Figure 1, Bangladesh faces a wide and diverse range of threats. In political arena, the country is at the nascent stage of democratic consolidation thereby, confronts with dysfunctional politics and democratic deficit as well as governance issues like lack of rule of law, rampant corruption and poor public service delivery engendering political security of the country. Unemployment, poverty, food insecurity, lack of economic opportunity, etc. are some of the NTS concerns of Bangladesh that fall within the category of economic security. Gender discriminations, child labour, drug abuse, crime, extremism and terrorism are some of the major NTS concerns hindering societal security of the country. Environmental degradation caused mainly due to unplanned industrialisation, natural disasters, and climate change vulnerabilities are also major NTS concerns of the country. Trafficking of small arms, drugs, women and children, water scarcity, energy shortages, etc. are some of the other significant NTS threats of Bangladesh. Addressing and managing some of these NTS threats, i.e. natural disasters, industrial hazards, urban disasters, law and order problems, and building infrastructural mega projects, frequently turns out daunting for civilian administration of Bangladesh. Therefore, military, especially, the Land Forces have very often been called upon to address various national emergencies faced by the country that actually falls within the category of NTS threats rather than the usual traditional security concerns. Below diagram represents a NTS threat framework for Bangladesh explaining various kinds of threats under different categories of security concerns.

11 Traditionally, nation-state has only been considered as a ‘referent object’. With the onset of ‘human security’ approach, human being has also been included as a ‘referent object’ in analysing and understanding security and threats.
Referent object: State and People
Insecurity drivers: National & Transnational Security Provider:
Internal – State & Non-state actors
External – State & Non-state actors

Threats to state by non-state drivers

Human Security (HS)
Threats to people by state & non-state drivers

Politcal Security
Governance issues; Democratic Deficit; Confrontational Politics; etc.

Economic Security
Economic Development; Poverty; Unemployment; Food Security; etc.

Societal Security
Gender issues; Child Security; Drug Abuse and Narcotics Control; Crime; Terrorism; etc.

Health Security
Epidemics; HIV/AIDS; Drug Administration; etc.

Environmental Security
Environmental Degradation; Industrial Waste; Climate Change Impacts; Natural Disasters; etc.

Cross-border Security
Trafficking in Small Arms, Drugs and Women and Children; Trans-boundary Water Issues; Cross-border movements of Criminals; etc.

Energy Security
Scarcity/availability of Energy resources; Optimum utilisation; etc.

Scope of Responses for Bangladesh Land Forces in Addressing the NTS Threats

Even though, Bangladesh is extremely vulnerable to various types of NTS threats, military is not the comprehensive solution to fight against entire range of threats that are projected in Figure 1. Following experiences from the past engagements of the military around the world in general and in Bangladesh in particular, below are some of the NTS threat areas where Bangladesh currently employs its Land Forces and can effectively utilise them in future.

Environmental Security Threats and Disaster Management

Due to geographical location, land characteristics, multiplicity of rivers, monsoon climate and coastal morphology, Bangladesh ranks as one of the most disaster-prone and environmentally vulnerable countries of the world. Historically, Bangladesh is exposed to a wide variety of natural disasters such as tropical cyclones and storm surges, floods, tornadoes, river or coastal erosion, earthquake, tsunami, torrential rains, arsenic contamination, salinity intrusion and various forms of natural and human-induced hazards. Environmental disasters like tropical cyclones, storm surges, floods and tornadoes ravage the country almost every year. Between 1980 and 2008, Bangladesh experienced 219 natural disasters, causing over US$ 16 billion of total damage. The last of the devastating cyclone, Sidr, that struck the coast of Bangladesh on 15 November 2007, claimed 3,406 lives and caused material damages worth of US$ 1.67 billion. Although, the country did not experience any major earthquake in recent past, yet following Nepal's 2015 devastating earthquake occurrence, the destruction effect and its magnitude of damage can easily be assessed if an earthquake of 7.5 on the Richter scale hits Bangladesh.

Whether it is a cyclone or flood, tornado or earthquake, the Land Forces of the country have frequently been called upon ‘in aid to civil power’ to conduct relief and rescue operations, thereby, participate effectively in the disaster management effort of Bangladesh government. In recent past, successful deployment of Bangladesh Land Forces after massive cyclone of 1991, combined with the US Marines under ‘Operation Sea Angels’ had been a unique testimony substantiating above proclamation.

In fact, Bangladesh Land Forces have been involved in all stages of disaster management from normal times to alert and warning stage and also at the disaster stage. In normal times, a Disaster Management Focal Point is designated within the Armed Forces that establish effective contact and ensure continuous liaison with Cabinet Committee on Disaster

Response (CCDR), National Disaster Response Coordination Group (NDRCG)\textsuperscript{15} and the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFD). During alert and warning stage, the Land Forces are involved in operating the Control Room and the Prime Minister’s Monitoring and Coordination Cell round the clock. At this stage, appropriate units of the Land Forces are also kept in readiness for conducting rescue, evacuation and relief operations as per requisition. Also, during the disaster phase, Land Forces, on the basis of requisition of the government, get deployed for disaster response, relief and rehabilitation work.\textsuperscript{16} However, not only at the operational level, but also Land Forces of Bangladesh are inextricably linked at the policy making level of the country’s disaster management system (Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Institutional Arrangement of Bangladesh Disaster Management**

![Institutional Arrangement of Bangladesh Disaster Management](image)

Source: M Aslam Alam, “Role of Armed Forces in Disaster Management: Coordination and operation”, op. cit.

Representatives of the Land Forces are included in all of the three policy making bodies of Bangladesh disaster management institutional arrangement. National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) is the apex policy making body at the national level, headed by the Prime Minister. Chiefs of Armed Forces and Principal Staff Officer (PSO), Armed Forces Division

\textsuperscript{15} The NDRCG is comprised of secretaries from ministries of Home Affairs, Information, Food and Disaster Management, Health, Post and Telecommunications, Education, Shipping, Water Resources, and Principal Staff Officer (PSO) from Armed Forces Division (AFD). Minister, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, heads the Coordination Group as its Chairman. For details, see, Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD), Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, Disaster Management & Relief Division, Disaster Management Bureau, April 2010.

\textsuperscript{16} M Aslam Alam, “Role of Armed Forces in Disaster Management: Coordination and Cooperation”, Paper presented in a Workshop on Civil-Military Relations: Trust Building, organised by Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) with support of the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) of USA, on 12 January 2011, Dhaka.
(AFD) are the members of this apex body that formulates disaster management policy and plans, and issues guidelines and directives for their implementation. It also approves Standing Orders on Disaster (SOD) ensuring coordination amongst civil administration, Defence Forces, NGOs, and a host of other related tasks. The Inter-Ministerial Disaster Management Coordination Committee (IMDMCC) is the second policy making body headed by the Minister for Food and Disaster Management includes all the relevant secretaries of Bangladesh government, Principal Staff Officer of Armed Forces Division, and other concerned officials. Land Forces representatives are also included in the National Disaster Management Advisory Committee (NDMAC) along with Members of Parliament from the disaster-prone areas, and representatives from government agencies, universities, NGOs, donor organisations and business community. Therefore, Bangladesh Land Forces remain the major actors and institutions in the national disaster management framework, consequently, over the years, its disaster management roles have been validated and institutionalised.

**Climate Change Threats**

Military Advisory Board of The Centre for Naval Analysis (CNA) Corporation, USA, found that drought induced from climate change in the Middle East and Africa is leading to conflicts over food and water and escalating longstanding regional and ethnic tensions into violent clashes. Rising sea levels in vulnerable coastal regions like eastern India, Bangladesh and the Mekong Delta in Vietnam are putting people and food supplies at risk and could lead to a new wave of refugees. This research clearly signifies the magnitude and threat of climate change for low lying areas of Bangladesh. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that a 1 metre rise in sea level may displace nearly 14.8 million people in Bangladesh. Thus, climate change combined with environmental vulnerability may compel millions of Bangladeshis to migrate from low lying areas to urban or relatively high altitude locality. Managing the movement of huge volume of climate refugees seeking for immediate shelter and food within a short span of time is gigantic and colossal task. This movement can trigger huge chaos and unruly situation, which could be extremely vulnerable for national security and stability. Recently, European Union (EU) has decided to use military to stop refugee migration from Asia and the Middle East. Though, it can be predicted that climate change is likely to take place over a prolonged period and with the resilience and adaptation capability, most of the affected people will probably try to cope up with the change and may get them settled within surrounding areas. Yet, the uncertainty of threat situation will never allow an option for accurate prediction based on which appropriate action can be planned by the government or law enforcing agencies. In such scenario, some of the tasks that Land Forces can be entrusted upon to address climate change threats are: conducting a detail study on climate change threat, developing a climate change action strategy, developing risk mitigation plan, climate migrants relocation plan (in collaboration with concerned ministries), refugee movement route control plan, detail route map for resettlement areas, development of resettlement areas, maintaining law and order situation, etc.

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**Transnational Terrorism Threats**

Transnational or international terrorism is a serious and growing global security concern in recent years. Taking advantage of porous borders and interconnected international systems like finance, communications, and transit; terrorist groups can reach every corner of the globe.¹⁰ Like many other regions, the security landscape of South Asia is also marked with diversity of conflicts, showing a sharp rise in terrorism. Since mid-nineties, Bangladesh has been experiencing the menace of violence and extremism by home based extremists with insignificant outside links. Be it for ethnic, religious, political or anti-state ideologies, the risks and vulnerabilities created by terrorist groups having financial support, innovative operational strategy, and patronisation by some states and international network pose serious threats to national security. In Bangladesh, over the last decade, a number of militant groups were banned by the successive governments. Members of these groups are kept on-the-run by law enforcing agencies. Yet, possibilities of clandestine terrorist attacks cannot be ignored. Regular law enforcing agencies are at times helpless to handle these threats due to organisational or structural shortfalls. Numerous recent examples from several countries can be quoted where Land Forces were deployed to fight against terrorists. Indian parliament attack by the terrorists in 2001, Nairobi Westgate shopping mall attack in 2013, Mumbai Taj Mahal Palace hotel attack in 2013, Pakistan (Peshawar) military school attack in 2014, and Kenyan Garissa University attack in 2015 are some of the recent cases where alongside other law enforcing agencies, the Land Forces had to intervene in neutralising the terrorists. Growing international network of al-Qaida, Islamic State (IS), Boko-Haram, Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organisations dictate that international terrorism has no geographic boundary and operational limit. Hence, the Land Forces need to remain prepared to face the challenges of terrorism threats whenever needed. Military in such cases may have to act as ‘striking reserve’ or ‘rapid response unit’ to neutralise the threat.

**Transnational Crime Threats**

Transnational crimes are the crimes that have actual or potential affects across the border and crimes which are intra-state but offend fundamental values of the international community.²⁰ Activities like arms and drugs trafficking, women and child trafficking, prostitution or sex slavery, transnational organised crimes, extortion, contract killing, money laundering, etc. can be termed as transnational crimes. Transnational Organised Crime is the crime coordinated across national borders, involving groups or networks of individuals working in more than one country to plan and execute illegal ventures.²¹ This is the most serious and alarming threat to nation-states as it can undermine the credibility of governments, if fails to provide a minimum level of protection to citizens. Criminal activity can also cause widespread fatality and public devastation. Counterfeit currency smuggling or money laundering can severely threaten state’s economy or disrupt financial control and destabilise public reliance on the nation’s banking system. In practice, during an incident of a crime, law enforcing agencies will take the control of situation to fight against transnational crimes. However, if the situation is beyond control of regular law enforcing agencies, military

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may be deployed. In addition, the military can also be employed as a supporting agency in remote border regions to curb illegal migration (e.g. along Myanmar border), drug and arms trafficking, etc. Land Forces may employ its intelligence and surveillance units for intelligence collection and provide early warning especially if these capabilities are not available with regular law enforcing agencies. However, the Land Forces are not designed for such operations and should only be used to deal with transnational crimes when considered essential.

**Health Security Threats**

An epidemic is the rapid spread of infectious diseases to a large number of people in a given population within a short period of time. In 2003, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic took the lives of nearly 800 people worldwide. In 2014, Ebola outbreak was the largest in history, affecting multiple countries in West Africa, namely Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. There were also small number of cases reported in Nigeria, Mali and Senegal. Until April 2015, nearly 10,704 confirmed deaths were reported worldwide. This epidemic compelled the governments of affected countries to declare national emergency. Schools, universities, markets, essential services and even some clinics were closed for months. At one stage in November 2014, nearly 3000 US Land Forces personnel were deployed in Liberia to stabilise the situation by establishing field hospitals, evacuation of patients and establishing training centers to training health workers and volunteers. So far, the effort is considered to be successful. The U.S. military effort to help prevent the spread of Ebola in West Africa could be an example of military use to fight against health security threats. Bangladesh has also sent a number of medical teams to disaster affected areas of the region including recently, in Nepal to support victims of devastating earthquake. These teams were successful in directly supporting to fight back health security threats in affected areas. Hence, Land Forces can play an effective role during an epidemic disease or any other health security threats; to conduct rescue and evacuation, establish field hospitals, train health workers, maintain quarantine areas, and assist national health authority in managing the threat.

**Energy Security Threats**

Energy security is a strategic determinant for economic and social progress of a country. It encompasses all kinds of energy sourced from coal, oil, gas, renewable and nuclear plants. Despite having the ambitious renewable energy targets, states will have to remain dependent on coal, oil and gas for many decades, thus making them vulnerable to supply disruptions. Over the years, Armed Forces of many countries have performed assertive roles in protecting energy security in many parts of the world.

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The US military is now underway to address energy related challenges to achieve energy security.\textsuperscript{26} Pentagon has pursued military dominance in the Middle East to ensure secured delivery of oil and repel any state or actor willing to create dominance on the hydrocarbon resources of that region. Strategically, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) played a significant energy security role by protecting critical energy infrastructures and transit. Presently, NATO is protecting the ships and sea lanes into and out of the Persian Gulf from a potential Iranian threat\textsuperscript{27}. Both Britain and France are seeking to enhance their military capabilities to protect the supply of key strategic resource like oil. The European Union (EU) is considering investing its military in protecting proposed Trans-Sahara Gas Pipe Line (TSGP) which would source gas from troubled Niger Delta.\textsuperscript{28} Under ‘Operation Atalanta’, the EU is conducting ongoing anti-piracy mission against Somali pirates, which is considered as the test case for military response against energy security.\textsuperscript{29} Besides, ships from the US, China and Russia have also joined this drive. By recognising the links between energy and national security, Indian official maritime doctrine states that disruption of India’s Persian Gulf-based oil supplies “could critically affect the country’s interests,” and that offshore oil and gas facilities are extremely vulnerable to disruptive attacks.\textsuperscript{30} Pipelines with oil supplies have been targeted in Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Columbia, Chechnya, Iraq, Sudan and many other places by rebels or terrorists. It is worth mentioning that Al-Qaida has frequently targeted oil infrastructures.\textsuperscript{31}

Energy production and supply in Bangladesh has always been scarce. While demand is increasing as a result of economic, social and technological expansion, the supply remains inadequate. It is therefore essential to take appropriate security measures to preserve all existing energy capability to support steady socio-economic development.\textsuperscript{32} Therefore, proposed nuclear power plant in Bangladesh being a sensitive key point installation must be protected from all kinds of NTS threats. Major gas fields being the largest contributors of country’s energy source (about 75 percent)\textsuperscript{33} should be under close surveillance. The choke points of national grid, India- Bangladesh high voltage power grid, major coal mine projects, hydro-power plant, large barge mounted and quick rental power plants, eastern refinery, oil fields and main storage areas are the places of major concerns for ensuring energy security. Land Forces can contribute by conducting NTS threat assessment on these installations, analysing the security risk, preparing risk mitigation plan and comprehensive security response strategy, rehearsing the response capability in peace time in coordination with all related agencies, finding the gaps in existing security arrangements, and assisting civil administration to enhance its security response capability to support national energy security.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid. p. 6.
\textsuperscript{31} Neil Endicott, Military Responses to Energy Security Problems, op.cit. p. 10.
Economic Security Threats

Bangladesh being a developing nation needs massive infrastructural expansion to boost its economic growth to provide enhanced economic security. Departments dealing with development projects at times fail to demonstrate required standards due to their organisational and logistical limitations. Land Forces having vast administrative and logistic capability is an excellent alternative choice when integrated with the mainstream development activities of a nation. With inherent capability, the Land Forces appeared as an essential body to carry out various large infrastructural projects in developmental roles. Mega projects like flyover, four lane highway, five star hotels, army housing scheme, large temple, large Hatir-Jheel lake (91 hectares) beautification project, sea beach marine drive road, etc. are some of the successful construction projects that military has completed in Bangladesh. In recognition to its satisfactory accomplishments, government has entrusted the supervision and consultancy task for access road of 6.15 km long ‘Padma road-rail bridge’ mega project to Bangladesh Army. Under this deal, the Army in association with Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation (BRTC) will act as a consultant for the construction of 15 km approach roads, selected bridge end facilities and service area involving an estimated cost of US $ 20 million. Successful completion of Padma bridge project will directly influence in national economy and contribute to increase in GDP growth.

Under the project named ‘Asrayan’, the Land Forces in Bangladesh are also involved nationwide in the construction of shelters for over 50,000 homeless families in close coordination with the civil authorities at national, district, and sub-district levels. The overall objective of the project is to alleviate poverty of the landless and homeless people by providing shelters and human resource development activities. The project will ensure better standard of living, basic education, health care and skill development on income generating activities for the poor homeless, distress and rootless people. This project can boost up the economic security for the inhabitants of coastal regions affected by cyclone, river erosion and flood.

Challenges Faced by the Land Forces of Bangladesh

Military cannot take a decision all by itself to deploy and fight against the NTS challenges even when national security is endangered. Activities of the Land Forces are guided by the government instructions, direction from headquarters, operational orders and accepted military doctrine. The terms of references and limit of operational responsibility need to be specifically outlined. Lack of clear and specific instruction may cause dilemma in making a comprehensive plan and may hinder its response capability during emergency. However, when ordered for such deployment, following are the possible challenges that the Land Forces of Bangladesh may encounter:

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22 Talk delivered by Shahedul Anam Khan, on “Defence and Development: A Perspective”, at Bangladesh Foreign Service Academy on 08 October 1998, Dhaka.
• **Organisational Restructuring.** Organisational structures of Land Forces are made considering its conventional or traditional roles. Current military structure is designed to fight against traditional enemy who is mostly known, while non-traditional enemy will differ in size, appearance and strategy, who are unknown. With the changing threat dimension, a restructured organisational setup will be essential to address multidimensional NTS threats. Therefore, military is likely to face the challenging need of restructuring its forces to counter the threats.

• **Training and Doctrine.** Training is the process that forges soldiers and material over time into combat ready units and formations. Such process requires an effective and efficient training system to make sure that the force is combat ready. Military training is focused by synchronising with its mission and operational role. But, encountering strategy adopted by military against traditional and non-traditional threats are different. Military doctrine is the expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. It is a guide to action rather than hard and fast rules. Doctrine provides a common frame of reference across the military. Therefore, to fight against NTS threats, the Land Forces will face the challenging need for specialised mission oriented training and appropriate doctrine.

• **Budget.** The size of a budget also reflects the entity’s ability to fund military activities. Modern military arsenals are extremely expensive which has caused defence expenditure to increase grossly. Moreover, military budget expenditure has to follow through bureaucratic audit system that delays procurement process. Such inherent limitations and process of utilising it to acquire advance technology; military arsenal and modern mission oriented equipment will be very challenging for Land Forces. In most cases, constraints of this kind can deter military preparedness.

• **Intelligence.** Assessing the vulnerabilities from perceived threats to ascertain the level of preparedness is the most decisive challenge for the government, so is the case with the military. Knowing and understanding the type of threats to be confronted is very crucial. It will be challenging to find real time intelligence on the objective, capabilities and strength of the threat to formulate the Land Forces strategy.

• **Civil-Military Relations.** Military in most democratic states are the largest government funded entity. Employment of military sometimes depends upon popular support or public and media demand. Besides, political resistance against the use of Land Forces in combating against NTS threats could also be a challenge. Anti-military sentiment or protests from human rights activists can make situation complicated and deter military deployment. Hence, to ensure increased civil-military relations will be easier said than done.

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40 Ibid. p. 7.
41 Glen Sagell, “Civil-Military Relations after the Nation-State”, UK: Glen Sagell publisher, December 2001, p.8
• **Lead Coordinating Authority.** Fighting against non-traditional threats is not a matter that concerns military only but also needs a concerted effort. Coordination with other forces, ministries and agencies (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home, Ministry of Finance, National Security Intelligence, etc.) are essential for operational success. This is one of the critical challenges that military might have to encounter. To counter this challenge, some of the developed nations like Russia, New Zealand, UAE, Cyprus and several Balkan states have formed an organisation named National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC or CMC) or National Emergency and Crisis Management Authority. Similar organisation in India is named as National Crisis Management Committee. This is an intervening organisation committed to manage a crisis or critical emergency situation before, during and after an occurrence. The centre may also forecast the scenario of possible natural and accidental emergencies. This type of centre works as lead coordinating authority and responds quickly to a crisis in collaboration with concerned stake holders. Absence of similar setup may cause considerable coordination gap that can make NTS operations more complicated.

• **Balancing the Role of Military.** Although military remains an important instrument of national security, it is not a comprehensive apparatus to fight against entire spectrum of NTS concerns. Employing the military against all types of threats may seriously jeopardise its primary mission. However, NTS being concerning threats of these days, military at times will have to deal with both, making their job more challenging. Mitigating threats being the primary responsibility of the military, the entire force cannot be employed against NTS threats only. Therefore, finding a balance in employment of Land Forces to address both types of threats will be difficult.

• **Regional Consensus and Coordination.** It could be difficult to eliminate some of the threats locally due to the fact of having regional connections and involvement. Hence, regional consensus and coordination will be essential for exchange of information, data, technology, prisoners and conducting joint operations to fight against these threats, which is a delicate and sensitive issue.

• **Risk of Military Use.** Use of military is not always the most appropriate decision to fight against terrorists or criminal threats; therefore, regular law enforcing agencies should be the best choice. Armed engagement is always risky due to chances of collateral damage and possible loss of civilian lives, though unintended. Hence, using the military with required caution following appropriate safety measures will be critical.

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Ways Forward

Large segment of the regular law enforcing agencies mostly remain committed to ensure the internal law and order situation of the country. In most cases, they are not sufficiently equipped to effectively engage against all kinds of NTS threats; hence, chances of military engagement to deal with such threats are ever-increasing. Considering this aspect, Land Forces must remain prepared to confront with the new trends of threats. Following are the possible ways forward to use Land Forces against NTS threats:

• There must be a clear and well-defined strategy provided to Land Forces by National Authority to respond against NTS threats;

• To fight against new dimension of NTS threats, Land Forces need to restructure their training module. Training must be focused addressing specific threats like trans-border crime, transnational threats, aircraft hijacking, hostage situation, cyber threat, health security threat, etc. Above and beyond, operational aspects of NTS threats must be included in military doctrine;

• Traditional military budget may no longer be an effective solution to fight non-traditional threats. Special budget allocation is required to acquire latest technology, digital machineries, modern equipment, monitoring devices and gadgets matching with the threat capability;

• NTS encompasses a wide variety of threats that needs multiple law enforcing agencies to deal with; therefore, establishment of a Joint Task Force under “National Crisis Management Centre” (or any other appropriate name) is needed under the direct supervision of Prime Minister’s Office to effectively deal with such kind of threats; and

• Strategies must be developed to obtain popular support and greater civil-military cooperation to ensure that civil societies clearly understand the danger of NTS threats and essentiality for deployment of Land Forces. Otherwise, common mass may impede military engagements by raising multidimensional concerns.

Conclusion

When compared to traditional threats, possibilities of NTS threat remains very high in Bangladesh. Multi-dimensional probabilities of these threats have made the national security parameters more intricate, difficult and asymmetric to handle. Anticipating the direction, time and volume of NTS threats are extremely difficult. Vast knowledge, extensive training, strong organisational skill and ability, prudent leadership, strong determination, quick response including national and regional consensus are some of the deciding factors that can make a difference. When faced with NTS threats, decision to use the Land Forces are directed by national or state policy depending upon its competency and capability. When other law enforcing agencies are strong, military can play a supporting role. But, when

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organisational and supervisory capabilities of Armed Forces are strong, they may take the lead role. This has manifested in many previous catastrophic instances like flood, cyclone, major disasters, train accidents, etc. Logically, from the past instances, it can be forecasted that, Land Forces will be deployed to face any similar future challenges as done before. It must be noted that, multi-dimensional NTS threats are interconnected and therefore, attention must be given to significant ones without ignoring the others. Land Forces being the most important ground element of countries defence forces, must remain prepared to face the challenges when threats are emanating from both within and transnational front. To deal with changing future threat scenario, Land Forces needs to undergo certain transformation in terms of structure, training and equipment. This will permit Land Forces to prepare against the changing battle field environment having no boundary or limit. Besides, the success of Land Forces engagement in NTS operations will greatly depend on the cooperation and coordination with other relevant civil authorities. Hence, military must ensure taking appropriate measures to maintain enhanced civil-military relations to achieve greater mutual confidence and support. Addressing the issues outlined above will possibly be the suitable options for Land Forces to address the NTS threats and challenges against Bangladesh in the 21st century.
Afterthoughts on PAMS XXXVIII: Offering a Soft Power Recipe for Greater Regional Cooperation
Abdullah Al Yusuf

September 2014 witnessed a phenomenal event at Dhaka, Bangladesh, where Land Forces’ representatives of about 25 countries from all over the Asia-Pacific region assembled to explore new areas of cooperation in pursuit of regional security. Habitually, Land Forces are maintained by the states to demonstrate, and if necessary, using hard power to safeguard national interests. If the interests of individual states were all complementary, then, the state will not feel the necessity to spend millions of dollars to maintain the armed forces. The fact that the countries do raise, train, equip and maintain armed forces; underline the unpleasant reality that they do have conflicting interests. When a country’s interests clashes, she tends to prevail over its adversary by imposing its wills onto them, by using coercive tools and violent means, i.e. by resorting to hard power. And of course, the military represents the hardest form of power. If and when the country’s neighbours expand their military capabilities, it becomes cautious. Also, the countries start enhancing their own military capabilities with equal vigour lest they subdue others with their superior might. An insane race for more and more and yet more hard power ensues. Therefore, the national resources drain away towards destructive purposes.

The September 2014 congregation at Dhaka signified a marked departure from this traditional notion about armed forces. The message was clear: the armed forces do not only meet at the borders to fight against each other, but also meet on regional platforms to discuss peace and collective security. The Seminar, known as the 38th Pacific Armies Management Seminar, also implied that countries do have many common interests to talk about and invest the collective efforts towards that end.

In the recent decades, especially after the end of the Cold War, there have been increasing realisations that the crude form of power benefits none in long run. Violence begets violence. The use of force invites retaliation. The weaker side temporarily retreats only to gain time, amass more power, and strikes back at an opportune moment with more savagery. The legacy drags on. Battles are won every now and then; but no side wins the ultimate war. Temporary victories do not help release a sigh of relief. The possible vengeance of the vanquished keeps the victor under stress. In the end, peace remains a dream; suspicion, hostility and violence become the stark reality.

There had been a lot of scholarly debates about making of a secured world. Even the very concept of security has been scrutinised through different lenses. Some scholars have tried to differentiate between ‘state’ and ‘human security’; some have viewed security as a matter of freedom: from fear and want; yet others have prophesied the idea of traditional and non-traditional security. All their arguments have genuine merits and deserve sincere attention. The most encouraging of all is the ever growing concern and sincere efforts to identify all the potential sources of insecurity and to develop an appropriate formula for collective peace. The very fact, that the nations are now willing to assemble together to discuss and identify new areas of cooperation to ensure collective security against common threats, signifies a major progress towards the noble mission of making a safer and more peaceful world.
Another significant development is the growing emphasis on resolving conflicts through means other than hard power. Academics and politicians all over the world are striving to evolve alternative strategies to address the sources of insecurity and conflict. Jr. Joseph Nye enunciated the idea of soft power: a kind of power that aims at using means and securing objectives that are beneficial for all the contending parties. The concept has not gone unchallenged. Some commentators have termed the idea as ‘velvet gloves hiding iron fists’; some have criticised it as a ‘choice of the weak’; and yet others have assigned it a secondary status - a smart and diplomatic prelude to the inevitable use of hard power. Nonetheless, the concept has definitely opened newer and more constructive lines of thoughts towards enhancing global peace.

The Pacific Armies Management Seminar, PAMS in short, was indeed a splendid demonstration of this soft power approach: ‘together we can do something that is better for all of us’, essentially, the message disseminated by Joseph Nye. Though the particular glossary, soft power, was rarely used by any of the speakers or panelists, the spirit resonated throughout the Seminar. To initiate the spirit of cooperation among the nations of such a vast region as the Asia-Pacific, some common threads of mutual concern had to be identified. The planners of the Seminar seem to have done quite a bit of homework and have floated a very pertinent issue for discussion, especially, non-traditional security. Environmental security, a comparatively benign and less controversial component of non-traditional security received some added focus and a complete session was dedicated for the purpose.

The insightful thoughts and ideas on the various dimensions of non-traditional security were indeed stimulating and intellectually rewarding. The common threats were identified and the need for greater cooperation among the nations was duly emphasised. But something looked a bit troubling. While the non-traditional security as a concept provided a common thread to weave the interests of the nations together, it is the very multi-dimensional nature of the concept that prompted diverse perspectives about the relative importance of its components.

As non-traditional security is often context-specific; the scholars belonging to different parts of the region stressed upon different components of non-traditional security: those that concern them the most. Some were spotlighting on illegal drug trafficking; some were more focused on terrorism; even, some were absolutely preoccupied with environmental issues; and yet others highlighted the threats of hunger, famine and diseases. The priority varied from people to people depending on to which part of the globe they belonged and which aspect of non-traditional threat affects them the most. People’s outlook is basically shaped by their observations and experiences. Therefore, it is no surprise that they view the world through the lens they are most familiar with. And that raises the fundamental question: how to prioritise the efforts, where to start from? This article is indeed a humble attempt to help prioritise the efforts towards making a safer and more secured world.

The term ‘security’ has often been used too broadly. Questions like security ‘for whom’ and ‘from what’ were often found critical, dilemmatic and controversial. The ongoing debates
over ‘state’ versus ‘human security’ could be a good starting point to probe further into the more complicated arguments about this matter. Who would really care if the desolate Greenland lagoons were draining away into some mysterious tunnels and the ice sheets were thinning out? Why should anyone care if the polar ice caps were melting away or the glaciers were losing density? We care, because these environmental phenomena threaten ‘people’ elsewhere on the planet. People become worried when they hear of the possibility of the Maldives going under the rising sea water. People do not care about what is happening in the vast emptiness of Antarctica or Greenland, but they care about the much smaller islands of ‘Maldives’ because ‘people’ live in there. It does not matter if the millions of hectors of uninhabited lands of North or South Pole are ruined into nothingness unless these affect lives on the planet. Generally, we care not about the land but about the people. That gives us some lead towards resolving the debate over ‘state’ versus ‘human security’. The two very basic constituent elements of ‘state’ are its terrain and demography: ‘a sovereign territory’ and ‘the people’. Even ‘sovereignty’, the qualifying term, relates to people. If there were none to claim sovereignty, a territory could be broken down into innumerable pieces and no one would care. To the contrary, borders defining sovereign territories have often appeared meaningless when those divided homogenous people with unique identity. Cross-border migration became the norm. Again, when our meticulously drawn land borders proved porous and ineffective, some ‘walls of diseases’ proved more effective in isolating people. Of late, even a microscopic Ebola virus defined a boundary that no one dared to defy. It completely sealed off an entire region from the rest of the world; something, even the most stringent immigration officials or the finest border patrols would not be able to ensure. All these arguments point at the indisputable fact that we care more about our lives and lifestyles than we care about the land. Our security concerns are for the people, not essentially the state or territory per se. That answers the security ‘for whom’ question.

Now, focus on the security ‘from what’ question could be discussed at this stage. Our lives and lifestyles can be threatened by quite a good number of factors. The list of the sources of insecurity could be quite long. Wars, conflicts, famine, diseases, disasters, illegal drugs, terrorism, ethnic divide, bad governance, corrupt bureaucracy, dictatorial regime, depleted ozone layer, a minuscule but venomous insect, or even a microscopic bacteria or virus can threaten our lives and lifestyles. Thus, instead of focusing on each individual threat, it is more convenient to search for a pattern or group of threats with identical features. The categories of threats identified by the United Nations Commission on Human Security in its 2003 Report appear more comprehensive than any other contemporary theories. The Commission has grouped the different kinds of threats to human security under three general heads: threats that induce ‘fear’, threats that affect basic human needs and ‘wants’, and the threats that undermine human ‘dignity’. The Commission thus postulates that the security of all human lives connotes ‘freedom from fear’, ‘freedom from want’ and the ‘freedom to live in dignity’.

It might be wise to note that the people who lack any of these freedoms are also the potential sources of threats to those who enjoy these freedoms. A starving person can be easily induced to committing crimes for survival; an AIDS or Ebola victim threatens others of spreading the disease; and any person deprived of basic education can easily be
indoctrinated to harmful ideologies and pose a significant threat to the society. Thus, our security is inseparably entwined with the security and freedom of all human lives. All these three aspects: fear, want and dignity, impact upon the overall security of the human race to a greater or lesser degree. For the sake of a more pragmatic analysis, it seems prudent to figure out the comparative influence of each of these three factors on the collective security. The sense of ‘dignity’ varies from person to person. It is a relative term. It refers to the intangibles; and hence, it is difficult to measure. Sense of dignity arises from the sense of self-esteem which is placed at a much higher tier in the hierarchy of needs. People usually care about self-esteem only after their other basic needs are fulfilled. Therefore, though lack of dignity may generate grievances and may invite retaliation from the victim against the society that alienates him, the threat may not be comparable, in severity and magnitude, to those generated by the ‘fear’ and ‘want’ factor. In so far, as setting a priority of the collective efforts are concerned, ensuring ‘freedom to live in dignity’ may wait for a while.

Next, the ‘freedom from fear’ aspect of security can be discussed. As the focus of the Seminar was ‘non-traditional security’, inter-state dimensions of fear may not be discussed in the paper. The search for the sources of fear that do not involve a foreign nation as an actor will be confined in the writing. Now, sources of fear may originate from both within and outside the national boundary. Elements of fear may find those roots both in the natural as well as anthropogenic events. Again, the sources of fear may be either sub-national or transnational in nature. Same source of fear may affect a single nation or a group of nations. In the case of the natural sources of fear, only two parties are involved in the showdown: ‘man’ and the ‘nature’. Hence, the phenomenon automatically inspires the human beings to unite and respond collectively against the common threat of ‘nature’. It is particularly so, when the threat involves more than one nation. In a sense, such threats lay open the much sought-for opportunity for the nations to work in harmony towards a common cause, leaving aside their differences in other fields. The other striking reality about natural sources of fear is that they do not differentiate between nationality, race, colour, religion, ideology or ethnicity. They affect everyone alike. It does not matter if we belong to the WWI or Third World, East or West, developing or developed nation; the natural sources of fear affect us all indiscriminately. Thus, they offer us a common enemy to deal with; a common cause to work together, to cooperate.

Nevertheless, cooperation may not be as simple and easy to come about as we might often think; even if, it involves dealing with the common threats of nature. Scholars would possibly argue that there cannot be any single harmful ‘natural’ event where at least some anthropogenic causes are not involved. When a hole is discovered in the ionosphere in the sky above New Zealand, it is believed that someone somewhere on this planet is burning excessive fossil fuel or emitting voluminous Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) or methane gas in the atmosphere. Thus, collective safety calls for collective responsibility too. However, since the rate of carbon emission is related to developmental policies, those should be better debated in the political platforms. Insofar, as the cooperation among the Land Forces are concerned, we are essentially referring to dealing with the harmful natural events that have already impacted or are about to impact on us.
Collective approach towards dealing with fears having anthropogenic elements could be a bit troublesome; because, these involve at least three major actors: those who create fear, those who are afraid, and those external actor(s) who are willing to intervene and help those struck by fear. Human-induced fears that demand the intervention of the third, and possibly neutral, actor(s) carry the potential of further escalation. The reason being that, the actor generating fear usually does so by the use of hard power; and only use of harder power can possibly subdue the threat. And of course, tussle of hard powers means friction, retaliation, heightened tension, and at the end, loss of more human lives. Indeed, this refers to the minimum level of danger when the intervening actor(s) are seen as neutral. Things can be even worse when the ‘right to intervene’, ‘justification of the intervention’ or the ‘neutrality’ of the external actor(s) come under question.

It can be quite problematic to figure out which side of the conflict rightfully deserves external assistance. The side suffering reverses may not always be right and the side causing the suffering may not always be wrong. Therefore, even the most benign attempt to intervene on humanitarian ground might well be viewed with suspicion by either of the conflicting parties. Even, the external actors might also get divided over the issue of assistance. Looking through the Syrian or Ukrainian prism, one can easily find the merits of this argument. Thus, expecting genuine and unprejudiced cooperation among the nations to deal with human-induced fears may prove too optimistic.

Now, the potential for greater cooperation towards securing people from ‘want’ can be examined. It is indeed the basic component of security. It refers to the fulfillment of the basic needs and wants of all human beings. The universally accepted basic needs are: food, health, shelter and education. Someone might like to refer to these as the basic human rights; some others might even like to go one step further in calling them the natural rights: the right of ‘self-preservation’. These rights are unalienable; all societies in all ages have recognised these rights.

The threats to these rights, or rightful ‘wants’, could be many: extreme poverty, famine, environmental catastrophe, diseases, unsafe drinking water or even as mundane as adulterated food. Similarly, there could be a lot of ways and means to deal with these threats. Nonetheless, formulation of appropriate strategies to deal with those may await further scholarly researches. For now, we need only to realise that the priority of our regional efforts to address non-traditional security lies here, in securing the fundamental needs of individual human being.

Human behaviour is stimulated sometimes by values, needs, or combination of both. But, the strongest stimulus comes from the needs. A starving person, or a person suffering from a mortal disease, does not care much about values. Extreme needs often obliterate the distinction between right and wrong. The overarching need for self-preservation eclipses the human conscience. When societies push someone to that extreme, he does not care harming others to ensure his own survival. He would not mind putting a bomb in a public place, transporting a bag of cocaine or taking any other immoral action so long as the action earns him money to preserve his own ‘life’, the most ‘value’-able thing we all individually possess. This overarching nature of human behavior essentially creates the ‘poverty-crime’ nexus. We cannot possibly check the crimes at any level - local, regional or global, unless
we free as many people as we can from their survival needs. Our security lies here; our journey towards meaningful cooperation begins here.

Eliminating the ‘bad guys’ would not bring lasting security. Plentiful of raw materials like hunger, disease, lack of education and environmental disasters are continuously pouring into the factories of ‘human nature’ to produce and deliver yet more ‘bad guys’. Thus, first, it needs to be ensured this steady supply of raw materials; or else, the revenge of the poor, sick and ignorant will continue to fall upon us. If we can free those people from their genuine ‘wants’, they will take off many of our burdens of worries.

As it has been mentioned in the introductory paragraphs, the purpose of this article was not to float any new idea, but to identify our priority of efforts. A less pronounced purpose was to identify those areas of cooperation that do not raise controversy at the very onset and weaken our strength to work in harmony. If we consider ‘freeing people from want’ as our take-off point, that would not antagonise anyone and we can preserve our togetherness. The key to our togetherness lies in the practice of soft power: together we do something that is good for all of us. We do not attempt to dominate others, prevail over others, secure our narrow interests at the cost of harming others; rather, we seek to develop strategies that are in the best interest of all of us.

The Land Forces have proven track records of humanitarian engagements saving millions of lives. The world bears the testimony of how passionately our regional Land Forces responded to some of the catastrophic earthquakes, the great tsunami and some of the worst cyclones in this region. Though the Land Forces usually represent hard power, the softest side of this so-called hard power is: only the soldiers stay prepared to lay down their lives to save the others.
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