

M Aynul Islam

MICROGOVERNANCE: A PROSPECTIVE TOOL OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN BANGLADESH

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Abstract

Contemporary world is witnessing new types of governance in which services are provided through networks and partnerships within and across the state and non-state actors. The core assumption of microgovernance approach is to enhance micro-solution centric approach, empowering micro-level institutions, localizing national policies, mobilizing mass people and to use local knowledge in governance. It is understood that the idea of microgovernance promotes more convergence than divergence in policy formulation and implementation. This paper attempts to identify some pressing problems of governance in Bangladesh and examine how the promotion of microgovernance approach can be useful to ensure good governance. It evaluates success stories of microgovernance in Bangladesh in order to assess its feasibility for and likely impact on effective governance. Microgovernance becomes relevant for Bangladesh for two specific reasons. First, there is a failure of traditional or existing governance paradigm. Despite the cry for good governance for the last fifteen years or even more, governance problems are still widespread in Bangladesh. It is assumed that microgovernance would fill the void or address the missing links. Second, the relevance of microgovernance can also be understood in the context of rising local initiatives demonstrated through civil society empowerment, grassroots participation, and effective local government

M. Aynul Islam is a Research Officer at BISS. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the International Conference on *Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: The Erosion of Public-Private Divide*, organized by the Basel Institute on Governance, Basel, Switzerland, during 8-9 February 2007. His e-mail is: aynul@biiss.org

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1. Introduction

Under the Westphalian nation-state paradigm, governance is dominated by state institutions where state remains at the apex of all governance activities. With the changing politico-economic environment at internal and external domains, the governance structure is increasingly being characterized by the movement for deregulation, privatization, and welfare reform lessening the role of state. The performance of state controlled bureaucracy has been challenged as nonflexible, incompetent, and unaccountable to the society. At present, governance mainly refers to the coordination of social systems, public-private relations, and increasing reliance on informal authority. All these often make the role of the state in society disputable.¹ In this context, the growing body of literature on governance exposes two diverse patterns of changes in scope, focus and mode of governance. First, the role of state has not withered away. The state is experiencing new strategies for delivering services, regulating the economy, and interacting with the public. Second, in the context of liberalization, the state functions have been exceedingly controlled. Development enterprises have been generated in private or quasi-public sectors in the shadow of the state or without state.

Consequently, the changing trends indicate the new range, scope, attention, or mode of governance all over the world. The objectives, frameworks, systems, actors, transaction and delivery mechanisms of governance are substantively changing. The shifting and diverse trends of governance are clearly reflected in the conceptual understanding of international financial institutions (IFIs). The World Bank encourages governments to create the legal and institutional framework for accountability and transparency, predictability and competence in the management of public affairs and the management of economic development.² The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) identifies governance as “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a society's affairs...encompasses the organizational structures and activities of central, regional and local

¹ See, for details, Martin Nekola, “Political Participation and Governance Effectiveness – Does Participation Matter?” Available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN022171.pdf>. accessed on 18 January 2007.

² World Bank, *Managing Development - The Governance Dimension*, 1994, Washington D.C

government, the parliament and the judiciary and the institutions, organizations and individuals that comprise civil society and the private sector insofar as they actively participate and influence the shaping of public policy that affects people's lives".³ The Asian Development Bank (ADB) focuses on the ingredients of effective management of development. The Inter-American Development Bank concerns with modernizing government and strengthening civil society, transparency, social equity, participation and gender equity. Thus, IFIs clearly recognize the role of non-state actors in governance paradigm. Another emerging mode of governance is nodal governance operating through partnership and networking among the different actors of governance in different parts of the world.

Governance in Bangladesh is mostly dominated by the state institutions. The state maintains widespread and monopolistic dominance in national life through its various formal and informal organs. Since the independence in 1971, the state has exerted its overarching control in policy formulation and implementation.⁴ Due to the existence of weak private sector and community based organizations (CBOs), three constituents of 'state' monopolized or nearly monopolized 'governance'. During 1990s, a World Bank report characterized governance in Bangladesh as preoccupied with process, too pervasive, highly centralized, overly bureaucratic, too discretionary, unaccountable, and unresponsive and wasteful.⁵

The political and bureaucratic elites played a predominant role in setting goals and priorities for the state and society,⁶ resulting in poor performance of many critical sectors of state and society in Bangladesh. Above all, this has enormous implications for the accountability and transparency of the organizations that drastically reduces their credibility

³ *Decentralized Governance Programme*, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, 1996.

⁴ See, for details, M. Aynul Islam, "Political Institutions and Governance in Bangladesh: Changes and Continuity", *BISS Journal*, Vol. 26, No.4, 2005, pp.581-611.

⁵ World Bank, *Bangladesh: Government that Works*, Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 1996, p. 67.

⁶ Hasnat Abdul Hye, "Good Governance: A Social Contract", in Hye, ed., *Governance: South Asian Perspectives*, Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 2000, p. 4.

either as implementing agencies or rule-making bodies. This has largely created a basic tendency of authoritarian and anarchical rule in the society in which money, power and arms maintain their strong control with minimum resistance from the state and the people. On the other hand, the post-1990s has witnessed changes in structure, functions, and authority in delivering public and private goods. In the past, whether it was in the economic or political realm, the state used to enjoy unchallenged monopolistic power through its various organs. Now, the state had to relinquish its power from some sectors that has redefined its structure, functions, and authority. The non-state actors, particularly private firms and the civil society, fill this newly created space. Despite the emerging role of non-state actors, in few basic governance indicators such as accountability, political stability, institutional effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, etc., Bangladesh scores one of the lowest among the developing countries. Governance institutions in the country, both at national and local levels, are not functioning effectively. People have not been mobilized adequately at collective level. They have a very low level of participation and confidence in governance institutions, national policies and frameworks.

Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to identify few pressing problems of governance in Bangladesh and examine how the promotion of microgovernance approach can be useful to ensure good governance. It explains success stories of microgovernance in Bangladesh to understand its feasibility and likely impact on effective governance. In this context, microgovernance is suggested for Bangladesh for two specific reasons. First, there is a failure of traditional or existing governance paradigm, despite the slogan for good governance for the last fifteen years or more. It is expected that microgovernance would fill the void or address the missing links. The microgovernance windowpane is expected to elicit better domino effect of governance. Second, the relevance of microgovernance can also be understood in the context of rising local initiatives demonstrated through civil society empowerment, grassroots participation, and decentralization of local government, etc.

Barring introduction and conclusion, the paper is divided into five sections. While the first section attempts to look for the conceptual clarification of microgovernance, the second section is designed to analyse the second generation problems of governance in Bangladesh.

The third section deals with the emergence of non-state actors in the domains of governance. The selected cases of microgovernance in Bangladesh are dealt with in the fourth section. Finally, the fifth section explains the implications of microgovernance for Bangladesh.

2. Conceptualizing Microgovernance

The understanding of microgovernance demands a brief review of existing thought on governance, popularly conceived as ‘good governance’. Donors and IFIs are playing a leading role in popularizing good governance in Bangladesh. Initially, international donors call for restructuring the public administration in Bangladesh to facilitate wider role of markets in the society. The World Bank has turned its focus to institutions and brought the concept into development discourse.⁷ Ironically, the prescription of good governance has been made when the damages had already been done. In Bangladesh, it is more often referred to as ‘good governance’, signifying the reality that there is a failure of governance and, hence, mis-governance. Sobhan extends the scope of governance as he argues that “the study of governance problem is, in essence, a search for ways and means of managing affairs of the state, taking into account the obstacles inherent in changes taking place in South Asian countries”.⁸ Khan and Ahmed conceive it as a notion of

⁷ The World Bank’s experience of disintegration of its economic policies in African countries led to attribute the failure of governance which includes administrative inefficiency, absence of rule of law and accountability, rampant corruption, and lack of transparency, etc. The Bank, however, did not relate these traits with any particular political regime. This link between governance and democracy is dynamically pressed into the development discourse by the international organizations. See, for details, *Managing Development: The Governance Dimension*, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1991; *Governance and Development*, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1992; *Governance: The World Bank’s Experience*, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1994; *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, The World Bank.

⁸ See, for further details, Rehman Sobhan, *Problems of Governance in Bangladesh*, Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 1992, p. viii; *The Independent Review of Bangladesh’s Development* (IRBD), Vol. 3, Dhaka: The Center for Policy Dialogue, 1996.

accountability from political and bureaucratic sense in the context of Bangladesh.⁹

Whatever may be the focus of their studies, the central concern remains to identify the quality of governance whether it is 'good' or 'bad'. As a result, it misses two overriding issues of 'harmonization' in relation to institutional transformation in a society as well as scope and agency of governance. Governance cannot be conceived properly just by understanding its qualitative level. Some other studies also focus on political dimensions of governance like democracy or electoral system. Again, like the study of markets or the public sector, it avoids critical linkages with the realities on the ground, particularly the rules and norms governing small units of human organizations. It brings about the idea of micro-governance.

The concept of governance has been changing to cope with new ideas, visions and institutions in the age of globalization. Scholars from a variety of disciplines and academic schools are trying to integrate the implications of these changes both conceptually and empirically. The normative political theorists tend to identify these transformations as 'deliberative model of governance' with emphasis on extended and localized forms of 'civic engagement'.¹⁰ As a result, new types of governance have emerged in which services are provided through a variety of governmental nodes including departments of state, education and health institutions, business entities, local government institutions and community-based auspices, etc. Some scholars tend to identify it as nodal governance.¹¹ It operates through networks and partnerships within and across the state and non-state segments. Nodal governance is the

⁹ Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, and A.K. Monwaruddin Ahmed, "Dimensions of Governance" in M. G. Quibria, ed., *The Bangladesh Economy in Transition*, Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 1997, p. 323.

¹⁰ See, for details, Dryzek, J., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Habermas, J., *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1983.

¹¹ Scott Burris, Peter Drahos And Clifford Shearing, "Nodal Governance", *the Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy*, Vol.30, 2005, pp.30-58; Jennifer Wood and Clifford Shearing, "Security and Nodal Governance", Paper presented at the seminar at the Temple University Beasley School of Law, Philadelphia, on 25 October, 2006.

guiding endeavour to create institutions of microgovernance¹² to promote localized, participatory and solution-centric governance.¹³ On the other hand, the Zwelethemba model, developed in South Africa in the 1997, suggests community-centred and experimental governance based on the identified deficit of governance. This programmatic work offers useful insights into the coordination of health and security outside the state-centred policing framework. The practical experience of this programme demonstrates the pledges of micro-governance approaches promoting health and security by mobilizing local knowledge and capacity among poor people. It has theoretical implications, particularly with regard to the capacity of small community to manage events flowing from more generalized and more powerful sources.¹⁴ Thus, the theory of nodal governance and the Zwelethemba model provide necessary conceptual basis for understanding microgovernance. A number of initiatives in many parts of the world have been taking place to develop and institutionalize the new forms of microgovernance and link them to the solution of critical community-level social and economic problems.

Box-1: Key aspects of microgovernance

- Micro-solution centric approach
- Localizing national policies
- Empowering micro-level institutions
- Mobilizing local people
- Using local knowledge and capacity

¹² Scott Burris, "Governance, Microgovernance and Health", *77 Temple Law Review*, Vol. 77, p. 335, 2004.

¹³ Robert J. Sampson, "Transcending Tradition: New Directions in Community Research, Chicago Style", *Criminology*, Vol.40, 2002, pp. 213-230; Scott Burris, 2004, *op.cit*; Johnston L. and C. Shearing, *Governing Security: Explorations in Policing and Justice*, London: Routledge, 2003; Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen W. Raudenbush, "Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence", *Research Report*, No. 00-451, the Population Studies Center, University of Michigan, 2001.

¹⁴ Scott Burris, "From Security to Health", in Jennifer Wood and Benoit Dupont, eds., *Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp.196-216.

The present study holds that the model of microgovernance is useful to address the fundamental problems at the micro level where the actual causes, practices, and environment of governance are identified. The idea encompasses policies, institutions and processes which consider the operational circumstances and conditions to influence people's lives, the services they receive and the policy environment as well. The core aspects of microgovernance approach is to enhance micro-solution centric approach, empowering micro-level institutions, localizing national policies, mobilizing mass people and to use local knowledge in governance epitome.

It could be treated as an entry point to identify governance deficits providing a real demonstration of what is feasible for administrative efficacy and development. The holistic centre of attention is to recognize the entry problems of governance to identify micro solution with the help of micro-level institutions. It is understood that the idea of microgovernance promotes more convergence than divergence in policy formulation and implementation. The basic manifestations of microgovernance pattern are micro-institutions, strategies, frameworks and partnerships.

Micro-institution refers to promotion of institutions from below utilizing local knowledge and capacity to enhance effectiveness and quality of institutions. There is a significant gap in the linkages between rural and urban areas, and new approaches are needed to grasp new challenges of governance. Local level NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) can be effective to accommodate local necessity and to use local knowledge. Micro-strategy refers to focus on micro-solution centric strategy. Micro issues of governance include issues in many sectors at the regional and central levels: government departments and state owned enterprises (SOEs), commercial firms, education and health institutions, cooperatives, non-governmental organizations such as the media, think tanks, and other NGOs; and informal institutions of governance which operate in the large informal sector across the country.

In the contemporary development discourse, citizens and governments are often engaged in ensuring participatory and deliberative governance through developing micro solutions to different pressing problems of governance. The approach of micro solution can focus on citizens, micro/entry problems and micro level institutions. In many cases, national policies remain complex and vague to the local people

that may result in poor performance of governance. So, there is a need to localize national policies with the help of micro level institutions and local people. The use of local knowledge and capacities in policy making and implementation can accelerate the performance of governance. Thus, the framework of microgovernance is conceived as a process that hinges more on compatibility factors and less on divergence in actions and policies by the state and citizens.

3. State of Governance in Bangladesh

The modern history of Bangladesh dates back to the colonial rule of the British Empire and subsequently internal colonialism of Pakistan era. Bangladesh achieved independence in 1971 with the dream of establishing *Sonar Bangla* (Golden Bangladesh). The motivation was to establish grass root democracy and achieve economic development. But due to volatile political environment, military rule, electoral failure, rent-seeking and patronage, party dominance, judicial interference, corruption, poverty, etc., the people's dream has not been materialized. Even with the fall of autocracy in the early 1990s, Bangladesh's politics and governance have been marked by a number of negative characteristics which include "politics of intransigence",¹⁵ "imperilled democracy",¹⁶ "destructive politics",¹⁷ "spiralling lawlessness",¹⁸ and "confrontational political culture."¹⁹ The system remains unconsolidated, politicized, confrontational and marred by bad governance. However, Bangladesh known as a 'bottomless basket case' and a 'test case' for development in the 1970s²⁰, is now called a low-income country by the

¹⁵ Golam Hossain, , "Bangladesh in 1995: Politics of Intransigence", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, 1996, p. 196.

¹⁶ Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 2002: Imperiled Democracy?," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLIII, No.1, 2003, p. 222.

¹⁷ Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 2003: Vibrant Democracy or Destructive Politics?," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLIV, No. 1, 2004, p. 56.

¹⁸ M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh in 2000: Searching for better Governance?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLI, No. 1, 2001, p.122.

¹⁹ Mobasser Monem, "Confrontational Political Culture and Economic Liberalisation in Bangladesh: Is there a Link?" Paper presented at *the 18th Conference on Modern Asian Studies*, Lund, Panel 41, p.1.

²⁰ Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state of the United States labeled Bangladesh as the 'bottomless basket case' while Just Faaland and JR Parkinson

World Bank and one of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Politically, Bangladesh is added to the list of newly democratized nations (NDNs) in the post Cold War era.²¹

3.1. Pressing problems of governance in Bangladesh

There exists a 'heterodox view' among the stakeholders in addressing governance deficits in Bangladesh. Politicians, bureaucrats, donors, economic elites and common people are sharply divided in setting goals and priorities of good governance in Bangladesh. As Zarina R. Khan points out, "effective democratic governance continued to be the elusive 'golden deer' that the nation doggedly sought but could not find."²² Hossain Zillur Rahman identifies four important problems of good governance goal in Bangladesh:

- i. a tendency towards encyclopaedic wish list in agenda formulation;
- ii. an insufficient appreciation of the institutional and political realities through which reform initiatives have to be carried forward;
- iii. over-focusing on what does not work while ignoring what does work; and
- iv. a lack of clarity as to where the governance agenda best interfaces with poverty reduction goals.²³

A recently published report entitled '*The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006*' by the BRAC University Centre for Governance Studies and BRAC Research and Evaluation Division points out four

labeled 'test case' of development in their book titled *Bangladesh: The Test Case of Development*, New Delhi: S.Chand and Company Ltd., 1976.

²¹ Syed Anwar Husain, "Challenges of Democratic Governance in Bangladesh", in SR Chakravarty (ed.) *Society, Polity and Economy of Bangladesh*. New Delhi: Har Anand Publications 1994, p. 110.

²² Zarina Rahman Khan, "Decentralized Governance: Trials and Triumphs", in Rounaq Jahan, ed., *Bangladesh: Promise and Performance*, Dhaka: The University Press Ltd. 2002, p. 107.

²³ Hossain Zillur Rahman, "Engaging on Good Governance: A Search for Entry Points", *The Weekly Holiday*, Dhaka, 25 February 2005.

acute problems of governance in Bangladesh. Firstly, the partisan politics has pervaded into all aspects of public affairs. It forcibly or illicitly gets into the public institutions or even to local level to control or influence local development processes and administration. Secondly, due to partisan public institutions and absence of appropriate framework, the formal accountability mechanisms are weak. Thirdly, the demand for reform is mainly coming from development partners. Finally, the knowledge of governance in Bangladesh is patchy and sometimes lacking adequate independence.²⁴ Understandably, these negative characteristics make institutions dysfunctional and poor governance as the major bottleneck for national development. Due to confrontational politics, boycott of parliament by opposition parties, general strikes, increasing suppression of the opposition by the government, it is causing havoc on the nation's democracy and economic advancement'.²⁵ Precisely, the governance institutions have largely failed and, therefore, democracy is not working. The constraints to institutionalisation process are enormous. Political centre of gravity towards making more accountable and effective governance institutions is missing in the country's political framework.

On the basis of above analysis, the problems of governance in Bangladesh can be identified as the permutation of several key deficits that predominantly affect governance institutions. These are democratic deficits, capacity deficits, resource deficits, vision deficits, value deficits and action deficits among the governance institutions and mechanisms.

Democratic deficits: lack of quality, quantity, equality and sustainability in participation

Democratic deficit is a worldwide phenomenon²⁶ existing at the international, national and local levels governing institutions. It largely describes the ills of contemporary governance. Today, while the democratic deficit continues to become visible globally, the citizens of Bangladesh are experiencing with democratic malaise — demonstrating

²⁴ See, for details, “The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2006-Knowledge, Perceptions, Reality”, the Centre for Governance Studies, BRAC University and BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, Dhaka, December 2006, pp. xiii-iv

²⁵ Mobasser Monem, *op.cit.* p.1.

²⁶ See, for details, “Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World,” The Human Development Report 2002. Available at: <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title/twe285f.htm> accessed on 18 January 2007.

the indicators such as distrust and dissatisfaction on political parties, administration, government officers, government media, local government, NGOs, judiciary and civil society organizations. Significant democratic deficits are limiting the participation of citizens and key stakeholders as well as affecting the capacities of existing governance institutions to address effectively critical issues ranging from poverty alleviation to peace and human security, human rights and gender justice, equitable development, and ecological sustainability in Bangladesh. Low citizen awareness and participation, ineffective government institutions and processes, significant inequalities and disparities in social structures and lack of institutional capacity for sustained actions, all are now affecting the performance of governance in the country.

The existing pattern of governance in Bangladesh is a centralized government body, distant and non-responsive, often silences the voice of the common citizens who finally lack control over their own political destinies. Addressing democratic deficits needs to understand political participation from below within a democratic governance framework. More participation may not necessarily result in positive development outcomes and sustainability. It needs to consider meaningful forms and spaces for broad participation and create a democratic context and enabling policy environment.

Capacity deficits: dysfunctional institutions and policies

Capacity development, which is recognized by the World Bank, UNDP, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) etc., is a critical issue to enhance the performance of governance. The UNDP recognizes capacity development as the process by which individuals, organizations, institutions and societies develop abilities both individually and collectively.²⁷ To pursue more complex development agenda, particularly in the context of globalization, there is a need for higher professionalism within the bureaucracy. The scenario in Bangladesh is marked by serious capacity deficits. Human resource development policies and institutions are inadequate. Even, human resource development policies within the private sectors and among the civil society organizations are insufficient too. At the local level, institutional problems, namely a lack of finance and staff capacity,

²⁷ “Capacity Development Technical Advisory Paper-2”, New York: United Nations Development Program, 1997, p. 3.

weaken the ability to function well.²⁸ Moreover, policies are largely ineffective because of over focusing on ‘big solutions’.²⁹ The policy makers, reformers, political leadership have repeatedly ignored the panorama of micro solutions aperture. Similarly, it is also true that focus on macro issues alone and devising micro solutions cannot be viewed as a panacea.

Value deficits: corrosion in the value-system

Massive corruption is another core governance problem in Bangladesh. Corrosion in the value-system has contributed to the rise of corruption in the country. The case of corruption is not only at the level of governmental institutions but also in different professional groups and the private sectors, *albeit* in varying degrees. Value deficits exist in the society in such a pervasive way that people have to learn how to complete a task by giving bribery to office employees. However, corruption is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh. It is rooted in the colonial period when the British East India Company seized power in 1757 relying on a largely corrupt administrative system. The scenario is reflected in the words of the then governor of Bengal Robert Clive who regarded the employees of the company as "a set of men whose sense of honour and duty to their employers had been estranged by the larger pursuit of their own immediate advantages." Later in 1960s, during Pakistan period, so called Basic Democracy, particularly programmes like the distribution of food aid to finance rural development activities promoted by it, demonstrated the institutionalization of corruption at the local level.

After independence, corruption has become rampant reaching out different corners of the society. The return to parliamentary democracy in the 1990s has not resulted in the lessening of corruption, if not the

²⁸ See, for details, Kamal Siddiqui, *Local Governance in Bangladesh: Leading Issues and Major Challenges*, Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 2006; Kamal Siddiqui, et al, *Mega City Governance in South Asia: A Comparative Study*, Dhaka: University Press Ltd; GoB, Decentralised planning and resource allocation to Union *Parishad*: Lessons Learnt from Sirajgonj Local Governance Development Fund Project, Proceedings from National Workshop, Dhaka.

²⁹ Hossain Zillur Rahman, “Bangladesh 2015: Achievements and Future Challenges”, the Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC), 2006, Dhaka, Bangladesh, p.11.

contrary. The Transparency International (TI), Political Risk Services, the World Economic Forum and the likes repeatedly emphasised on the prevalence of a high degree of corruption in Bangladesh. Governance indicators estimated by the World Bank³⁰ show very poor governance situation in the country. Table-1 shows governance indicators and income level of the country.

Table 1: Governance Indicators and Income in Bangladesh

PPP GNI Per capita 2005 US\$	GNI per capita (US\$)	Voice and Accounta bility	Political Stability	Government Effectiveness	Regulator y quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corrupt ion
2,090	440	-0.69	-1.24	-0.72	-1.15	-0.86	-1.09

Source: Kaufmann *et.al.*, (2005) and WDI (2006).

The World Bank estimates that 2-3% of GDP growth is lost due to corruption each year. Per capita income could double if the government restrained corruption. A Study on “*Unbundling Governance: Towards an Annual Report on Governance in Bangladesh*” conducted by Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC), Dhaka shows the malicious reality of the governance pattern. It has documented that people have less trust in political parties, police administration, business class, government offices and medium level of trust on government media, local government, NGOs, judiciary and civil society organizations.³¹

Pervasive nature of corruption in Bangladesh has been depicted in a recent survey conducted by the Transparency International Bangladesh titled “*Corruption in Bangladesh: A Household Survey, 2005*”. While it is a partial picture of what is going on in the country, the Survey includes a large number of sectors and a wide variety of forms of corruption. The findings of the Survey are summarized in Table-2.

³⁰ Daniel Kaufmann, Kraay, A. and Massimo M., ‘Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004’, 2005, World Bank.

³¹ According to the PPRC report, 36.4 percent of the people have less trust in political parties, 67.3 percent in police, 43.3 percent in business class, 39.8 percent in government offices, 26.8 percent in government media, 19.2 percent in local government, 16.3 percent in NGOs, 16.1 percent in judiciary and 15.2 percent in civil society organizations. *The Daily Star*, 30 July 2006.

Table-2: Ways of Malpractices in Different Government Sectors in Bangladesh³²

Sectors	Forms of corruption
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Students at the primary level pay admission fees whereas it is supposed to be free; • Students engage private tutors from the same institution where they enrolled; • A primary school student who is entitled for Government stipend has to pay to receive the stipend; • Girl students at the secondary level has to make similar payments; • Deducting a portion of government stipend by the authority; • Paying annual fee whereas it is supposed to be free; • Absence of teachers and students.
Health sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outdoor patients pay bribes to doctors for receiving medical treatment at the public hospital; • Patients who has to undergo surgery in public hospital pay bribes; • Patients who needs diagnostic tests in public hospital pay bribes; • Absence of staff and doctors.
Land administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buyers of land pay bribes for land registration; • Illegal payment for land mutation; • Illegal payment for collecting land related documents; • Illegal payment for land survey; • Illegal payment to receive <i>Khas</i> land.
Police department	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Illegal payment to lodge FIR to the police station; • Illegal payment for registering GD to the police station; • Illegal payment for getting clearance certificate from police; • Payment by accused person.

³² Based on “Corruption in Bangladesh: A Household Survey, 2005”, conducted by Transparency International Bangladesh, released on 20 April, 2005, available at: <http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/documents/HouseholdSurvey200405-sum1.pdf> accessed on 28 April 2007.

Banks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Illegal payment in collecting loans; • Illegal payment in clearing remittance.
Taxation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bribes during payment of income, transport and holding taxes.
Service for electric supply	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment to use illegal connection; • Payment for getting electric line; • Payment for tempering meter reading to avoid paying; the due amount.
Local Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment to elected local government representatives holding <i>shalish</i> (mediation); • Payment for enrolling to receive relief; • Giving less quantity.
Pension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment for processing pension.

Action deficits: inadequate and poor implementation of plans and strategies

In Bangladesh, the rate of successful implementation of development policies and plans is very poor. In most cases, policies are not sufficiently inward-looking with respect to setting of goals and objectives. The process of implementation is not adequately forward-looking as well. During the last three decades, Bangladesh has implemented four Five-Year Plans and a Two-Year Plan. Due to the lack of proper and real guidelines, most of the plans and strategies did not achieve targets. For instance, during the first Five Year Plan of 1973-1978, the curve of target and rate of implementation was very uneven. The targeted GDP growth rate and per capita income growth rate was respectively 5.5% and 2.5% but the actual rate was 4.1% and 1.1%. The third Five-Year Plan achieved a growth rate of only 3.8% instead of the target of 5.4%. The country is currently implementing several other administrative and institutional reform projects and economic development strategies. But due to lack of proper implementation, the success rates of development plans are very poor thereby contributing to the poor governance in Bangladesh.

Absence of multi-agent framework

There is a serious lack of multi-agent framework among government departments in Bangladesh, including the police, the judicial system, the

prison systems, the election commission, civil transaction authority, revenue authority, banking system, etc. The partnership process is like a blue moon between the governmental nodes. The whole governance apparatus has become bundled. As a result, most of the domestic endeavours, the prescriptions of donors and other development institutions have not been working effectively to ensure good governance and to some extent it has become 'fragile dialogue' in relation to the implementation of the aspiration of development administration.

However, above analysis demonstrates that the fundamental crisis of governance in Bangladesh comes from a variety of deficits ranging from democracy to value. Although a complex array of national and regional institutions, government and non-governmental departments or nodes are involved in the process, it ignores multi-agent framework of the actors. Inadequacy and unequal mobilization of resources, traditional ways and means and other motivational deficits are slowing down the performances of governance in Bangladesh. The strategic sectors are also packed. There has been excessive focus on macro issues in policy making. Most of the national policies are not yet localized. Particularly, a value deficit has been creating profound and pervasive corruption in different sectors. Increasing transparency and combating corruption are recurring themes to establish good governance. It is expected that working in partnership and promoting local institutions in the framework of microgovernance could make progress towards reducing corruption and enhancing the transparency in different strategic sectors in Bangladesh. Two issues are coming into the fore. First, there is a growing but largely unnoticed visibility of non-state actors in governance while the second issue involves in identifying the cases seen at micro-level addressing the problems of governance. The following sections deal with the stated issues.

4. The Emergence of Non-State Actors in Governance

Bangladesh is a developing country possessing an agro-based and low industrialized economy with dominant public sector. Considering the stakeholders of governance, primarily there have been observed two broad mechanisms of governance, state and non-state, involving a wide range of differing organizations and agencies for the delivery of public goods to the people. Although state has been disproportionately dominant in the hierarchy of governance, since the early 1990s, non-state

actors started getting engaged in governance. Currently, in Bangladesh, non-state actors register their presence in the domain of governance in many different ways such as market, hierarchy, networks, association etc. The NGO sector is diverse in terms of organisations and approaches.³³ The country hosts some of the successful and largest NGOs in the world like Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the Grameen Bank, and Proshika. The non-state actors are concerned with operating micro-credits and SMEs, environment and human rights issues, corporate social responsibility, labour regulation, governance of the manpower sector, consumer rights, private non-profit foundations, etc. Government policies and strategies in various sectors also promote non-state actors. For instance, the Industrial Policy of 1991, updated in 1999 and 2005, indicate the Government's desire to promote the private sector and act as a catalyst of private sector growth in Bangladesh. Currently, the Government has been focusing on privatization and proper utilization of resources to increase performance.

The phenomenon of non-state actors' empowerment generally dominates the agenda of donor agencies and countries. To them, civil society empowerment is largely concerned with good governance, democratization and privatization. Although there is a considerable debate about defining civil society empowerment, none can deny the increasing importance of this phenomenon in Bangladesh. The UNDP in its *Human Development Report 2005* has primarily attributed active partnerships between state and civil society for rapid human development in Bangladesh during 1990-2000. Some of the critical and micro-level challenges of governance in different sectors like education, healthcare, etc., are being addressed by the NGOs and Civil society Organizations better than the state. The micro-credit programs of Grameen Bank or non-formal education programs of BRAC are well known in the world. They are even replicated in many developing countries.

But the private sector is not effectively vocal in Bangladesh. In most cases, the private sector is fragmented. It has not been an effective voice against the mismanagement of public sector. As a result, due to the

³³ David Lewis, "On the Difficulty of Studying 'Civil Society': NGOs, State and Democracy in Bangladesh", Paper was presented at *the South Asian Anthropologists Group (SAAG) meeting* during 12-13 September 2001 at University College, London.

inefficiency of the public sector, the economic losses are huge in count. For instance, during garments labour unrest in Dhaka, around 4000 factories in Dhaka went on wildcat strike, 16 factories were burnt down by strikers and hundreds more ransacked and looted. The Chittagong Sea Port does not perform to its full potential making it three times less efficient than the Mumbai Port, India, and many times less efficient than other sea ports in South Asia. Furthermore, the NGOs, CSOs and business people are politically divided and, therefore, there is no basis for partnership or collective actions.

5. Cases of Microgovernance in Bangladesh

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has recognized certain strategic sectors as well as governmental nodes to be reformed namely the police, judiciary, transport and many others. There is no denying the fact that all pervasive corruption resulting from poor governance is the major impediment to economic growth and development. There are examples of microgovernance model which have produced constructive result in response to the current problem of governance in Bangladesh.

5.1 Microcredit

The first case of microgovernance is related to the emergence of microcredit which has deeper impact on macro issues. The micro-finance institutions (MFIs) have achieved a degree of success with much of institutionalization. They have successfully faced the problems of the issues of power, control, and transparency, as well as problems of cash flow within a short track. It has emerged as a mainstream development intervention for addressing poverty alleviation and women's empowerment.³⁴ Microcredit's contribution in capacity building,

³⁴ See, for details, Dichter T. 1999, "Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Microfinance: Past, Present and Future", Available at: www.esd.worldbank.org/html/esd/agr/sbp/end/ngo.htm accessed on 20 September 2006; Amin R., S. Becker and Abul Bayes, "NGO-Promoted Microcredit Programmes and Women's Empowerment in Rural Bangladesh: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence", *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 32, No. 2, Winter 1998, pp. 221-236; Hulme D. & P. Mosley, *Finance Against Poverty*. Vol. I & II, London: Routledge, 1996 ; Hashemi S.M., S.R. Schuler & A.P. Riley, "Rural Credit Programs and Women's Empowerment in

awareness raising and empowerment is notable. Mark M. Pitt *et al* identify how group-based micro-credit programs influence women's autonomy and gender relations in the society. They observe:

“... credit program participation leads to women taking a greater role in household decision making, having greater access to financial and economic resources, having greater social networks, having greater bargaining power compared with their husbands, and having greater freedom of mobility. Female credit also tended to increase spousal communication in general about family planning and parenting concerns.”³⁵

The micro-lending programs, giving women access to loans, many times as little as \$75 to \$125, is giving poor women the means to start or expand micro-enterprise activities like buying and selling milk, sewing clothes, husking rice, etc. Even a token increase in a woman's ability to generate income has not only been seen to reduce the mental and physical torture of women. In any cases, it has stopped altogether. The micro-credit programs and its critical role in the society have become much-favored among international development organizations. It has been treated as a new paradigm of economic development and social mobilization. With the help of micro-credits, increasingly the rural women are being translated into a labor force and a contributor to national economy.

Bangladesh”, *World Development*, Vol. 24, No 4, 1996, pp. 635-653; Kabeer N., “Money Can't Buy Me Love'? Re-evaluating Gender, Credit and Empowerment in Rural Bangladesh”, *IDS Discussion Paper*, No 363, 1998 ; Johnson S. & B. Roglay, *Microfinance and Poverty Reduction*, Oxfam, UK1997; Johnson S., “Microfinance North and South: Contrasting Current Debates,” *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 10, No 6, 1998, pp. 799-810; Mayoux L., “Women's Empowerment and Micro-Finance Programmes: Approaches, Evidence and Ways Forward,” *DPP Working Paper*, No 41, 1998; Rahman A., “Micro-Credit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable Development: Who Pays?”, *World Development*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1999, pp. 67-82; Wright G.A.N., “Examining the Impact of Microfinance Services – Increasing Income or Reducing Poverty,” *Small Enterprise Development*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1999, pp. 39-47.

³⁵ See, for details, Mark M. Pitt, Shahidur R Khandker, and Jennifer Cartwright, “Does Micro-Credit Empower Women? Evidence from Bangladesh”, *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, No. 2998, March 2003, Available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=636360>.

A survey shows that the borrowers and even those who are drop-outs, are economically empowered and politically and socially more conscious than non-borrowers in the society.³⁶ Another study shows that women's participation in micro-credit program leads to women playing a greater role in household decision-making, greater access to financial and economic resources, greater social networks, and getting greater freedom of mobility in the society.³⁷ A survey conducted by the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) among 1200 women micro-credit borrowers in 1998 conclusively shows that the borrowers' capacity has increased, their awareness has improved and the women are empowered in economic and social matters. A report on the '10 years of World Bank support for micro-credit in Bangladesh'³⁸ shows that it has reached more than 6 million poor in Bangladesh, out of which 90% are women, through microfinance projects.

Microcredit is not only a tool for economic development but also a movement to enhance social capital, capacity and awareness at the micro-level of the society. It raises peoples' participation in socio-political and development activities. The peaceful social mobilization is contributing to establish a just and corruption free society as well as enhancing social participation in governance mechanism. It is more than a breakthrough to avoid illegal transaction of money to sanction a loan from any traditional commercial bank. However, many contributions are still beyond quantifiable. It is also contributing to enhance the performance of governance in financial aspect from below through socio-economic transformation of rural Bangladesh.

³⁶ M. Aynul Islam, "Globalization and Women in Bangladesh: Towards Empowerment or Marginalization?", Paper presented at the International Seminar on *Women's Situations and Women's Studies in South Asia* on 18-19 December 2006 at the Centre for Women's Studies (CWS), North Bengal University, Siliguri, West Bengal, India.

³⁷ See, for details, Mark Pitt, M., Khandker, Shahidur R. and Jennifer Cartwright, *op.cit.*

³⁸ The World Bank, "10 Years of World Bank Support for Microcredit in Bangladesh," Available at: <http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/countries/southasiaext/0,,contentmdk:21153910~pagepk:2865106~pipk:2865128~thesitepk:223547,00.html> accessed on 09 January 2007

5.2 Changes in Stamp Act

The change in the age-old Stamp Act has contributed to simplify land related matters — registration, printing of stamps, selling of stamp etc. It is well known that corruption is widespread in the land administration in Bangladesh. It is commonly held that buyers and sellers of land have to pay bribes for land registration, land mutation, and even for collecting land related documents. The land reform agenda is on the table for a long time but it is not moving forward. The reform in the Stamp Act has led to cost savings for the government, removed some of the institutional sources of corruption around the printing, distribution and imitation of stamp papers, and lessened the bureaucratic load on the sub-registry offices. It has also reduced the hassle for the buyers and sellers of land. Such small solutions serve to improve the quality of governance as a process.³⁹

5.3 Initiatives on environment

Initiatives in environmental sector such as ban on the use, production and marketing of polyethylene shopping bags all over the country to uphold and conserve environment in 2002 was a historic step towards achieving sustainable development. Also, the introduction of four-stroke CNG run vehicles in Dhaka city, use of low sulphur content coal as fuel, installing chimney with the height of 120ft in the brick kilns, promoting the manufacture of concrete block brick, use of Catalytic Converter and Diesel Particulate Filter for Petrol and Diesel driven vehicles, ban on plying Bus, Minibus, Microbus, Taxi older than 20 years and Truck, Mini truck, Tank lorry, Van older than 25 years in Dhaka City from 1 January 2002 brought about success of microgovernance in environmental sector. The common people overwhelmingly supported these decisions. In effect, the environmental policies and plans are there and the industrial policy has been updated. However, the rate of their implementation and success is very slow.

5.4 Innovations in local governance

Another example is the direct fund allocation to the Union Parishads (UPs). Funding and funding methods are greatly important to empower

³⁹ Hossain Zillur Rahman, “Road to 2015: MDG Prospects”, *The Daily Star*, Dhaka, 7 March 2006.

local government institutions (LGIs). Without empowering LGIs, the goals of development cannot be achieved properly. The UPs receive funds from the government Annual Development Program (ADP) paid in instalments called block grants. This financing system is full of ambiguity creating serious setbacks in development activities. Money does not reach the UPs directly; rather it is channelled through Upazila authorities. So, the administrative and political interference may slow down the development activities. The criteria for allocation are also vague and the distribution process is not free from biasness due to the control of administration. Thus, corruption at the project level and delay of implementation has been obstructing the performance of local governance. Sirajganj Local Governance Development Project (SLGDP), implemented during 2000 to 2006, was the best innovative model of improvement in UP service delivery and people's participation in local self-governance. One of its core innovations was performance-based funding to the UPs, which had been directly transferred to the UP accounts as block grant in Sirajganj district. The other innovations were infrastructure and service delivery mechanism which has ensured people's participation in local level planning, budgeting and implementing development schemes. These resulted in awesome successes in ensuring transparency and accountability in fund use, reducing corruption drastically, and thereby notable improvement in local governance.⁴⁰ Heavily inspired by these overwhelming successes of innovation in microgovernance, the government has made decision for direct allocation to selected UPs under Local Governance Support Project (LGSP), aiming to empower the UPs, the second-lowest tier of the LGIs. Under this project, all the UPs will gradually receive the annual block allocation directly from the central government. The process is designed to reduce corruption. It will reduce delay in project approval and implementation, and facilitates people's participation in local expenditure, policymaking and budgetary processes. This would also develop participatory planning and budgetary system to prioritise development schemes.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Atiur Rahman, Mahfuz Kabir, Taiabur Rahman and Saiful Islam, *Sirajganj Local Governance Development Project: Power to People, Development From Below*, Government of Bangladesh, UNDP, UNCDF and Unnayan Shamannay, Dhaka, 2007 (forthcoming).

⁴¹ Hossain Zillur Rahman, *op.cit.*

5.5 Incentive based delivery of basic utilities

The implementation of incentive-based system in strategically important sectors such as primary education, health care, etc. has brought about successes in delivery of basic services. Government and development partners are closely involved in implementing various programmes related to these sectors. It is widely believed that the country has achieved enormous success in primary education since the early 1990s due to several initiatives by the government, donors and other non-state actors.⁴² One of such programs is educational stipends for the primary and secondary girl students, which has emerged as a major success in the country. Under the Female Sub-Stipend Program,⁴³ the Government pays stipend to girl students on the basis of their attendance in school. As a result, during the last decade, primary and secondary student enrolments have dramatically increased.⁴⁴ It has also contributed to improve gender balance and to expand public budget for education. At the local level, there is also scope for community participation in the government primary school management. Selected community representatives have got opportunity to get involved in the school management committees. Primary schools have also parent-teacher associations.⁴⁵ Another incentive-based initiative is the community management of water in Dhaka.

⁴² Since 1982, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and the Government have been implementing several innovative education programmes which resulted in enormous success in Bangladesh. Key programmes are: (i) two types of Non-Formal Education Programme by BRAC-one is a 3 year NFE schools for 8-11 years old children, and 2 year adolescent schools for 11-14 years old; (ii) NFE Programme by Proshika for 8-11 years old children; (iii) GoB operated Stipend programme for poor children, stipend program for all girls under different projects; (iv) Dhaka Ahsania Mission's Alternative Primary School Programme; and (v) UCEP Schools for under-privileged children of the age group 6-14 years etc.

⁴³ Raynor, Janet, Wesson, Kate, "The Girls' Stipend Program in Bangladesh", *Journal of Education for International Development* 2:2, 2006, Available at: <http://www.equip123.net/JEID/articles/3/Girls'StipendPrograminBangladesh.pdf> accessed on 28 April 2007.

⁴⁴ The primary school enrolment rate is approximately 94% but only 76% students complete class five. The rate of drop-out is 23.6%, See, the UN Millennium Development Goals Indicators 2004, updated in June 2006.

⁴⁵ See, for details, www.usaid.gov/bd.

5.6 Civic activism on budget

Finally, the case of pre-budget consultation gives some idea to understand the relevance of microgovernance. Like ‘neighbourhood meetings’⁴⁶ at Porto Alegre of Brazil to decide local priorities and to elect representatives to negotiate with other neighbourhoods, and the farmers’ meeting with finance ministry, NGOs, district and local governments to setting priorities for the national budget in Uganda,⁴⁷ the pre-budget consultation in Bangladesh is another important initiative to ensure equal and pertinent distribution of resources. Bangladesh has started the process of dialogue between the finance minister and different professionals, business groups and civil society organizations before the formal presentation of budget before the national parliament. Although it is basically a state led initiative, it contributes to ensure equal distribution of resources and proper utilization. Civic participation in sub-national budget is also taking place, particularly centering on UPs and some municipalities, local people are taking part in open budget sessions. These have been contributing to enhance local governance through increased transparency and accountability of the LGIs.⁴⁸

There are other examples in Bangladesh that include local government reforms, criminal justice reform, recently introduced Legal Service Delivery System in police forces, etc. The Legal Service

⁴⁶ Neighborhood Meetings is a part of framing participatory budget in Brazil which involves three parallel sets of meetings- neighborhood assemblies, thematic assemblies, and meetings of delegates for city-wide coordinating sessions. See, for details, Rebecca Abers, "From Ideas to Practice: The Partido dos Trabalhadores and Participatory Governance in Brazil," *Latin American Perspectives*, 23,4, Fall 1996, pp. 35-53; William W. Goldsmith, "Participatory Budgeting In Porto Alegre, Brazil", *Feature*, Planners Network, Available at: http://www.plannersnetwork.org/publications/2000_140/goldsmith.htm accessed on 9 August 2006

⁴⁷ Beatrice Egulu and Peter Ebanyat, "Policy Processes in Uganda and their Impact on Soil Fertility" *Discussion Paper*, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Edinburgh, United Kingdom, Available at: http://www.poptel.org.uk/iied/docs/drylands/soils_16.pdf accessed on 9 August 2006

⁴⁸ See, Atiur Rahman, Mahfuz Kabir and Mohammad Razzaque, "Bangladesh: Civic Participation in Sub-National Budgeting", in Anwar Shah (ed), *Participatory Budgeting*, Vol III, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp. 1-29.

Delivery System in police forces is an innovative strategy towards restoring peoples trust and confidence. Under this system, the confused or indigent city-dwellers will get legal and other necessary support from the police station.

6. Implications of Microgovernance for Bangladesh

The examples as explained above have profound impact on society, polity and economy of Bangladesh. It gives a new dimension to understand the governance debate in Bangladesh. Most importantly, these cases clearly demonstrate that there are several benefits of microgovernance for the country.

First of all, microgovernance involves working through simple process and horizontal networks that embodies diverse cooperative arrangements involving both state and non-state actors. It enhances effective organizational coordination and generates policy creativity in governance mechanism. During the past five to ten years, the diversity of actors has been found in horizontal governance in Bangladesh.

Second, it ensures wider participation of the stakeholders which give rise to the emergence of new actors and agencies in human activities. LGIs and a range of stakeholders with different interests and backgrounds, including NGOs, professional associations, volunteers, service organizations, and the private sector are now visibly involved in the governance process in Bangladesh. Moreover, it creates opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate continuously and directly in the governance framework of strategically important sectors in Bangladesh.

Third, microgovernance framework is an innovative solution to redressing deep-rooted corruption agenda that contains elements of mobilizing operational actors. It can be possible by rekindling an ethically committed administrative and political class as well as deepening a social discourse to face value deficits in governance system in Bangladesh. It creates more scope for transparency and accountability of the actions by the local actors.

Fourth, in practice, the microgovernance variables are highly correlated with measures of the quality of the rule of law and the absence of corruption.

Fifth, the micro-governance arrangement in combination with demand-side efforts is giving the poor a chance to articulate and mobilize their most immediate concerns. In this regard, the micro-governance arrangement is pro-poor governance in nature that empowers the poor by building institutions for local representation. It also leads to mounting opportunities by ensuring downward accountability, flexible delivery and development of local capacity. Thus micro-governance initiatives are producing material improvements in well-being and reveal the poor citizens' capacity for good governance.

Sixth, it offers better scope for manageability by reducing continuity deficits which is a crucial factor behind the effective implementation of programmes and policies.

Seventh, to facilitate the implementation of widespread governance improvement measures, the promotion of micro-governance can be an important option for Bangladesh by enhancing potential networking to ensure institutional quality of strategic public sectors.

Finally, the microgovernance structures support deliberative processes for identifying, analysing and acting upon threats to human security in the ways that contribute to the societal and economic outcomes at the community level in Bangladesh.

7. Concluding Remarks

The paper has demonstrated that Bangladesh has much to contribute to the emerging debate on governance. In this regard, microgovernance can be an effective tool for its successful intervention in resolving local problems. Bangladesh is demonstrating evidence of pluralistic participation by promoting the institutions of microgovernance in different sectors. Strategically selected micro solutions have been generating noticeable outcomes that can build reform momentum. In order to face generic challenges of governance in Bangladesh like huge corruption, inefficiency, unaccountability, or deficits of capacity, resources, motivations, values, actions, and ensure achievements in these fields, the promotion of microgovernance institutions is a necessary prelude. The design and implementation of national policies and strategies depend on how it includes the micro-level realities and how institutions of microgovernance can accommodate them. Thus, it may be argued that microgovernance involving a full range of public, private and

voluntary sector organizations opens up new horizons for understanding the dynamics of governance in Bangladesh. Above all, it makes use of a wide policy instruments which may result in an enhanced ability to respond to new challenges or change circumstances leading to better policy outcomes.

Ian Holliday, Ahmed Shafiqul Haque and Taiabur Rahman

**PREVENTIVE DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA: PARLIAMENTARY
GOVERNMENT IN BANGLADESH, INDIA AND SRI LANKA**

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Abstract

In Fear's Empire, Benjamin Barber holds that the sole alternative to the Bush administration's policy of "preventive war" is "preventive democracy." While looking around the contemporary world for potential sources of anarchy, terrorism and violence, the states characterized as the "axis of evil" in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula appear to be on the lime light. However, there is a possibility that South Asia may prove to be a critical arena where intractable challenges of interdependence will have to be dealt with. It, thus, makes sense to look at the chances of entrenching preventive democracy in South Asia with a focus on the three regional states: Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. In doing so, we focused on the operation of the central institution of democracy in these states: parliament. We conclude with an analysis of the measures that need to be taken both by reformers in our three states, and by supportive external leaders and agencies. We argued that while all three parliaments are currently secure, none of them functions optimally, and all reveal differing degrees of fragility. To ensure their successful functioning in the years ahead, local politicians and global leaders should, therefore, develop strategies for strengthening them. If Barber is right, the future of global politics could depend on the success with which such strategies are conceived and implemented.

Introduction

Ian Holliday, Ph. D., is Professor and Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hong Kong. His Email address is: ian.holliday@hku.hk; **Ahmed Shafiqul Haque**, Ph. D., is an Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, McMaster University, Canada. His Email address is: huqueas@mcmaster.ca; **Taiabur Rahman**, Ph. D., is an Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka. His Email address is: taiabur_rahman@yahoo.com

In Fear's Empire, Benjamin Barber (2003) argues that nations seeking to confront the growing challenges of an interdependent world have "but two options: to overpower the malevolent interdependence that is terrorism by somehow imposing a global pax rooted in force; or to forge a benevolent interdependence by democratizing the world." More succinctly, he holds that the sole alternative to the Bush administration's policy of "preventive war" is "preventive democracy". This competing doctrine "assumes that the sole long-term defence for the United States (as well as other nations around the world) against anarchy, terrorism and violence is democracy itself". Strong democracy offers the only hope for a global order wherein the fundamentalist forces of Jihad would gradually fragment and decline, and finally, overwhelmed by the globalizing dynamics of the McWorld.

While looking around the contemporary world for potential sources of anarchy, terrorism and violence, the states characterized as the "axis of evil" in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula appear to be on the lime light. However, in the longer term, there is a possibility that South Asia may prove to be a critical arena where intractable challenges of interdependence will have to be dealt with. The region is a queer amalgam of people and faiths. A bitter division on the basis of religion, race, language, caste and ethnicity make it a fertile ground for conflicts. Ethnically, South Asia is one of the great melting pots of the world and its racial diversity is perhaps the most complex to be found anywhere outside Africa. There are six main religions, viz., Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Christianity, Buddhism and Jainism, hundreds of languages (including local dialects) and scores of ethnic groups subdivided into countless ethnic tribes. Rarely is there a region with such a great diversity in religion, language and ethnicity. This coupled with the fierce competition among diverse groups for the scares resources and the failure of the ongoing process of socio-economic development in South Asia to address their competing needs generate rivalry, mistrust and conflict along the religious, linguistic, ethnic and other parochial lines.

This has sustained numerous conflicts, particularly violent ones, within South Asian societies. The same has also caused a number of wars among the South Asian states in the post-colonial period. This implies particularly to India and Pakistan, which, by now, have acquired nuclear capability. Bordering the region is Afghanistan, the country in which the Bush doctrine of preventive war was first played out, and in which it has yet to register a clear success.

If Barber is right to argue that preventive democracy is the only viable alternative to preventive war, and if that alternative seems worthy of pursuit as global leaders seek to secure the long-term future of the planet, it makes sense to look, in some details, at the chances of entrenching preventive democracy in South Asia. In particular, there are good reasons for looking at both the track-record and the future prospects of democracy in three states in the region that

are currently democratic: Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. How secure is democracy in each of these states? How well does it function? What are its prospects in the years to come?

To address these and related questions, we focused on the operation of the central institution of democracy in these three states: parliament. Our analysis ranges across both external and internal aspects of legislative operations. In this regard, attempts have been made to probe onto the functioning of parliament and parliamentary committees. We begin by looking, in more details, at the argument that preventive democracy can offer a viable alternative to preventive war. We then turn to comparative analysis of the three parliaments, concentrating initially on the external aspects and then moving towards internal operations. Thus, the article begins with an exploration of preventive war and preventive democracy. Then it probes into the challenges of parliamentary government in South Asia with a focus on the context and operation. Finally, the article makes an attempt at evaluating the prospects for parliamentary government in South Asia.

Preventive War and Preventive Democracy

Debates about the nature of global conflict, and about appropriate response strategies and mechanisms, have been going on for many years. Barber's Jihad vs. MacWorld thesis that appeared during the mid-1990s has been a significant contribution to this debate. Samuel Huntington's contention (1996) that what we now face is a clash of civilization has been another one. However intense these debates on Jihad vs. MacWorld may have been, the September 11, 2001 terrorist strikes on New York City and Washington DC transformed both academic and policy discourse on the subject. These developments have prompted the articulation of a preventive war doctrine by the Bush administration. In its formative stages, the doctrine was implemented in Afghanistan in October 2001. Subsequently, a more mature version of the doctrine formed the basis for US engagement in Iraq in March 2003.

At the level of policy discourse, aspects of the new doctrine were evident in speeches given by President Bush after the 9/11 strikes. Addressing a joint session of Congress and the American people on September 20, 2001, he promised to "pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism". He warned that "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make". Further he declared emphatically that "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." In the State of the Union address delivered to Congress on January 29, 2002, he noted that "some governments will be timid in the face of terror." "If they do not act," he averred, "America will." He also used the occasion to make a personal commitment to US citizens: "I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer." Speaking to West

Point's bicentennial graduation class on June 1, 2002, he maintained that the US now had to adopt an offensive stance. Americans, he declared, should "take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge." Finally, he declared that in the war on terror, the maintenance of US security required "all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary."

The new doctrine took a fuller and more settled form when it was incorporated into The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released on September 20, 2002, precisely one year after the address to the joint session of Congress and the American people. Chapter III of the new strategy declared that "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against ... terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country." It insisted on the point that is central to Bush's preventive war doctrine: "our best defence is a good offence."

Although the competing doctrine of preventive democracy is implicit in some of the contributions to global debate made at the United Nations and elsewhere, it has not been given such a clear political expression as the Bush doctrine. Rather, it is to be found chiefly in the writings of academics. Notably, Barber himself has long argued in favour of "strong democracy."

Parliamentary Government in South Asia: Context

Even in the three South Asian states now ruled by or through parliaments, the experience of democracy has not always been smooth. In Bangladesh, parliamentary government has been punctuated by military dictatorship. In India, it has been disrupted by emergency measures and, in Sri Lanka, it has faced the challenge of long-running civil war. In any analysis, then, the social underpinnings for democracy must be given serious attention.

The context of a parliamentary system is influenced by a number of factors including constitutional history, political and social environment. The leadership of the movement for independence in South Asian countries was provided by western educated liberal personalities, who followed constitutional means to replace British rule. South Asian countries were, thus, influenced by the British parliamentary tradition and most sought to establish a similar system immediately after achieving independence. However, subsequent developments within the countries and the sub-continent have played a role in contributing to further changes and adjustments in the system of government.

Norton and Ahmed listed a number of external and internal factors that influence the external and internal environment as well as the capacity of the legislatures. The external factors include political culture, external patrons, the constitution, administrative structure, the party and electoral system, and

interest groups, while the internal factors include the chamber, party groups, committees, and members (Norton and Ahmed 1999: 3-8). They also play a prominent role in determining the context in which parliaments operate.

The Indian National Congress, the political party that led the movement for independence, had a number of British educated lawyers among its leaders. The Indian Independence Act 1947, which provided the interim framework of governing for the new country, placed considerable emphasis on the constituent assembly which was assigned to function as the central legislature. It was also entrusted the task of framing the first constitution of India. Political developments and competent leadership have contributed to the emergence and sustenance of a democratic culture, with a brief stint of authoritarian rule for two years (1975-77). The military has been restrained and did not display a tendency to interfere with the political process.

India has a variety of political culture, which reflects the relationship between the citizens and political institutions. The ancient Indian tradition of village panchayats represented some form of representative council, and they co-existed with regional royalty. Subsequently, modern elected institutions took roots, but the traditional values have not been completely displaced. With the strong influence of religious institutions, the political culture in India has taken on a unique form with conspicuous impact of class, caste, language and ethnicity vying for centre stage.

Parliamentary democracy has a deeper root in Sri Lanka, because it was the first colonial territory in which elections under universal suffrage were held prior to independence in 1931, 1936 and 1947 (Silva 2004: 48). In 1946, Sri Lanka established a bicameral parliament consisting of the House of Representatives and a Senate, with the Governor General as a titular head of state. The 1972 constitution led to several changes including the adoption of a unicameral legislature and the replacement of the Governor General by a President, and the 1978 constitution established a semi-presidential system. Proportional representation was introduced for multi-member constituencies (Wagner 2001:699).

Thus, power was gradually shifted from a cabinet that was part of the parliament to an executive president who is elected independently and is not accountable to the legislature. In practice, the president usually ensures that the parliament enacts legislation favourable to him/her or their political party. In fact, the president cannot be criticised in the parliament due to standing orders. Welikala (2002:3) described the powers of the executive as “formidable” and its relationship with the parliament as “unequal”.

Wilson recognized the differences in race, language, culture, religion and caste in Sri Lanka, but explained that ‘expediency, if not necessity’ has compelled the leaders to seek accommodation of the different forces (1977: 281). The political

culture in Sri Lanka has also been influenced by a contrast of traditional and modern values, and the function of an extremely strong executive exercising almost absolute control over all the key institutions.

The birth of Bangladesh was the outcome of a struggle against a strong executive that operated under Pakistan's presidential system of government. The party at the forefront of the liberation was pledged to establish a parliamentary system and the new constitution of 1972 was formulated accordingly. The experiment was short lived and was affected by authoritarian style of leadership and military intervention in the politics of the country. From the early days, the parliament faced frequent suspension or abolition and normal parliamentary activities remain unperformed. The political instability had a strong impact on the role and performance of the parliament.

In 1991, Bangladesh returned to a parliamentary democratic system in the wake of a mass movement that brought down a pseudo-military government. The re-emergence of mass political parties as critical actors in the political process and renewed emphasis on parliamentary system raised expectations of a strengthening of democracy. However, a high level of intolerance between the major political parties has rendered the parliament to a mere platform for propagating government views, while the opposition failed to perform the role expected of them. The trend of boycotting the legislature persists, and the institution is unable to perform effectively.

The political culture in Bangladesh is strongly influenced by the history of the country and its environs. There are contradictions between traditional and modern values, secular and religious forces, and understanding of the purpose and functions of the government. The overbearing presence and dominating natures of the majority party in the parliament distorts the objectives and there is practically no means of upholding the interests of the country as a whole. Deutsch (1972:312) warned that majority rule could "disregard reality, the rights of individuals and smaller groups, and the rights of the possible different majority of tomorrow against the perhaps transitory majority of the day". The political context in Bangladesh reflects the disadvantages of a democratic system that disregards the spirit of the ideology.

Parliamentary Government in South Asia: Operation

India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are currently experiencing several challenges. Following the adoption of parliamentary government, the three countries have achieved varying degrees of success in dealing with problems through actions of the legislature. The political systems and leadership patterns have been influenced, to a considerable extent, by history and traditions. Therefore, the operation of the parliaments continues to be guided by these factors.

The Indian parliament consists of the President, the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and the House of the People (Lok Sabha). The President is elected by the

members of an electoral college consisting of the elected members of both Houses of parliament and the elected members of state legislatures (only members of the lower Houses in case of bi-cameral state legislatures). The President of the republic is a figurehead, but he can exercise some discretion through the power to withhold assent to bills. The lower House enjoys a wide range of powers, and legislations are enacted after being endorsed by both Houses and the assent of the President.

The Indian constitution of 1950 established a full-fledged parliamentary system of government with a modern institutional framework. The electoral system made it difficult for the disparate opposition to win seats commensurate with the votes obtained, and that allowed the Congress Party to be the dominant participant in the legislature for many years (Kothari 1964), until the emergence of smaller parties holding the balance of power that resulted in coalition governments. Parliamentary committees have provided a sound platform to oversee the functioning of the government, and their effectiveness varies across sectors. Although some problems can be noticed, the operation of parliamentary government in India can be considered satisfactory.

In Sri Lanka, the exceptionally strong position of the President does impact on the nature of parliamentary government practiced in the country. The President holds the dual position of head of state as well as head of government. The powers include the appointment of the cabinet in consultation with the Prime Minister. The President appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers, including the prime minister, and even presides over cabinet meetings. The command of the armed forces is vested in the office of the President, who usually holds crucial portfolios such as defence, finance or foreign affairs. More importantly, the President can dissolve the parliament one year after it commences, and may submit matters of national importance to referendum (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 2000). Thus, the political arrangements undermine the role of the parliament in formulating rules and making critical decisions.

Many of the activities of the parliament are aimed at further consolidating the strength of the President and the ruling political party as well as advancing the policies advocated by them. Since the establishment of the executive presidency in 1978, the role of the parliament has declined considerably (CPSU 2002). Baxter et. al. (2000: 341) expressed concern that as the President is in a position to control both the cabinet and the party, the parliament may be reduced to a rubber stamp.

As suggested, within the existing political framework, the parliament is virtually powerless and a member of the parliament opined that the institution does not really add any value to the nation. The National State Assembly of Sri Lanka has supreme legislative authority. However, the President and majority of the members have belonged to the same political party for the past 26 years, with the exception of 29 months. There is ample scope for the President to bypass the

parliament. For example, the President has the discretion to submit to the public by referendum any bill which has been rejected by the parliament. Moreover, under a state of emergency, the President has the power to pass legislation without parliamentary consent. The power structure in the political system is reflected in the operation of parliamentary committees in Sri Lanka. Representatives of the ruling party occupy a predominant role and have the final word on most matters. Therefore, the operation of the parliament is affected by the uneven distribution of power that places the ruling party and its leaders in an advantageous position.

The operation of parliamentary government in Bangladesh follows a similar pattern, with the Prime Minister – the leader of the legislature and the head of government – wielding extensive power. The Prime Minister’s Secretariat reportedly acts as the final arbiter in all crucial government decisions. Such concentration of power has generally rendered the parliament weak. The electoral system in Bangladesh has helped most governments assume power on the basis of manufactured majority. It has also made the political system extremely competitive, and undermined the representation of the electorate to the parliament.

The Speakers of the parliament in Bangladesh display partisan inclinations, and this has hindered the normal operation of the legislature. The provision of the removal of the Speaker by a simple majority vote has pushed them to act in this manner. The relationship between the ruling and opposition parties has been adversarial in nature and it is a major obstacle to the normal operation of the parliament. Legislative decisions are seldom the product of debates and deliberations among the representatives of the people. The Prime Minister dominates the formation of parliamentary committees with the power of final approval of membership. With comprehensive jurisdiction and the authority to set their own agenda, the ruling party is able to impose its views and guide the operation of the parliament in Bangladesh.

Parliaments in South Asia operate according to the standard rules and procedures. Members are elected through a process and the rituals of parliamentary practices are observed. There are regular sessions and issues of importance are discussed. But there are variations in the impact of their operation. The Indian parliament has, so far, been the most effective in terms of representation of the electorate and making policy decisions. Even with a dominant party at the helm for a long time, regional parties and interests have been well served, thanks to the presence of an effective opposition. This may be attributed to the long tradition of democratic practices in India.

The Sri Lankan parliament is guided by extremely strong leadership from the country’s President. Apparently, this feature affects the democratic spirit, although it allows a channel for representation of the public and an opportunity for debating important issues. The parliament in Bangladesh becomes captive to

the party in power and the opposition has to resort to extra-parliamentary means for performing their role in representing their constituency and contribute to the operation of the government.

Parliamentary Government in South Asia: Prospects

Parliamentary government has operated in South Asia since most of the countries in the region achieved independence in the 1940s. The results are mixed. As suggested earlier, the role of democratic institutions may be critical in preventing countries from falling into the trap of authoritarian or illegitimate government. Deutsch proposed a 'yardstick of democracy' that included several elements: majority rule; equality; similar treatment for all individuals and small groups, including minorities; fair distribution of wealth, freedom, power and the satisfaction of health and other basic needs; opportunity for direct participation; freedom of speech, information and opinion; freedom to organize; constitutionalism and legality; and trust in the autonomy and spontaneity of individuals and small groups (Deutsch, 1972: 312-13). Many of these areas are directly affected by the economic, social and political environment prevailing in a country.

In the case of South Asia, a number of threats need special attention. Generally, the weak state of the economy has been a common problem in most developing countries. A democratic system of government could be the best means of protection against increased economic inequality as there is scope for input by various parties representing the interests of different groups in the society. A vibrant democratic culture facilitates the interaction of the state with the international community, and contributes to economic development. India's long experience of democratic government has been an important factor in its steady economic performance, as well as a deterrent to violent revolutionary movements. Sri Lanka, too, has reaped the benefits of a democratic environment, and Bangladesh's late start is gradually demonstrating result. Both these countries have witnessed better economic growth and the prospects are bright.

Parliamentary government has been a useful means for mediating social conflicts in South Asia. India encompasses a wide variety of language, culture and regional features, and there has always been a potential threat of separatist tendencies among the units. But these issues were sorted out in the parliament consisting of representatives of the various units, and the threats were minimized. Although Sri Lanka has continued to experience a bitter ethnic conflict, the government has succeeded in maintaining order, while making efforts at devising a solution to the conflict through negotiations instead of adopting a confrontational approach to the problem. In the case of Bangladesh, despite the incidence of extreme poverty, significant progress has been achieved in social development, and the parliament has been a useful tool in facilitating them. In all three countries, the parliaments – in varying degrees – have

contributed to the process of governing by performing their basic functions, although the circumstances are far from ideal.

Not only have parliamentary governments helped in improving economic conditions, it has also contributed to considerable social changes. The parliaments have facilitated the introduction and implementation of various programmes that have, ultimately, resulted in higher literacy rates, increased per capita income and better standards of living. These outcomes have gone a long way in containing social disturbance and accommodating the various groups in the society. The biggest contribution of democratic arrangements has been the gradual establishment and consolidation of principles and practices that facilitate representation of different interests and constitutional transfer of power. The countries have promoted the values of tolerance, equality, participation and access. The combined effect of all these has been an environment that prevents the eruption of ethnic and sectarian conflict, and unconstitutional usurpation of governmental power.

The containment of political unrest is critical for South Asian countries. As the region lies between the geo-politically important areas of West and East Asia, there has been a high level of concern over its stability. The international community, in particular the United States of America, has been propagating democratic ideal in its campaign against anarchy, terrorism and violence. In this regard, the experiences of parliamentary governments in India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh demonstrate positive results.

Based on these discussions, it is possible to comment on the prospects of parliamentary government in the region. It has been possible to govern a huge and diverse country like India due to the effective functioning of the parliamentary government. It has also been possible to manage various problems in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It is necessary to accommodate the various forces within the same system. While expressions of discontent with the government's activities and performance are manifested in different ways in the South Asian countries, the parliament remains a key institution for deliberation and decision-making on major issues.

Representative government has come to occupy a prominent place in the political culture as well as the expectations of the citizens. This is reflected in the rising level of participation in public affairs. Voter turnouts in the national parliamentary elections in the 1990s in both Bangladesh and India were quite high. In Bangladesh, voter turnout in the parliamentary elections was 55% in 1991, 75% in 1996 and 76% in 2001 (Bangladesh Election Commission, 2006). In India, voter turnout in the national parliamentary elections was 56.93% in 1991, 57.94% in 1996, 61.97% in 1998, 59.99% in 1999 and 57.65% in 2004 (Election Commission of India, 2006). More citizens are exercising their voting rights and the number of political parties as well as institutions of the civil society is on the increase. At the same time, organized interest groups have

become more active in pressing for demands on behalf of their constituencies. Reaction to the unsatisfactory performance of the government is expressed through demands for fresh elections and change, rather than unconstitutional or revolutionary means.

There is strong pressure in favour of parliamentary government from external sources as well. International donor agencies and sponsoring countries are openly concerned about the legitimacy of governments in countries to which they provide financial and technical support. In recent years, records of fair trade and labour practices as well as human rights have received more attention from overseas investors. Participation of South Asian countries in international trade and commerce is contingent upon adherence to international charters and conventions, and these usually push governments towards the adoption of a representative system of government.

There is a very strong demand for popular representative system of government. The long domination of the Congress Party in India, and concentration of power in the offices of the President (Sri Lanka) and Prime Minister (Bangladesh) have narrowed down the scope of meaningful participation and made the public quite uncomfortable. This is evident in the rapidly increasing interest in a vibrant civil society, which is expected to serve as a watchdog and valuable participant in the process of promoting and maintaining democratic ideals. Fraser (2003: 103) claims that “the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty and the consequent blurring of the separation between (associational) civil society and the state represent a democratic advance over earlier political arrangements”.

As it seems, democracy has become order of the day at the global level. In the era of globalisation, the US and its allies are likely to create pressure on South Asian countries for further liberalization of their economy and polity. In this regard, the ongoing process of democratization in South Asia based on the parliamentary form of government would continue to deserve significant attention, since it enjoys widespread support on the part of international community. Thus, the domestic political environment, emerging civic culture and the realities of operating in the international community indicate towards better prospects for parliamentary governments in South Asia.

Conclusion

Following the adoption of parliamentary government, the three countries have achieved varying degree of successes in dealing with problems through actions of the legislature. While expressions of discontent with the government’s activities and performance are manifested in different ways in South Asian countries, the parliament remains a key institution for deliberation and decision-making on many critical issues.

The paper finds that broader socio-political contexts have largely determined the way parliaments have performed in these countries. Leadership, the degree

of the institutionalization of democracy, and the efficacy and reasonable functioning of the major political institutions and parliamentary mechanisms also matter. Apart from providing legitimacy for the rulers to govern, parliaments in these countries have performed significantly the key tasks of representation, legislation, oversight of the executive and conflict resolution with varying impacts (Rahman, 2007). While all three parliaments are currently secure; none of them functions optimally and all reveal different degree of fragility.

Representative government has come to occupy a prominent place in the political culture as well as the expectations of the citizens. There is strong pressure in favour of parliamentary government from external sources as well. International donor agencies and sponsoring countries are openly concerned about the legitimacy of governments in countries to which they provide financial and technical support. In terms of external relations, the prospect of parliamentary government appears to be promising in South Asia.

Preventive democracy, as it is evident in this paper, has offered a better and viable alternative to preventative war and a strong and functioning parliament is at the heart of the advancement of preventative democracy in the three states in South Asia. Slow but gradual move towards consocietal democracy from majoritarian one may diffuse internal tensions within the states, ensure stability and maintain friendly interstate relations in the region through dialogue, cooperation and engagement.

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Bhumitra Chakma

PAKISTANI MISSILES: EXPLAINING PROCUREMENT AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

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Abstract

Pakistan, starting a missile development programme in the 1980s, is a significant missile force today. Its missile arsenal is composed of varied types of short and medium-range ballistic and cruise missile systems. They are both solid and liquid propellant and can carry conventional as well as non-conventional ammunitions. This paper analyses Pakistan's missile procurement approach and strategic implications of Pakistani missiles. While the Pakistani missile programme was initiated as a corollary to its nuclear weapons programme, yet the strongest impetus for building a missile force came from its chief strategic rival, India. In building its missile capabilities, Pakistan had to overcome severe international constraints and relied heavily on clandestine procurement of appropriate technologies. The Pakistani missiles may be viewed to have strengthened Pakistani deterrent capability and has contributed to strategic stability between itself and India.

Introduction

Since the World War II, the trend of missile proliferation, in terms of increasing sophistication and the number of countries acquiring them, has been fairly consistent. In recent decades, missile systems have proliferated not only in the developed world but also in many developing countries.¹ The primary reason for this consistent missile proliferation in

Bhumitra Chakma, Ph. D., is a Lecturer in War and Security Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Hull, UK. His email address is: B.Chakma@hull.ac.uk

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¹ For a general overview of missile proliferation in the developing world, see, Martin Navias, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World*, Adelphi

the post-war era is that missiles, in particular ballistic missiles, are more efficient and secure means of delivering conventional as well as non-conventional munitions than the traditional means of aircrafts. And, of course, the acquisition of missile capability enhances the credibility of a state's military power.

Two interesting points arise from missile proliferation in the developing world. First, developing countries in general lack advanced technologies; how do they build considerably sophisticated missile capabilities is, therefore, a moot question. A perspective in this regard can be found in what the Iranian intellectuals call as 'Pakistan Syndrome', meaning 'a state that has failed along many dimensions but still can do one thing well – build a nuclear bomb'.² Second, although missile proliferation ostensibly appears to be benign, it does not, however, mean that their spread is devoid of any implication. In fact, acquisition of missile capabilities by a state does make profound strategic impact on a given region.

These two issues are examined in this paper in the context of Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan is an interesting case because vital lessons can be learnt from it regarding the process of missile proliferation as well as strategic implications of their spread in the developing world. This paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, it provides an inventory of Pakistani missiles. The second section analyses the rationale and the history of Pakistan's acquisition of missile capabilities. Finally, it provides an in-depth analysis of strategic implications of Pakistani missiles.

Missile Capabilities of Pakistan: An Inventory

Pakistan's missile arsenal is composed of varied types of short and medium-range ballistic missile systems. They are both solid and liquid propellant and can carry conventional as well as non-conventional

Paper, No. 252, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1990); Jane E. Nolan, *Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1991); Aaron Karp, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); *Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Jane's Special Report*, (Geopolitical), Jane's Information Group, February 2000.

² Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p.330.

ammunitions. To be precise, Pakistan's capabilities include the solid-fuelled *Hatf* battlefield missile series, the liquid-fuelled *Ghauri* intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and the solid-propellant *Shaheen* series. Pakistan recently has developed its first cruise missile system the *Babar*. Additionally, Pakistan possesses several dozens of M-11 missiles, which Beijing supplied to Pakistan in the early 1990s.

Table 1: Pakistan's Missile Capabilities: Missile System Type First Test Range/km Payload/kg Fuel

Hatf-I	BRBM	Early 1989	50-90	450	Solid (Single Stage)
Hatf-II/ Abdali	BRBM	Early 1989	70-200	450	Solid
Hatf-III Ghaznavi	SRBM	26 May 2002	100-290	800	Solid
Hatf-IV /Shaheen-I	IRBM	15 April 1999	200-650	850	Solid
Hatf-V /Ghauri-I	IRBM	6 April 1998	300-1300	680	Liquid
Hatf-VI /Shaheen-II	IRBM	9 March 2004	700-2200	1100	Solid
Hatf-VI /Shaheen-II	IRBM	14 April 1999	1800	1500	Liquid
M-11	SRBM		280-300	800-1200	Solid
Hatf-VII /Babar	SRSCM	12 August 2005	500		
Hatf-VIII /Raad	ALCM	25 August 2007	350		

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks: A net assessment* (London: IISS, 2007); Major General (Retd.) Mahmud Ali Durrani, *Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons*, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper, SAND 2004 3375P, Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004; *Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems*, (Issue 39, July 2002), pp. 124-131, http://www.pakistanidefence.com/Nuclear&Missiles/Pakistani_Ballistic_Missiles.html

The News (Rawalpindi), 25 August 2007.

Hatf-I

The original variant of *Hatf-I* was a single-stage, solid-fuelled *rocket*, which had a range of 50-90 km, and could carry 450 kg payload

ordnance.³ It was first tested in early 1989, but its accuracy remains unknown and is strongly suspected. It is also very doubtful whether the original variant of *Hatf-I* could actually carry a nuclear warhead. It is more likely that it was intended to carry high explosives, sub-munitions, and possibly chemical weapons.⁴ After its first test, *Hatf-I* went into oblivion for a long period of time, and only came back to the limelight when a modified variant, of about 100 km range, was test-fired in February 2000.⁵ There is no clear explanation from the Pakistani authorities why it was kept dormant for such an extended period of time, or why it reappeared. A plausible explanation for reviving *Hatf-I* missile is, perhaps, due to the necessity of a tactical delivery vehicle that was specifically felt in view of the experience of the 1999 Kargil War. Islamabad is widely believed to have received Chinese technical assistance in developing this missile in the 1980s. This missile system has already been deployed and Pakistan probably currently possesses as many as 80 *Hatf-I* missiles.⁶

Hatf-II/Abdali

It is a two-stage, solid-fuelled ballistic missile system, which has a 70-200 km range and can carry a 450 kg payload munitions.⁷ Its first test took place in early 1989 simultaneously with *Hatf-I*. Pakistan, like *Hatf-I*, is believed to have received Chinese technical assistance to develop this missile system. *Jane's Defence Weekly* reported that Pakistani officials had admitted the Chinese assistance to the Pakistani missile

³ “Hatf-1 – Pakistan Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems”, *Federation of American Scientists*, available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/hatfp1.htm>. It is noteworthy that a rocket differs from a missile system in the sense that the former does not have guidance system and relies on its launch trajectory in order to hit the intended target.

⁴ *Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems*, (Issue 37, July 2002), pp.124-131.

⁵ Ben Sheppard, “Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: The Ramifications for Regional Stability”, Brookings Institution, available at www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/south_asia/events/20010405.htm

⁶ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002-2003*, (London: IISS, 2002), p. 133.

⁷ “Hatf-II – Pakistan Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems”, *Federation of American Scientists*, 19 June 2003, available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/hatf-2.htm>

development programme and specifically mentioned of Chinese help in developing the guidance system of *Hatf-I* and *Hatf-II*.⁸ After its first test in 1989, nothing was heard about *Hatf-II* until the project was revived in 1997. There is no explanation from the Pakistani government as to why the project was suspended and later revived. A number of reasons can be inferred for the suspension of the *Hatf-II* project. One probable reason is that the project suffered technical difficulties, which forced Islamabad to suspend it. Another reason could be that it was merged with another project. Or it could even be that the project was abandoned, as this missile resembled the M-11 missile system, which China supplied to Pakistan in the early 1990s.⁹ The project was revived in 1997, probably considering its potential use as a battlefield delivery system. A new variant of *Hatf-II* was developed upon the project's renewal, which was tested on 28 May 2002. Pakistan conducted a series of tests of this missile in 2003, 2005 and 2006.

This missile system is generally considered to be substantively accurate. Hence it can be used against specific targets such as military

⁸ Mushahid Hussain, "First Sight of Pakistan's 'Lance', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (vol. 11, No. 10, 11 March 1989), p.381; Joseph Cirincione, *Deadly Arsenal: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 213.

⁹ In the summer of 1996 press reports in the U.S. based on leaked U.S. National Intelligence Estimate suggested that Pakistan had obtained about three dozens of M-11 missile from China. See, Bill Gertz, "Pakistan Deploys Chinese Missiles", *Washington Times*, 12 June, 1996; R. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Report Cites China-Pakistan Missile Links", *Washington Post*, 13 June 1996. For the full version of the National Intelligence Estimate, see, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace home page available at <http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/brief213.htm> China's ambassador to the United States, while not specifying the M-11, acknowledged in an address to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., that China had given a limited number of ballistic missiles to Pakistan, quoted in Shirin M. Mazari, "Missile Development in India and Pakistan: Impact on Regional Stability", *Security and Economic Review*, (vol. 1, no. 1, 1992), p.14. For more discussion on Pakistan-China links relating to missile and missile technology, see, Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998); Nayan Chanda *et. al.*, "The Race Is On", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (vol. 161, no. 24, 11 June 1998), pp. 20-22; "CIA Says China Helped Pakistan Missile Program," *The New York Times*, 9 August 2000.

bases, airfields, etc. It is carried on a road mobile Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicle. The use of solid propellant and the TEL vehicle make the missile easy to store, transport, and launch. Given this characteristic of this missile system, its potential use as a tactical weapon in a limited war context is enormous. Islamabad has already deployed *Hatf-II* missiles.

Hatf-III/Ghaznavi

Hatf-III is a solid-fuel, single-stage ballistic missile which has a maximum range of 290 km and is capable of carrying an 800 kg payload. It can deliver both conventional ordnance as well as nuclear warhead. It was first tested on 26 May 2002.¹⁰ This system closely resembles the Chinese M-9 missile.¹¹ *Ghaznavi* missiles have formally been inducted into the Army's Strategic Forces Command in February 2004.

Hatf-IV/Shahen-I

It is a solid-fuelled, road mobile missile system, which has a maximum range of 650 km, and is capable of carrying an 850 kg payload warhead. It is widely believed to be a scaled-up version of China's M-11 missile.¹² *Shahen* missile system is developed in the National Development Complex (NDC), a subsidiary of Pakistan Atomic Energy

¹⁰ Although Pakistani officials claimed the 2002 test to be the first test of *Hatf-III*, *The Nation* in 1997 reported that a *Hatf-III* test had taken place. See, "Hataf III Test", *The Nation*, 6 July 1997. It is not very clear whether the 2002 variant was an improved version of the 1997 *Hatf-III*.

¹¹ CRS Report, "Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Countries", 26 July 2005, p. 20; available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30427.pdf>

¹² In late August 1996 intelligence finding in the U.S. was leaked to the press which said that using blueprints and equipment supplied by China, Pakistan in late 1995 had begun the construction of a factory to produce short-range missiles based on the Chinese M-11 missile design. See, R. Jeffrey Smith, 'China Linked to Pakistani Missile Plant', *Washington Post*, 25 August 1996. This did not lead to U.S. imposition of sanctions on Pakistan. However, in 2001, Washington imposed MCTR Category II sanctions on Pakistani and Chinese entities for trading sensitive dual-use technologies. See, Amir Mateen, 'New U.S. Sanctions on China, Pakistan', *The News*, 2 September 2001. These sanctions were lifted following the terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 when Pakistan emerged as a frontline state in the US-led war on terror.

Commission. It was first tested in April 1999, although its serial production began in 1998.¹³ It was inducted into Pakistan Army's Strategic Forces Command in March 2003.

Hatf-V/Ghauri-I

Ghauri-I is a single-stage, liquid-propellant, road-mobile Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and has a range of 1300 km with a payload capacity of 680 kg. Pakistan specifically developed the *Ghauri* in response to India's development of the *Prithvi* missile system.¹⁴ This missile was developed in the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and its first test took place on 6 April 1998. The *Ghauri-I* has formally been inducted into the Pakistan Army's Strategic Forces Command in January 2003. This missile closely resembles North Korea's *Nodong* missile, and it is widely believed that Pakistan obtained the design and technologies to build this missile system from North Korea in the early 1990s in exchange for its assistance to the DPRK's clandestine uranium enrichment programme.¹⁵

Hatf-VI/Shahen-II

Shahen-II is a road-mobile, two-stage, solid-fuelled ballistic missile system, and an improved version of *Shahen-I*. It has a maximum range of 2,200 km and is capable of carrying a 1,100 kg payload warhead.

¹³ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 1998, p. 3.

¹⁴ On *Prithvi* missile, see, Federation of American Scientists, 'Prithvi', available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/prithvi.htm>

¹⁵ In early 1990s, Islamabad assisted North Korea to build its nuclear enrichment programme in exchange for missile design and technology. For details, see Duncan Lennox, "Ballistics Boom", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (vol. 32, no. 10, 8 September 1999), p. 31; Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *International Security*, (vol. 29, no. 2, 2004); Joseph Bermudez, "A silent partner," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (vol. 29, no. 20, 20 May 1998), pp. 16-17; Gaurav Kampani, 'Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea', *The Nonproliferation Review*, (vol. 9, issue 3, Fall/Winter 2002); Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Pakistan and North Korea", *Strategic Comments*, (vol. 8, issue 9, November 2002), available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/Pakistan%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf>

Many speculate that *Shaheen-II* has been developed from the design of Chinese M-18 missile system.¹⁶ It is a considerably sophisticated and accurate missile system with a separating re-entry vehicle. Without going for a test-flight, this missile was first displayed during the Pakistan Day Parade on 23 March 2000 and eventually was tested on 9 March 2004.

Ghauri-II

Ghauri-II is an improved version of the original variant of this series *Ghauri-I*. Like *Ghauri-I* it is liquid-propellant, but unlike its predecessor, it is a two-stage IRBM. It has a range of 1800 km and is capable of carrying 1500 kg payload ammunition.¹⁷ Its first flight-test took place on 14 April 1999.

M-11

Pakistan has about three dozens Chinese manufactured M-11 missiles, which Beijing, as noted earlier, supplied in early 1990s. M-11 is a road-mobile, solid-propellant missile system, which has a range of 280-300 km and is capable of carrying a maximum 1200 kg payload munitions.

Hatf-VII/Babar

Babar is a subsonic, low-level terrain-mapping and terrain-hugging cruise missile system. It closely resembles American BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile.¹⁸ This missile has been developed as part of *Hatf* series (*Hatf-VII*), and has a range of 500 km. Its first flight test took place on 12 August 2005. With modifications, it may be possible to launch this missile from ships, submarines, and aircrafts. Islamabad probably has undertaken a new project to upgrade the *Babar* and develop a new variant of this missile system (*Babar-2*) that will increase its range

¹⁶ 'Shaheen-II/Hatf-6/Ghaznavi - Pakistan Missile Weapons Delivery Systems', *Federation of American Scientists*, available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/shaheen-2.htm>

¹⁷ Ben Sheppard, "Regional Rivalries are Replayed as India and Pakistan Renew Ballistic Missile Tests", *Jane's International Defence Review*, 5/1999, p. 57.

¹⁸ "Hatf 7, Babar Cruise Missile", available at http://www.pakistanidefence.com/Nuclear&Missiles/BaburCruiseMissile_info.htm

and payload. Serial production of the original variant of *Babar* began in October 2005.

Hatf-VIII/Raad

It is an 'Air Launch Cruise Missile' (ALCM) with a range of 350 km and can carry varied payload munitions. According to Pakistan military sources, the "Raad can carry all types of warheads and has accuracy comparable to Pakistan's longer Babar cruise missile,"¹⁹

Dynamics of Pakistan's Missile Capability Build-Up: Origin and Evolution

In absence of any authentic government source materials, it is difficult to be certain about when the Pakistani authorities began to pay serious attention to develop the country's missile capabilities or when it actually launched a missile development programme.²⁰ However, activities surrounding the country's space programme in the early 1980s indicate that Islamabad probably at that point realised the necessity of building missile capabilities. In 1981, while elaborating a 10-year national space programme, Salim Mahmood, chairperson of Pakistan Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO), pointed out that the government had been studying in detail the configuration of a satellite which could "serve strategic purposes by taking pictures of military installations, army movements and acting as control, command and communication bases."²¹ It is noteworthy that SUPARCO came into being in 1981 against the backdrop of India's flight-testing of SLV-3 in July 1980 and the widespread concern it generated in Pakistan due to the possibility that New Delhi might use it for the development of strategic missiles.²² The Pakistani Government

¹⁹ "Pakistan tests new cruise missile," BBC News, 25 August 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6963768.stm.

²⁰ Although its authenticity remains doubtful, but at least one source claims that Pakistan's early generation missile development programme that produced *Hatf-I* and *Hatf-II* missiles began in 1980. See, 'Pakistan's Missile Program Chronology', available at http://www.pakistanidefence.com/Nuclear&Missiles/Missile_Program_Chronology.html.

²¹ B. Radhakrishnan Rao, "Pakistan's Space Ambitions: a military option?", *Nature*, (vol. 294, 10 December 1981), p. 507.

²² *Ibid.*

paid considerable attention to the works of SUPARCO. The fact that President Zia-ul Haq himself headed the organisation was a clear indication that the government was prioritising its works.

Notwithstanding the growing awareness about the necessity of building missile capabilities, within the Pakistani military, political and bureaucratic circles, there was, however, a conspicuous lack of seriousness in pursuing a missile development programme in the early 1980s. Shortage of appropriate technologies, bureaucratic complexity, unavailability of fund, and lack of political commitment were presumably responsible for this. Hence, Pakistan made little progress during the initial phase of its missile development.

From the mid-1980s onward, Islamabad geared up its missile development activities. A number of factors prompted Islamabad to be serious about the development of its own strategic missiles. First of all, Pakistan's missile development programme was a natural corollary of its nuclear weapons programme. It is only natural for a state to seek suitable delivery vehicles when it possesses nuclear weapons. Pakistan launched its strategic weapons programme in the early 1970s and by the mid-1980s it was on the threshold of acquiring the ability to build nuclear weapons.²³ At that point the Pakistani defence planners clearly realised that sooner or later Pakistan would have to develop missile capabilities as a safe and more reliable means of delivering nuclear warheads other than aircrafts.

Moreover, during the Afghan War in the 1980s, Pakistan became exposed to missile threat from the Soviet Union as the Soviet forces fired Scud missiles across the Durand Line targeting the Mujahedeen bases and training camps inside the Pakistani territory.²⁴ It influenced the Pakistani strategic thinking about missiles, which was subsequently translated into pro-active missile development activities in the late 1980s. Additionally, the demonstration effect of ballistic missiles in the Iran-

²³ For more exposition on Pakistan's nuclear weapons development, see Bhumitra Chakma, "Road to Chagai: Pakistan's Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations," *Modern Asian Studies*, (vol. 36, no. 4, October 2002), pp. 871-912.

²⁴ Naeem Ahmad Salik, "Missile Issues in South Asia", *The Nonproliferation Review*, (vol. 9, no. 2, Summer 2002), p. 50.

Iraq war (1980-1988)²⁵ and general missile proliferation in the developing world in the 1980s also made considerable impact on the Pakistani thinking about the necessity of building missile delivery systems.

But, the decisive impetus to Pakistan's missile programme came from its chief strategic rival, India. New Delhi launched a comprehensive missile development project, known as the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), in July 1983.²⁶ It was the most ambitious and by far the largest missile development project India ever had undertaken which, very alarmingly from the Pakistani standpoint, made New Delhi's intention of building a nuclear-capable missile force very clear.²⁷ Islamabad could not but be concerned that if materialised the IGMDP could drastically alter the military balance between the two countries. Specifically, the plan to develop the *Agni* missile system clearly signalled a nuclear-orientation of India's project, because for only conventional use the development of *Agni* had little sense. Even the inclusion of the *Prithvi*-type missile system raised questions about India's intentions. As a retired Indian military officer has observed, "*Prithvi's* potential as a decisive weapon of war is not when it carries conventional munitions load, but when tipped with a nuclear device".²⁸ New Delhi's announcement of the IGMDP was closely observed by Islamabad and its strategic implications were carefully assessed by the Pakistanis. In general it was viewed that India was determined to build a nuclear arsenal and a compatible missile force. No wonder then that in reaction Islamabad geared up, *albeit* clandestinely, its *Hatf-I* and *Hatf-II* missile projects.

²⁵ This point is discussed by defence analyst Rodney W. Jones, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia", *Asian Affairs*, (vol. 25, no. 2, Summer 1998), p. 71.

²⁶ On the launching of the IGMDP and the development of India's missile capabilities, see, Anupam Srivastava, "India's Growing Missile Ambitions: Assessing the Technical and Strategic Dimensions", *Asian Survey*, (vol. XL, no. 2, March-April 2000), pp. 311-341.

²⁷ A leading Indian strategic analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, has maintained that the IGMDP made it clear that 'India was aiming at developing its nuclear option further.' See, K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Nuclear Policy – 1964-1998", in Jasjit Singh, (ed.), *Nuclear India*, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 39.

²⁸ Lieutenant General (Retd.) Harwant Singh, quoted in George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 296.

India, following the launching of the IGMDP, quickly developed the *Prithvi* and *Agni* missile systems and tested them in 1988 and 1989 respectively. Those tests reinforced Pakistani resolve to expeditiously build a countervailing missile force. In particular, India's testing of the *Prithvi* missile on 18 February 1988, which is generally considered to be Pakistan-specific, made a critical impact on the Pakistan strategic calculation. It not only expedited Pakistan's missile development endeavour, it also forced Islamabad to foster secret links with friendly countries, such as China and North Korea, in order to expeditiously build its missile capabilities. Pakistan's sustained effort soon bore fruit, which can be observed in its development and testing of *Hatf-I* and *Hatf-II* in early 1989. When asked why Pakistan was developing ballistic missiles, Pakistan's then Minister of State for Defence, Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, replied that Pakistan needed "to have an antidote for what our enemy (India) next door has."²⁹

Because of a weak industrial and technological base, Pakistan was to a large extent dependent on the supply of relevant technologies from external sources to build its missiles. From the outset, however, Islamabad confronted a hostile international environment, which severely impeded the expeditious development of its missile capabilities. For one thing, Islamabad was already widely suspected for pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme and was under severe pressure from the West, in particular the USA, to abandon its nuclear weapons ambition. Washington imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1979 for clandestine procurement of uranium enrichment technologies which violated the Glenn-Symington Amendment.³⁰ Pakistan, therefore, was under the close watch of the West, and was included as a target country in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group's (NSG) so-called trigger list.³¹ Additionally, the creation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987

²⁹ Roger Fronst, "Pakistan's New Defence Minister on Missiles, Self-reliance and Afghanistan", *International Defence Review*, April 1989.

³⁰ In 1976 and 1977, the US Congress enacted the Glenn/Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which provided that countries importing or exporting sensitive dual-use technologies under certain conditions would be cut off from US economic and military assistance.

³¹ The Nuclear Suppliers Group was formed in 1975 by industrialised countries in reaction to India's 1974 nuclear test. Its primary objective was to control export of dual-use sensitive technologies. The 'trigger list' is the guideline for the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technology.

came as a crippling blow to Islamabad's quest for missile technologies from the international market. Such a hostile international environment, on the one hand, and the strategic necessity of quickly building missile capabilities, on the other, forced Islamabad to use clandestine means to procure missile technologies. It was in this context that Islamabad fostered secret links with Beijing and Pyongyang.

On 25 April 1988, the Pakistani Government claimed that it had launched an 800 km range ballistic missile.³² It raised eyebrows amongst observers about Islamabad's claim as at that stage it was practically not feasible for Pakistan to build a missile of such range. No independent source is available to verify the Pakistani claim. However, it did highlight the Pakistani concern regarding India's *Prithvi* missile and Islamabad's desperate attempt to acquire a countervailing missile force. Indeed, the Pakistani government indicated that this missile system was developed to counter India's growing missile capability.³³ In early 1989, Pakistan test-fired a 150 kg multi-stage rocket at an altitude of 640 kilometres, which was soon followed by the testing of short-range, solid propellant, *Hatf-I* and *Hatf-II* missiles. China provided, as noted earlier, vital assistance to Islamabad to develop these two missile systems. Following the test of *Hatf-I* and *Hatf-II*, Pakistan embarked upon building longer-range missiles, which was prompted by the necessity that Pakistan was still short of a missile capability that could hit New Delhi. It is noteworthy that neither *Hatf-I* nor *Hatf-II* had a range that could strike the Indian capital. Not surprisingly, then, that Islamabad undertook new missile projects and expeditiously pursued them. Pakistan's then Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg stated that Pakistan had embarked on a new project to develop a missile with a range of 600 km that would enable his country to strike New Delhi.³⁴

In 1989, Islamabad concluded a secret deal with Beijing to purchase 34 solid-propellant M-11 ballistic missiles.³⁵ It resulted from Islamabad's

³² Institute of Regional Studies (Islamabad), "Missile Proliferation in South Asia", *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, (vol. IX, no. 1 January 1990).

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan 'responding to change'," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (vol. 12, no. 15, 14 October 1989), p. 779.

³⁵ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Pakistan and North Korea", *Strategic Comments*, (vol. 8, issue 9, November 2002), p. 1, available at

frantic effort to build missile capabilities to counter India's growing missile power and was catalysed by two specific factors: (1) a hostile international environment created by the formation of the NSG and the MCTR, which made the procurement of relevant technologies from open international sources for developing missiles very difficult; and (2) the test of Pakistan-specific *Prithvi* missile in 1988 and *Agni* in 1989, which made, as discussed above, huge impact on Pakistan's missile building priorities. In addition to supplying M-11, Beijing also assisted Pakistan in building an indigenous capability to manufacture missiles. The *Washington Post*, citing US intelligence sources, reported that China had not only sold manufactured M-11 solid-fuel missile to Pakistan in the early 1990s, it had also transferred to Pakistan the production technology for a solid-fuel ballistic missile manufacturing plant.³⁶

Islamabad also established secret link with Pyongyang as another source of missile technology. It is unknown how and when this link was established or who – Zia-ul Haq or Benazir Bhutto – took this initiative. It is, however, evident that after becoming Prime Minister in December 1988, Benazir Bhutto gave her full support to the missile programme and did everything to expedite the country's missile capability. Reportedly Pakistani officials visited DPRK's Sanum-dong Missile Development Centre in late 1980s to examine the *Nodong* missile. In July 1992, North Korean Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam visited Islamabad and discussed issues pertaining to missile cooperation and his country's sale of *Nodong* missiles to Pakistan. In May 1993, Pakistani scientists and engineers attended a test launch of the *Nodong* in North Korea. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto herself visited Pyongyang on 30 December 1993, which probably was a turning point in the Pakistan-DPRK collaboration in the missile and nuclear fields. It is widely speculated that a 'missile for nuclear technology' deal was negotiated during her visit.

This was followed by a visit a few months later of a delegation led by the head of the Khan Research Laboratories, A.Q. Khan. This is not very clear what the primary objective of Khan's visit was or whether he discussed about the barter deal. However, evidence suggests that further

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/Pakistan%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf>

³⁶ R. Jeffrey Smith, "Reports Cite China-Pakistan Missile Links", *The Washington Post*, 13 June 1996.

negotiations were conducted during a visit of Marshall Ch'oe Gwang, former vice-chairperson of North Korea's National Defence Commission, to Islamabad in late 1995.³⁷ Possibly a barter deal was at a final stage of negotiations at that time. Interestingly, the Chief of Army Staff Jahangir Karamat also paid a visit, albeit secretly, to Pyongyang in December 1997, which highlighted the development of a strategic partnership between the two countries.³⁸

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new international environment made Pakistan strategically more vulnerable than before, which reinforced Pakistan's sense of urgency to develop a robust nuclear deterrent capability and a compatible missile delivery force. In an altered post-Cold War international environment, Washington not only withdrew its patronage, it also emerged as a 'nuclear watchdog' in its relations with Pakistan, which was reflected in Washington's imposition of sanctions on Pakistan in 1990 applying the Pressler Amendment.³⁹ It should be noted that Pakistan enjoyed unprecedented geopolitical weight

³⁷ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Pakistan and North Korea", *Strategic Comments*, (vol. 8, issue 9, November 2002), p. 1, available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/Pakistan%20and%20North%20Korea.pdf>

³⁸ John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe: Senior Pakistani Army Officers were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says", *Washington Post*, 3 February 2004. Benazir Bhutto herself has acknowledged that Pakistan had paid North Korea in cash for the transfer of missile technology during her second term in 1994-1996, although that did not involve any missiles or missile technology. See, "Bhutto Says Pak Paid N Korea for Missile Tech", *The Economic Times* (Mumbai), 11 February 2004; Anwar Iqbal, "Exclusive: Bhutto on Pakistan Nuclear History", *United Press International*, 13 April 2004.

³⁹ The Pressler Amendment, named after Senator Larry Pressler who tabled the bill, is a Pakistan-specific anti-proliferation legislation enacted by the US Congress in 1985. This legislation was designed to cut off US aid and government-to-government military sales to Pakistan unless the President certified at the beginning of each fiscal year that Pakistan did not "possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed U.S. assistance programme will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device." From 1985 to 1989 President Reagan and President Bush certified every year that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device in order to facilitate military and economic aid to that country. They did so despite strong evidence that Pakistan was making significant advances in acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

in the 1980s as a frontline state in the Afghan War and Washington waived the application of Pressler Amendment in the latter half of the decade. This sense of security vulnerability again sharpened when a crisis over Kashmir erupted in 1990, which had a nuclear connotation.⁴⁰ Reportedly Pakistan modified American-supplied F-16 aircraft for possible nuclear delivery.⁴¹ Islamabad's deepening of strategic collaboration with Beijing and Pyongyang and its effort to build missile capabilities should be seen in the context of new strategic environment that emerged after the end of the Cold War.

In June 1997, press reports suggested that the Army version of Indian short range *Prithvi* missiles had been deployed in Jullundur, an area which is very close to the Indo-Pakistani border.⁴² New Delhi denied the 'deployment' of *Prithvi* missiles, but said a batch of missiles had merely been moved from its production facilities in South India to the north. Responding to this development, Pakistan tested a nuclear capable missile *Hatf-III*, which essentially highlighted Islamabad's determination to match India's expanding missile capabilities.⁴³

Pakistan developed the liquid-propellant, road-mobile *Ghauri* (*Hatf-V*), with an estimated range of 1,300 km and a payload capacity of 680 kg to counter India's *Prithvi* missile. According to Pakistani officials: "the *Ghauri* compensates for Pakistan's lack of strategic depth.... [it] serves the strategic need of Pakistan to be able to hold India in a position of vulnerability similar to itself."⁴⁴ Pakistan also developed a solid-fuel missile system *Shaheen-I* (*Hatf-IV*) and tested it on 15 April 1999. Pakistan's President Farooq Ahmed Leghari maintained that Pakistan was

⁴⁰ On the 1990 Kashmir crisis, see, Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis", *International Security*, (vol. 20, no. 3, Winter 1995/96), pp. 79-114.

⁴¹ Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, "Nuclear Deterrence – An Article of Faith", *The News*, 17 March 1993.

⁴² R. Jeffrey Smith, "India Moves Missiles to Near Pakistan Border", *The Washington Post*, 3 June 1997. There are two versions of the *Prithvi* missile system. The Army version with a 1,000-kilogram payload has a range of up to 150 kilometres. The air force version with a lighter 500-kilogram payload has a range of up to 250 kilometres and can reach all important cities and Army bases in Northern Pakistan.

⁴³ "Hataf III Test", *The Nation*, 6 July 1997.

⁴⁴ Umer Farooq, "Pakistan ready to arm *Ghauri* with warheads", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (vol. 29, no. 22, 3 June 1998), p. 4.

compelled to join a missile race with India since the *Prithvi* and other Indian missiles constituted a lethal threat to Pakistan's own security.⁴⁵

Pakistan has continued to upgrade its missiles following the May 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistan developed a new variant of Ghauri missile, Ghauri-II, and tested it on 14 April 1999. It also conducted flight test of the *Shaheen-1 (Hatf-IV)* on 15 April 1999. Pakistani officials stated that the flight test of *Ghauri-II* and *Shaheen-1* would ensure that Pakistan's 'minimum deterrent capability' was technically credible and it would maintain 'strategic balance in South Asia'.⁴⁶

Following these tests, Islamabad halted missile test 'for now' and called on New Delhi to join in a 'strategic restraint regime' in order to limit the development of missile and nuclear weapons technology and deployment.⁴⁷ Pakistan observed the self-imposed moratorium on missile testing for the next three years and in fact did not respond to India's test of *Agni-II* in January 2001 or *Dhanush* in September 2001 with any missile test of its own. Pakistan resumed missile testing in May 2002 against the backdrop of a military stand-off with India. This crisis erupted as India mobilised its troops along the Indo-Pakistani border in response to the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, allegedly carried out by Pakistani-based terrorist organisations. The Pakistani missile test was a clear deterrent signal during the stand-off.⁴⁸ Islamabad inducted the *Ghauri* missile into the Army's Strategic Forces Command in January 2003. Senior Pakistani officials claimed that the decision to induct the *Ghauri* into the Army was a response to India's decision to induct short-range ballistic missiles into its military.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ *The Nation*, 1 June 1995. Pakistan's President again expressed his extreme concern about India's *Prithvi* missile threat after India conducted *Prithvi-II* flight-testing in January 1996. See, *The Pakistan Times*, 3 February 1996.

⁴⁶ Umer Farooq, "Pakistan's Ghauri Test for 'national security'", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (vol. 31, no. 16, 21 April 1999), p. 3.

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, January 2001, p. 30; available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf>

⁴⁸ Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control," in Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, eds., *Escalation Control and Nuclear Option in South Asia*, (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004).

⁴⁹ "Command Structures Watertight: Musharraf: Hatf-5 given to army", *Dawn*, 9 January 2003.

Although various factors accounted for Pakistan's missile procurement and development approach since it started its missile build-up programme in the 1980s, the strongest impetus for its missile acquisition came from the strategic necessity of defending itself against the perceived threat of its traditional security rival, India. Starting in the 1980s, Pakistan today has built a robust missiles force. Pakistan's missile programme, some consider, is more advanced than India's.⁵⁰

Strategic Implications of Pakistani Missiles

Ballistic missiles can attack distant targets with great rapidity and considerable accuracy, and, hence, they possess great ability to penetrate adversary's defensive systems. For first, retaliatory, or surprise attack there is in fact no comparable delivery vehicle to that of ballistic missile. Once it is launched virtually delivery of munitions is assured. Because of its assured delivery capability, introduction of ballistic missile makes great strategic impact.

Three issues need to be taken into account for assessing strategic implications of Pakistani missiles: first, its implications for, and impact on, Pakistan-India deterrence stability; second, its impact on crisis stability in the volatile and crisis-prone South Asia region; and third, the role of missiles in conflict escalation and intra-war deterrence in the case of a conflict.

Deterrence Stability

The central question regarding the implications of Pakistan's missile power on deterrence stability is whether it enhances Pakistan's nuclear deterrent capability that stabilises strategic relations between itself and India or whether it upsets the existing strategic balance resulting in strategic instability.

Islamabad has built, as discussed earlier, a formidable missile force comprising a variety of systems that can deliver varied payload nuclear warheads at different targets inside India. Presumably, they equip Pakistan with an ability to inflict 'unacceptable damage' on India, meaning that Islamabad has acquired a robust deterrent capability against its chief strategic adversary. According to a senior Pakistani military official, the *Ghauri* missiles are earmarked for first-strike 'offensive'

⁵⁰ Cirincione, *Deadly Arsenal*, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

operations, while the *Shaheen* missiles are reserved for 'defensive' second-strike purposes.⁵¹ The Rumsfeld Commission Report also noted that Pakistan had acquired an ability which had put 'all of India within range of Pakistani missiles.'⁵²

Islamabad pursues a strategy of 'minimum nuclear deterrence', which implies that it has built or intends to build a small, *albeit* credible, nuclear arsenal. It also means that Pakistan needs such a missile force which is compatible with this strategy but sufficient enough for its nuclear deterrence. At a cursory glance, nuclear deterrence since the advent of nuclear weapons in the region has generally functioned in South Asia and has prevented any outbreak of major wars.⁵³ Since the May 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan and India have fought a 'limited war' in Kashmir (Kargil War) and have gone through a major military stand-off in 2001-02. From the experience of these two engagements, one can advance this argument that the Pakistani missile force is considerably efficacious and robust, and in general contributes to deterrence stability in South Asia region. The Kargil War remained 'limited' because of the possession of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan and in the same vein, nuclear weapons helped to de-escalate the 2001-02 stand-off.

However, at another level, it is also arguable that the advent of nuclear weapons and the building of compatible missile force by both India and Pakistan may have made war 'irrational', but it has not made war impossible. The Kargil War under the nuclear shadow between the two nuclear rivals is a case in point. Nuclear weapons may be a deterrence stabiliser. Paradoxically, they also may be 'risk maximiser', thereby creating instability in a nuclear environment. The situation is,

⁵¹ Quoted Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "The Implications for Postures and Capabilities in South Asia", *Special Joint Series on Missile Issues*, Occasional Paper No. 7, *International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses*, Centre for Non-proliferation Studies (Monterey) and the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (Southampton), May 2001, p. 62; available at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op7/op7.pdf>.

⁵² Executive Summary of the Rumsfeld Commission Report, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeldexecsum.htm>

⁵³ For a detailed assessment of pre-tests South Asian nuclear deterrence system, see, Devin T. Hagerty, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); On post-tests nuclear deterrence, see Michael Quinlan, 'India-Pakistan Deterrence Revisited', *Survival*, (vol. 47, no. 3, Autumn 2005), pp. 103-116.

thus, known in strategic literature as ‘stability-instability’ paradox.⁵⁴ From this perspective, possession of nuclear weapons and reliable delivery systems has made both India and Pakistan complacent and relaxed in strategic assessment and substantively prone to take risk and play the game of brinkmanship. Arguably, the 1999 Kargil War resulted from such a risk-taking tendency. Similarly, the 2001-02 military stand-off resulted from such an Indian attitude. As the lethality and sophistication of the South Asian missiles will grow this risk-taking tendency of Pakistan and India may increase even further. Therefore, in this sense, missiles have made the Pakistan-India relation below the strategic threshold rather inherently unstable.

Missiles are not necessarily de-stabiliser. They operate in the context of overall military capability of a state and they may be strategic stabiliser if deployed or employed judiciously in a strategic manner and if it’s military and political context is put in the right perspective. Therefore, robust missile capabilities and defensive measures to ensure the survival of the missile force against an enemy attack may contribute to deterrence stability. The measures for ensuring survival of missiles may include the hardening of missile storage sites, dispersal of missiles, and building of ATBMs, etc. Defensive measures generally make first-strike and counter-military strike difficult, which reinforce deterrence stability.

Crisis Stability

Crisis stability is defined as a situation ‘in which neither side can expect a lasting profit by actually initiating war.’⁵⁵ It functions when a general power balance in offensive and defensive forces exists, but is undermined if a country acquires a capability of rapid penetration into enemy defences and actually undertakes attack. Of course, it is not only the weapon systems and technologies that matter in holding or undermining crisis stability, the political context also critically weighs in the equation. In South Asian context, the primary question that needs to

⁵⁴ On stability-instability paradox, see, Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury, (ed.), *The Balance of Power*, (Scranton: Chandler, 1965), pp. 185-201.

⁵⁵ Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Control Management or Reform?*, Chatham House Paper, (no. 31, London: Routledge Kegan Paul; Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986), p. 6.

be considered is whether and how the introduction of missiles and their increasing sophistication undermine or contribute to crisis stability.

Incentives for and the likelihood of undertaking a pre-emptive strike by a party in a given context is a primary cause of strategic instability. A state may be strongly tempted to carry out pre-emptive strike in a crisis situation for a number of reasons. Firstly, a pre-emptive attack is likely if a state calculates to gain 'lasting profit' from a first strike by disarming the adversary and reducing the likelihood of a retaliatory strike. This is more likely to occur when substantive military imbalance does exist between the adversaries or a particular weapon system may be decisive in disarming the opponent in the first strike. Secondly, when a state possesses limited military capabilities, and specifically lacks retaliatory power (second strike capability), it is more likely to undertake a pre-emptive strike. Thirdly, in an environment of acute crisis states always fear that the opponent may carry out the first strike. In order to limit the damage from such an attack, a state may be seriously tempted to hit first. Fourthly, a state may undertake a pre-emptive strike due to the fear that the enemy may deliberately escalate the conflict. When military capability favours a state to acquire 'escalation dominance' in a crisis, first strike becomes a real possibility.

Do Pakistani (and for that matter Indian) missiles affect its strategic calculations in a way that may provoke it to undertake pre-emptive strike or escalate crisis? Although Pakistan has built a robust missile force, Pakistani missiles certainly have not become such decisive weapons that may tempt Islamabad to undertake disarming first strike against India. Nor Islamabad has acquired the ability to have 'escalation dominance'. In other words, with its missile force it is unlikely that Pakistan may expect to gain 'lasting profit' by first strike or through war escalation. In a future crisis, challenge to crisis stability may derive from the Pakistani temptation of striking first to limit the damage that may cause from a perceived Indian first strike. However, fear of Indian retaliatory strike will moderate this Pakistani temptation.

In the 2001-02 crisis, Pakistan pursued a 'pure deterrence' strategy instead of a strategy of 'escalatory deterrence.' Islamabad pursued 'pure deterrence' strategy by communicating deterrence signal through missile

movement and missile testing during the course of the crisis.⁵⁶ Therefore, Pakistani missiles did not play any role as offensive weapons for the initiation of war; instead they were used to de-escalate the crisis. Pakistan is likely to advance similar deterrent posture in future Indo-Pakistani crises.

Escalation and Intra-war Deterrence

The decision for war initiation, escalation, and its conduct may be affected if certain types of offensive weapon systems have the potential to play a decisive role in the outcome of a war. It is not only the weapon systems and the quantity and quality of missiles that matter, other variables, such as political dynamics, general balances of forces, missile-to-target ratios and the development of defensive systems are also important and critically influence decision to initiate wars. And if open hostilities were to erupt, missile may have implications for intra-war deterrence. For example, missiles can be employed for punishment, deterrence or compellence during the course of a conflict which can affect the course of a war.

Again the examples of the 1999 Kargil War and the 2001-2002 military stand-off between India and Pakistan provide important insights in this context. Although missiles were not employed, yet it was not that missiles did not play any role. During the Kargil conflict both India and Pakistan used missiles to realise certain objectives and they played important role in the process of the conflict. Although both Pakistan and India deployed missiles during the Kargil war, they did so to prevent escalation rather than use them for offensive operations. Missiles played a similar role during the 2001-2002 crisis.

Both India and Pakistan readied their missiles tipped with nuclear warheads during both the crises. While “India activated all three types of nuclear delivery vehicles and kept them in what is known as Readiness

⁵⁶ Pakistan tested three missile systems *Ghauri-I*, *Ghaznavi* and *Abdali* in late May 2002 when the military standoff was on its peak. According to a former Pakistan Army officer, the testing of those missiles ‘was the most explicit signal by Pakistan of the readiness of its missile-deliverable deterrent during the composite crisis period.’ See, Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haide, *Escalation Control and Nuclear Option in South Asia*, (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), p. 89.

State 3 – meaning that some nuclear bombs would be ready to be mated with the delivery vehicle at short notice” and “DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) scientists headed to where *Prithvi* missiles were deployed and at least four of them were readied for possible nuclear strike. Even an *Agni* missile capable of launching of nuclear warhead was moved to a Western Indian state and kept in a state of readiness,”⁵⁷ Pakistan also mounted nuclear warheads on its missiles. Washington strongly believed that Islamabad readied missiles for deployment during the course of the conflict.⁵⁸

Pakistani account, however, is that Islamabad did not readied missiles because it could lead to escalation. Pakistani measures and movements of missiles were of defensive in nature for protection or survival of its strategic assets should New Delhi were to undertake pre-emptive strike during the course of the crises. It served to de-escalate conflict on both occasions.

Both the countries tested missiles during the course of the 2001-02 crisis to communicate deterrence signals. New Delhi tested a new version of its *Agni* missile. The test was in general considered to be ‘Pakistan-specific’.⁵⁹ Pakistan resumed missiles testing in May 2002 ending its three-year old self-imposed moratorium. It tested *Ghauri-I*, *Ghaznavi* and *Abdali* in quick successions. The testing of these missiles ‘was the most explicit signal by Pakistan of the readiness of its missile-deliverable deterrent during the composite crisis period.’⁶⁰ According to International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), three probable political messages underscored the Pakistani missile tests: first, they were intended to placate domestic critics; second, to increase pressure on India to refrain from launching military strikes; third, to indicate that Pakistan was capable of using short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and prepared to do so, if required.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Raj Chengappa, *Weapons of Peace*, (New Delhi: Harper-Collins, 200), p. 437.

⁵⁸ President Clinton’s interview, “Avoiding Armageddon,” available at <http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi> Also, see, Strobe Talbot, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and The Bomb*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 161.

⁵⁹ “Future-Fire – The Shorter Smarter Agni Heralds a New Genre of Missiles Directed Toward Pakistan”, *India Today*, 29 January 2002.

⁶⁰ Feroz Hassan Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁶¹ IISS, *The Military Balance: 2002-2003*, p. 126.

Islamabad was also convinced that missile testing effectuated intra-war deterrence and contributed to the de-escalation of the conflict. As President Musharraf explained:

By testing, with outstanding success, the delivery systems of our strategic capability, these men (scientists) validated the reliability, accuracy, and the deterrence value of Pakistan's premier surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems of the Hatf series, namely Ghauri, Ghaznavi, and Abdali...we need to ensure that the three basic ingredients of the deterrence - capability, credibility and resolve never get compromised.⁶²

Pakistani missiles in both cases, therefore, played a critical role as a factor of intra-war deterrence and conflict de-escalation. Pakistan advanced calculative deterrent signals, primarily through the movement of missiles and missile testing, which prevented further escalation of the conflicts. Given that Pakistani missiles were not in any way penetratively decisive delivery vehicles and Islamabad had no intention of war escalation during these crises, therefore it can be concluded that Pakistani missiles did not play an escalatory role rather helped to maintain intra-war deterrence and de-escalate crisis. Indeed, rather than being a factor of escalation, Pakistani missiles played the role of escalation-minimiser.

Conclusion

Pakistan will continue to upgrade its technology for more lighter missiles in order to increase their reliability, efficiency, and accuracy. More tests are expected in the future and more competitive developments of missiles will follow. As nuclear deterrence will be the dominant security discourse in the South Asian environment, Pakistan's missile development will probably continue until it stabilises at a point when Islamabad is assured of obtaining a robust deterrent force.

Pakistani missiles have acted as a factor of deterrence and crisis stability in the strategically volatile South Asia region. It has prevented crisis escalation and contributed to obtain intra-war deterrence. There has been hardly any indication that missiles have increased its temptation to undertake pre-emptive strike. Therefore, ballistic missiles are not

⁶² "Nation Proud of Missile Test Results, Musharraf," *The News*, 18 June 2002.

necessarily destabiliser, rather so far have proved to be a factor of strategic stability in South Asia.

S.Y. Surendra Kumar

PEACE-BUILDING IN SRI LANKA: THE ROLE FOR NGOS

Abstract

In the contemporary world, the Non-government Organizations (NGOs) have a potential role in mitigating large scale suffering in the affected regions, preventing violent conflicts, working in war zones, supporting reconstruction programmes, negotiations and settlements. And in the process, there have been many successful stories of NGOs around the world and at the same time in many situations NGOs have also become part of the problem by either generating or escalating conflict. In this context, this article deals with the NGOs (dealing with peace work, human rights and democratic restructuring) in the ethnically polarized protracted conflict of Sri Lanka. It analyses the possible role of NGOs in peace-building exercise and the activities they carry out for building peace like addressing the ethnic divides, shaping the public opinion, political mobilization, and reconstruction and development activities. It also examines the major obstacles the NGOs often confront towards building peace such as ethnic polarization, inadequate NGOs activities, violent atmosphere, strong anti-peace lobby and so on. Finally, it analyses the impact of the present scenario in Sri Lanka on the NGOs quest for establishing peace.

Today, there are far too many cooks in this peace soup...most of whom have failed to enter our Sri Lankan Universities, qualified aboard and arrived here to head heavily funded NGOs who dance to the tune of their government or sponsors. These people under the cover of civil

S.Y. Surendra Kumar is a Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Jnana Bharathi Campus, Bangalore University, Bangalore, India. His Email address is: surendrajnu@gmail.com

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society do not represent the people – only a miniscule anglicized Colombo society.¹

The world today is becoming a more dangerous place owing to the intensification of a number of armed conflicts around the globe. Similarly, the rise of terrorism marked by the 9/11 attacks led to the unilateral approach of pre-emptive strike and regime change as manifested in the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. It has led to incremental rise in terror attacks around the world in reaction to the US-led coalition launching the “War on Terror”. These developments have added a new dimension and aggravated communalism, fundamentalism, and gender violence, and in the process, several regions have become more prone to violence.² These violent developments have led to large-scale destruction of property, loss of innocent lives, refugees and displacement of vulnerable people. In this context, providing humanitarian assistance and building peace in the affected regions has become a major challenge to the respective states and also for the international community. It is in this context that the role of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) as a subordinate to government becomes essential for performing the humanitarian assistance programmes and peace building in conflict zones as well as in post-conflict situations.

The role of NGOs in conflict resolution and peace building³ has gained importance in the development and policy discourse due to various reasons. These are:

- i. When the State and the rebels are unwilling to cooperate directly with each other in addressing the grievances of civilians, the NGOs can play a vital role in providing neutral

¹ “Peace Talks: Wanted Negotiators, Not Appeasers”, *The Island*, (4 November 2003), p.8.

² Successive terrorist attacks on the civilians around the world – the Bali bombing in 2002, Madrid bombing in March 2004, and the serial bomb attacks in London in July 2005, Mumbai serial train attack in July 2006 and so on.

³ Peace-building here means any activity undertaken for the purpose of preventing, alleviating or resolving conflicts. These may include counselling, gender sensitization, health programmes, and political mediation between the conflicting parties. Jonathan Goodhand and David Hume, “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understating Conflict and Peace-building in the New World Disorder”, *Third World Quarterly*, (Vol.20, No.1, 1999), pp.13-26.

facilitation/mediation, humanitarian assistance, poverty alleviation and the protection of human rights;

- ii. The NGOs are perceived to be less constrained by narrow mandates, which help it to act as an interface between the government and people, and also with the rebels either to initiate peace talks or sustain peace building measures;
- iii. The NGOs are brought forth as a suitable partner for implementing developmental policies and programmes when governments fail in the face of confrontation with rebels and also when governments have proved to be corrupt and inefficient. Subsequently, NGOs are considered to be more efficient and suitable for peace building as they are less visible, less expensive and more flexible;⁴
- iv. Furthermore, the interaction with NGOs have increased due to protracted conflicts around the world, like, Gulf War (1991), Somalia crisis (1993), Rwanda genocide (1994), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the ongoing crises in Central and Western Africa, Palestine, Afghanistan, Sudan and Iraq.⁵
- v. Another important factor, for understandable reasons, the international organizations, such as, the United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Trade Organization (WTO) feel comfortable in working with the NGOs in conflict-prone areas. Motivated by the conviction that the NGOs act as a bridge between society and polity in establishing peace, influential world bodies as mentioned above are persistently working towards strengthening their ties with

⁴ According to the World Bank, it is estimated that more than 15 per cent of all development aid is channelled through non-state actors today. Camilla Orjuela, "Dilemmas of Civil Society Aid: Donors, NGOs and the Quest for Peace in Sri Lanka", *Peace and Democracy in South Asia*, (Vol.1, No.1, January 2005), available at www.pdsajournal.com/journal2005vIn102Camilla.pdf.

⁵ Willaim M Reilly, "UN: Civil Society Helps Peace Building" *Washington Times*, 22 June 2004, available at www.washingtontimes.com/upibreaking/20040622-073436-5912r.htm and UN Security Council "Open Debate on the Role of Civil Society in Post-Conflict Building" June 2004, available at www.un.int/brazil/speech/005d-4ms-csnu-roleofcivilsociety-2606.html; Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), *Civil Society in the State of Africa*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1994).

NGOs around the world through myriads of channels of communication.⁶

Thus, the NGOs have a potential role in mitigating large scale suffering in the affected regions, preventing violent conflicts, working in war zones, supporting reconstruction programmes, negotiations and settlements. And in the process of building peace there have been many successful stories of NGOs around the world, like in Liberia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Somalia, Bosnia, and so on. Ironically, in many situations NGOs have also become part of the problem by either generating or escalating conflict. For instance, in Afghanistan, many NGOs have become stooges of warlords and elites who steal or misdirect aid for their own purposes. In the case of the genocide in Rwanda, NGOs were involved in propagating ideology of hatred along with the State. In Sierra Leone, some NGOs are part of the problem as they are involved in the illegal diamond business and supplying guns to the rebels.⁷ Hence, NGOs could be part of the problem as well as the solution, and in this context, Sri Lanka is no different.

NGOs in Sri Lanka

NGOs are the most used and abused sector of the Sri Lankan society. The NGOs in Sri Lanka have a limited role to play due to the protracted and violent nature of the conflict since the 1980s and the ethnic polarization between the Sinhalese and Tamils, which provides narrow space for NGOs working towards peace building exercise. Despite these drawbacks, NGOs have, to a certain extent, registered their effective role in peace building measures. Before we proceed further, it is important to trace the historical background and the growth of NGOs in Sri Lanka.

The first generation of NGOs came up during the British period. Most of them were Church-based NGOs with welfare and charity as

⁶ For more details, see, John Keane, *Global Civil Society?*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Leon Gordenker and Thomas G Weiss, "Devolving Responsibilities: A Framework for Analyzing NGOs and Services", *Third World Quarterly*, (Vol.18, No.3, 1997), pp.443-455.

⁷ Henry F Carey, "NGO Dilemmas in Peace Processes", *International Peacekeeping*, (Spring 2003, Vol.10, Issue-1), pp.173-175; Said Adejumobi, "The Civil Society in Conflict Management and Peace Building in Africa", *DPMN Bulletin*, (July 2001), available at www.dpmf.org/civil-society-Said-july-2001.html.

motives involved in dealing with social issues, such as the Baptist Mission (1802), YMCA (Young Men's Christian Associations), YWCA (Young Women's Christian Associations) and Salvation Army.⁸ Later on, similar NGOs emerged among the Buddhist community, like *Maha Bodi* Society (1891) and Young Men's Buddhist Association (1898) and even among the Muslim communities like the Muslim Education Society (1890).⁹ The main guiding factors for the emergence of NGOs from the Sinhala-Buddhist community were the anti-Christian and later on anti-Tamil sentiments. As a result of which from time to time various Sinhala-Buddhist NGOs have organized rallies and demonstrations opposing any kind of conflict resolution, perceived to be compromising the so-called national [Sinhala] interest.

After independence, due to the low intensity of riots there were fewer NGOs involved in peace works and majority of them focused on socio-economic issues. However, with the liberalization of economy in 1977, there was an increase in the development aid from the foreign donors, which led to the growth of new NGOs. Furthermore, there was drastic increase in the foreign aid particularly for relief and rehabilitation programmes after the outbreak of civil war in 1983. Thus, many NGOs began to focus towards peace activities. In the 1990s, the civil war reached its peak resulting in large scale killing of civilians, devastation of property and violations of human rights committed by both the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This development also brought about a sea change in the policy of the donor countries regarding the distribution of aid. First of all, increasingly more aid was being allocated for the purpose of mitigating the humanitarian consequences of ongoing civil war. Secondly, one fifth of the total foreign aid came to be channelled through NGOs. This specifically implies to the donors, like, Canada, Norway, Finland. In this regard, the NGOs, which focused on human rights and peace building measures, came to be the main beneficiaries.¹⁰

⁸ Camilla Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War: The Case of Sri Lanka" *Civil Wars*, (Vol.7, No.2, Summer 2005), p.123.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Nira Wickramasinghe, *Civil Society in Sri Lanka: New Circle of Power*, (New Delhi: Sage, 2001), p.168; Sunil Basian, "The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses- The Case of Sri Lanka", *Centre for Conflict Resolution Working Paper*, No.2, (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 1999).

Subsequently, in 1994, President Chandrika Kumaratunga came to power on the peace plank. Thus, the term 'peace' became the buzzword and made vast impact on the growth of NGOs as well as on the peace movement.¹¹ This led to an increase in peace aid from Sweden, Norway and other nations, which channelled their aid specifically through NGOs focusing on peace building programmes like educational and language reforms, devolution of power and campaign for "national integration".¹² At the same time, this period also saw the growth of many research organizations like, the National Peace Council (NPC) in 1995, which involved themselves in conducting various workshops/seminars etc. on conflict management and peace-building. Since then, the NGOs and the donor community have emerged as a "new circle of power" in Sri Lanka.¹³

Many NGOs came to focus exclusively on issues pertaining to conflict and peace, primarily, due to the pressure exerted by bigger donor agencies and countries, such as, ADB, WB, the US, the United Kingdom, Japan and the European Union (EU). These donors have been frequently threatening to withdraw aid if the government failed to control the human rights violations and also if it resumed the war.¹⁴ Subsequently, the LTTE has also come under close scrutiny by the donors, who often warned the LTTE to stop recruiting children, preparations for war and come to the negotiation table otherwise aid to the north-eastern region would be suspended. Apart from this, Norwegian facilitators have been

¹¹ On International Human Rights Day in December 1994, thousands of peace and human rights activists representing more than 40 NGOs organized a peace rally in Colombo, followed by street plays, music, speeches on peace and human rights. Camilla Orjuela, "Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?", *Journal of Peace Research*, (Vol.40, No.2, 2003), p.199.

¹² This foreign aid plays a vital role in the normalization process i.e., rebuilding and resettlement in the north and east. Camilla Orjuela, *op.cit.*, p.5.

¹³ The new circles of power include the international financial organizations, humanitarian relief organizations and the Northern NGOs. The donor community includes the World Bank, Norway, US, Japan, Canada and others. For more details see Nira Wickramasinghe, *op.cit.*, p.11.

¹⁴ According to Sri Lankan Finance Minister Sarath Amunugama, the country would lose aid if talks are not resumed. The aid pledges by donors include \$300 million in debt relief and another \$250 million to help shore up foreign reserves. See, "Lanka must win peace or lose aid: foreign donors", 18 May 2005, available at www.news.indiainfo.com/2005/05/18/1805lanka-aid.html

regularly consulting the NGOs regarding the ongoing peace process, indicating the significance that the latter have gained in recent years.¹⁵

Modus Operandi

The NGOs have been successively carrying out various peace activities in various parts of the Island and to an extent have succeeded in achieving their objectives. There are different types of NGOs working at different levels and organizing various kinds of activities for building peace. Some of their routine activities include organizing peace marches, rallies, demonstrations and other manifestations for peace. This is done to bring about awareness for peace among the common people through highlighting the consequences of protracted war. They also seek to persuade the main political parties/leaders to work towards de-escalation either through peace negotiations or by initiating political reforms for the betterment of the vulnerable sections of the society. Ironically, these activities are carried out mainly in parts of Colombo, Jaffna, and Vavuniya, and unfortunately, these rallies do not draw a large crowd as is the case with political rallies.¹⁶

There are some NGOs involved in conducting research programmes and spreading information among the common people, politicians and the international community about the cost of war. They are also involved in exploring possible solutions. Such NGOs include the Centre for Policy Alternative, Centre for Women's Research, Free Media Movement, Law and Society Trust, Marga Institute, NPC, International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) and so on. Many NGOs also provide platform for debate and discussion on non-violent means of conflict resolution like the Quaker

¹⁵ Jehan Perera, "The Peace Within: President Takes to Third Track or Peace Process", *Himal South Asian*, (29 July 2002), p.3.

¹⁶ Some of the notable peace rallies: the Jaffna peace rally on 31 October 1997, by the Christian Youth in Vavuniya, available at www.christiantoday.com/news/asia-pacific/peace.rally/154.html accessed 7 September 2004; around 84 civil society groups carried out a peace march in Vavuniya on 11 April 2005, available at www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2005/4/1545.html

Peace and Services, *Thirupthiya*, *Ahimsa*, Oxfam and so on.¹⁷ They have been successfully conducting workshops around the Island in building consensus over conflict resolution. Subsequently, they are drawing the attention of the international community to exert pressure on the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and LTTE to negotiate and end the conflict as early as possible. All these activities are carried out through media, organizing workshops, seminars, conferences, vigils and mediation campaigns in support of the peace process.

A few other NGOs are involved in building peace through dissemination of peace education to the local communities; building trust and better understanding among ethnic groups; raising awareness of the roots of the conflicts and emphasizing the need for resolution; campaigning to vote for peace during the successive elections, like in the 1994 and 2001 elections; and also in persuading the people to abstain from supporting or mobilizing for violent activities. For these purposes, they seek the assistance of school teachers, academicians, community and religious leaders. Some of the other means adopted by NGOs is to bring together different ethnic groups – Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims, and encouraging/facilitating local communities to visit each others' areas which have been devastated by the war, so that they could see for themselves and understand the trauma and scourge during and after the conflict. For instance, Inter-religious Peace Foundation, *Sarvodaya* Movement and some of the Christian organizations based in Jaffna arrange trips for Sinhalese to visit the northeast war zone and hence provide them an opportunity to interact with other communities. In this regard, in November 2001, the Jaffna-based Centre for Performing Arts invited Sinhalese artists to perform and provided space for groups to meet and overcome their misunderstandings.¹⁸ Apart from this, NGOs assist in reconstruction and rehabilitation work undertaken by the government and the international humanitarian agencies, in implementation of programmes in social sector, even organizing

¹⁷ Dileepa Witharana, "Community Peace Work in Sri Lanka: A Critical Appraisal", *Working Paper*, No.12, (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2002).

¹⁸ Camilla Orjuela, *op.cit.*, p.12 and p.203.

elections as well as election monitoring.¹⁹ These activities to a certain extent have an impact on the ongoing peace process in the country.

In addition, the NGOs' track record of responding to immediate crisis has been significant and better than the GOSL and the LTTE. This was evident during the *tsunami* that struck the Island on 26 December 2004. This tragedy devastated the coastal island stretching over 1,000 km which is about 70 per cent of the coastline, between Galle in the south and Trincomalee in northeast. As a result, around two lakhs families were displaced, 40,000 dead, 5,000 missing, 15,000 injured and many were in need of medical attention.²⁰ In this situation, the NGOs responded immediately by providing basic needs like food, clothing and shelter, organizing rescue operations, finding the survivors and the dead. Unfortunately, the GOSL and the LTTE's response to the disaster was lukewarm, as the GOSL administration was not able to co-ordinate and carry out immediate relief works and the latter responded with military approach by depending upon its cadres to carry out the humanitarian works. In the circumstances, around 80 to 90 per cent of the foreign funds were channelled through NGOs. At the same time, the NGOs also had easily tapped individual voluntarism and the private philanthropy of fellow citizens.²¹ *Silumina*, the Sunday newspaper, stated that, "NGOs have taken US\$9 billion out of the US\$10 billion foreign aid".²² Thus, the overall response of the NGOs towards *tsunami* affected people was adequate though with some drawbacks.

Major Obstacles

Although the role of NGOs in peace-building has become necessary, the activities carried out by them are, however, not enough for ensuring

¹⁹ Jayadeva Uyangoda, "Ethnic Conflict, the Sri Lankan State and the *Tsunami*", *Forced Migration Review*, (July 2005), pp.30-32.

²⁰ Around 900 to 1,000 children lost their parents, and 150,000 lost their homes, 200 educational institutions and 100 health facilities were destroyed or severely damaged. Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, "Impression from the Devastation", *Himal South Asian*, (Sept-Oct 2005), p.94.

²¹ Jayadeva Uyangoda, "Ethnic Conflict, the State and the *Tsunami* Disaster in Sri Lanka", *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, (Vol. 6, No. 3, September 2005), pp. 341-344.

²² S. Nanthikesan, "Post *Tsunami* Posturing", available at www.lines-magazine.org/Art_Feb05/nimanthi.htm

and sustaining peace. This is mainly because of their limitations. In Western nations, NGOs have emerged as a result of long struggles and are, thus, firmly rooted in the society. In case of Sri Lanka, most of the NGOs emerged on an anti-colonial, and later on, anti-Tamil platform and a few also due to foreign funds. Subsequently, it is a challenging task for such NGOs to work in a society that is deeply divided on ethnic lines and where there is territory demarcated as cleared and un-cleared areas. As a result, the NGOs have a limited role.²³ Moreover, some of the leading NGOs are backed by the political parties, who use these groups as weapons against the rival parties.²⁴ Subsequently, several prominent political party members are either conveners or hold some important positions in some NGOs. In addition, there is intense competition among the NGOs, usually over matters of influence, funding and resources, leading to lack of co-ordination. There remain, however, many local organizations linked either to the Church, or, in some instances, to the Buddhist and Hindu temples, which do not voice political concerns and, thus, able to carry out humanitarian work effectively. Thus, with these limitations, building peace remained constantly a difficult undertaking for the NGOs.

Furthermore, there are many obstacles, which act as hindrances in the NGOs quest for peace in this long-drawn conflict. Some of the obstacles are discussed below.

Ethnic Polarization

The cordial relationship among the various ethnic groups is a key factor influencing and shaping the political solution to any conflict. However, this factor is missing in case of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka as the relationship among the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims are characterised by a high degree of animosity, fear, suspicion, mistrust and an uncompromising attitude towards a possible peaceful settlement. According to Howard Wriggins, the Tamils characterized the Sinhalese as proud, bold, lazy and selfish. The Sinhalese characterized Tamils as

²³ Cleared areas are considered to be areas under the control of the Sri Lankan armed forces and have no presence of militants. The uncleared areas are those under the military control of the LTTE. Also there are areas which are considered as disputed territory.

²⁴ Neil Devotta, "Civil Society and Non-Government Organization in Sri Lanka: Peacemakers or Parasites?", *Civil War*, (Vol.7, No.2, Summer 2005), p.174.

poor, cruel, dissident, arrogant, clever, self-centred and simple-living.²⁵ Subsequently, the relations between the Tamils and Muslims are also not cordial. The prevailing animosity is due to the desire of LTTE to make the eastern parts of the Island purely Tamil dominated and also for achieving its own long-term gains. As a result, from time to time the LTTE forced the Muslim community living in the north to leave the area, often within 48 hours.²⁶ As of now, the relations between the two communities stand improved due to economic interdependence. However, a great deal of suspicion still prevails between the two communities. Even the relations between the Muslims and the Sinhalese in the northeast continue to deteriorate. Thus, given the deep distrust among various ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, it is difficult for NGOs to function in an efficient manner.

Furthermore, the ethnic polarization has also played a role in dividing NGOs along ethnic lines. Some NGOs work only for the welfare of a particular community. For example, in the northeast, LTTE backed Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) controls local NGOs through which all international aid is channelled. At the same time, majority of NGOs are Tamil-led dealing primarily with meeting the needs of the Tamil population, and ignoring the grievances of the Muslims and Sinhalese. Apart from this, most of the peace NGOs (except few NGOs backed by Church)²⁷ working in northeast cannot undertake any peace-building measures without the backing/approval of the LTTE. Any anti-LTTE programme would be ruthlessly opposed by

²⁵ Howard W. Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp.232-234.

²⁶ For instance, in 1990, the LTTE killed around 140 Muslim worshippers at a mosque in Kattankudy, and in October same year around 90,000 Muslim residents were evicted by the LTTE from the north, who now live in Puttalam, Anuradhapura and Kurunegala areas. In spite of the atrocities, the Muslim community is known for taking a neutral position in this protracted conflict. Cathrine Brun, "Local Citizens or Internally Displaced Persons: Dilemmas of Long Term Displacement in Sri Lanka", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, (Vol.16, No.4, 2003), pp.376-397.

²⁷ According to Camilla Orjuela, Church has gained credibility for its long-term commitment to working with the people during the war, providing relief and even investigating and informing the international community about the human rights abuses, even issues related to child recruitment by LTTE. Camilla Orjuela, *op.cit.*, p.130.

the LTTE. Thus, in areas under the control of the LTTE, sustained independent protest and public dissent has become impossible. As a result, there is always a threat to NGOs working in the northeast. On the other hand, it is no different in the south as many NGOs are largely mono-ethnic (Sinhala) and contacts with the northeast are considerably restricted. This is a common phenomenon among the local NGOs working in peace building process. Even some of the members of the NPC are divided and have exhibited their pro-LTTE or pro-GOSL stand. For example, a prominent activist for the NPC wrote an article in the Tamil Weekly of the *MIRJE* justifying the attacks carried out by LTTE on Dalada Maligawa, sacred to the Buddhist. Similarly, the Sinhala members too have often expressed anti-Tamil sentiments from time to time.²⁸ Thus, ethnic polarization has hindered the meaningful role of NGOs in building peace in the Island.

NGOs Activities: Not Sufficient

While the activities undertaken by the NGOs are vital for the peace-building process, it remains inadequate. This is mainly due to shortcomings of the peace NGOs, as most of their activities and even the donor agencies are Colombo-centred and are often circumscribed to contacts with the English-speaking elite. In the process, they depend upon the voluntary groups belonging to different communities, which are non-English speaking people, to maintain contacts with different parts of the country. This leads to lack of co-ordination in implementing the programmes successfully. Against this backdrop, it is also difficult for peace NGOs to mobilize masses for any peace rally, peace march and demonstrations.²⁹ The participation of people in the rallies organized by the NGOs is limited compared to the rallies and demonstrations organized by the political parties. For instance, the peace rally organized by People's Peace Front, backed by 60 NGOs in December 2000, drew less than 1000 participants.³⁰ Similarly, around 84 NGOs carried out a peace march in Vavuniya on 11 April 2005 and could mobilize only around 1000 people.

²⁸ UTHR (J), *Peace Activism, Suicidal Political and Civil Society*, Briefing No.4, 4 December 2001. Available at www.uthr.org/briefings/briefing4.htm

²⁹ Camilla Orjuela, *op.cit.*, p.5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.12, and pp.200-201.

Ironically, the rallies supported/backed by LTTE have been successful in attracting large crowds. For example, on 17 January 2001 a civil society group known as *Pongu Tamil* (Tamil Uprising) comprising of teachers and students had successfully organized a massive rally in protest against the disappearances, mass graves and abuses carried out by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA). Despite, the stiff opposition and warning from the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) against organizing rallies, around 4,000-5,000 students, teachers and religious leaders participated in the rally.³¹ One of the LTTE leaders even described the rally organised by the *Pongu Tamil* as “a milestone in the history of Tamils”. Thus, the rally was successful as it was backed by LTTE. However, if it was against LTTE then mobilization by NGOs would have been minimal due to fear of LTTE. On the other hand, the successive rallies organized by the political parties and religious outfits either against the peace or in favour of peace attracted more crowds. It is due to the support they enjoy among certain segments of Sri Lankan populace. The NGOs cannot replicate this even despite providing food and transportations to the participants.³²

Performance of NGOs: Mixed Results

Many peace NGOs, both local and international, are playing a vital role in mitigating the impacts of conflict on the most vulnerable sections of society in different parts of the world. At the same time, to a certain extent, many NGOs are driven by “briefcase temptation” than working for the social cause. As a result, people’s trust in NGOs working for peace often falters. In case of Sri Lanka, it is not much different as the common people have mixed perceptions about the working of NGOs. The general perception is that NGOs “are earning dollars and pounds by selling peace” and that peace has become a business for the NGOs due to

³¹ This organization was started by the University of Jaffna in January 2001. See Camilla Orjuela, *op.cit.*, p.9 and p. 132.

³² Some of the rallies organized by the political parties and religious outfits attract around 10,000 people, like the pro-peace rally organized by the UNP government in Colombo on 9 September 2002, “Big pro-peace rally in Sri Lanka”, 9 September 2002, available at www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/2041d/south_asia/2246757.html. Even the rallies organized by the Tamils on 2 April 2001 for peace and self-determinations at UN and Toronto attracted more than 10,000 people. “10,000 Tamils rally at UN”, 2 April 2001, available at www.tamilnet.com/art.html

the inflow of foreign funds.³³ Also, there are allegations of various NGOs being corrupt, misusing public funds, disappearing with the villager's savings due to which some NGOs are often taken to court. Thus, the NGOs in Sri Lanka are seen with suspicion and, in the process, NGOs lose the people's confidence which renders them useless. Thus, the prevailing perception is that many NGOs implements short-term programmes and are oriented towards funding requirements rather than addressing the real needs of the vulnerable.

Apart from this, there are many Sinhala-Buddhist groups backed by some of the prominent Buddhist clergies who are very critical of NGOs working in war zones and conducting peace works. Their main allegations are that the NGOs do not have the legitimacy, are manipulated by the foreign interests, and in the process the government losses its legitimacy by allowing foreign-funded NGOs to work in war zone and border areas. Allowing NGOs to carry out politically-sensitive peace work is considered by them as nothing but privatization of foreign policy. The NGOs working particularly in North-eastern parts are alleged to be part of a Western conspiracy sympathetic towards the LTTE.³⁴ Some of the allegations are motivated simply by anti-Christian and anti-Tamil feelings. However, these critics fail to see the other side of the coin. There are many reputed international NGOs such as Oxfam and Save the Children Fund which through the local NGOs reach out to and meet the basic needs of innocent victims, which the State and rebels fail to take care. Subsequently, these NGOs are able to carry out the relief work and peace building measures effectively due to funding from foreign sources, which the GOSL is unable to provide. It is in this light that the NGOs are brought in as suitable partners for implementing development programmes and in the process gain legitimacy and enjoy the support of needy people.

Anti-peace Lobby: Maximalist Position

While the NGOs are working towards ensuring peace but, there are groups working against the peace process with the support of more people than NGOs enjoy. These include the Sinhala-Buddhist political parties and organizations like the *Mahajana Eksath Peramuna* (MEP),

³³ Dileepa Witharana, *op.cit.*, p.18 and Jonathan Goodhand and Nick Lewer, *op.cit.*, p.4 and pp.79-82.

³⁴ Neil Devotta, *op.cit.*, p.25 and pp.175-176.

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), *Jathika Hela Urumaya* (JHU), National Bhikkhu Front (NBF), and other Sinhala nationalists.³⁵ These groups are dissatisfied with the present United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government. As viewed by them, UPFA government is pursuing the peace process in a similar fashion – the so-called pro-LTTE and anti-Sinhala manner – similar to the previous UNP-led Government. They have been opposing the 2002 peace process on various grounds that it is anti-patriotic. The peace talks have always been confined only to GOSL and the LTTE, and that it did not involve other parties and groups from the Sinhala and the minority communities. They oppose Norwegian facilitation calling it *Sudi Koti* (White Tiger). They accuse them of being excessively sympathetic and partial towards the LTTE activities.

All these arguments are partially true, as was evident during the cease-fire. The LTTE, on various instances, violated the norms of cease-fire and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) failed to condemn or prevent LTTE from doing so and instead paid lip services to prevent the peace process from breaking down. According to SLMM, from February 2002 to July 2006, the number of violations committed by the GOSL and the LTTE is around 277 and 3944 respectively.³⁶ This vital factor acts as an impetus for the anti-peace lobby to mobilize mass support.

In addition, the anti-peace lobby vehemently opposes the legitimization of the LTTE by the GOSL as a sole representative of the Tamil community. They contend that the view and freedom of other Tamil political parties and various civil rights groups are curtailed by the LTTE. Subsequently, most of the Sinhala-Buddhist outfits and political parties are opposed to the idea of an *Eelam* (Tamil homeland) that would lead to an eventual division of the Island. These groups consider

³⁵ Even the 22 elected MPs of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) are but a mouthpiece of the LTTE. They oppose peace processes that compromise the Tamil interest [Eelam] or do not benefit the LTTE's short and long term goals.

³⁶ Major share of the violations carried out by the LTTE includes the child recruitment, constituting 47 per cent of total violations, followed by abduction of adults (16%), harassment (6.54%), and so on. The violation by GOSL includes harassment (30%), hostile acts against the civilian population (6.27%), abduction of adults (5.54%) and so on, available at www.peaceinsrilanka.org/peace2005/insidepage/AtaGlance/Ceasfire_Feb-July2006.asp and V.S. Sambandan, "Sri Lanka Ceasefire fragile", *The Hindu*, (22 February 2005), p.13.

themselves to be the only force which could stop the creation of *Eelam*. They also reject federalism on the ground that it is totally inappropriate as Sri Lanka has always been a unitary state. As an alternative to *Eelam*, they advocate administrative structures and powers to be decentralized within a unitary state, which the LTTE has rejected outright. In the circumstances, it is difficult for NGOs to work towards peace-building measures as the anti-peace lobby enjoys more mass support than the NGOs. As a result, the commitment to and efforts at achieving peace by the NGOs in Sri Lanka remains a difficult undertaking.

Violent Atmosphere

The NGOs require conducive atmosphere to carry out peace-building exercise. Such an atmosphere has been constantly lacking in Sri Lanka. As a consequence, since the 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA), there has not been much headway in the peace process. On the contrary, there has been certain degree of intensification of violence in the country. For instance, the perpetuating fighting between the SLA, Sri Lankan Sea Forces (SLSF) and LTTE over the capture of strategic areas has intensified. The process has led to the displacement of the hundreds of thousand of innocent people. The “Water War” in July 2006 began with the LTTE closing the reservoir in Mavil Ani and the naval base in Trincomalee. This led to the clash between the SLSF and the LTTE over the control of reservoir used for the irrigation projects. This resulted in two weeks of violent battle leading to displacement of around 170,000 people.³⁷ Subsequently, the frequent clashes between the Sea Tigers of LTTE and the SLSF over the control of sea areas has also resulted in the killing of innocent people and even some of the people working with NGOs.

In addition, the infighting within LTTE, which for the first time disputed LTTE’s claim as the sole representative of the Tamils, was seriously challenged politically and militarily from within its ranks by the most efficient military commander in eastern province, V. Muralitharan (Col. Karuna), in April 2004.³⁸ Col. Karuna went one step

³⁷ Muralidhar Reddy, “Unfolding Tragedy”, *Frontline*, (9 September 2006), p.32.

³⁸ Col. Karuna stated that the main reason for his revolt against the LTTE hegemony was the discrimination adopted by the LTTE leadership against the Tamils of eastern province. V.S. Sambandan, “The Stalemate in Sri Lanka”, *Frontline*, (31 December 2004), pp.52-54.

ahead and launched a new political party, *Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal* in October 2004 and even made his maiden “Hero’s Day Speech” on 27 November 2004.³⁹ However, one cannot rule out the possibility of a particular role played by the GOSL in the emergence of Col. Karuna. Since then, heavy fighting have been taking place between the two groups for political dominance in the east. As a result, the LTTE has lost 72 cadres, the highest number since it signed the cease-fire in 2002. It is estimated that around 150 cadres from both sides of the divide have been killed. In the process, many cadres were killed and many people were displaced, as in July 2004 when around 15 people were killed in Batticaloa region as a result of retaliation by the LTTE in response to pro-Karuna attacks on LTTE members and civilian sympathizers.⁴⁰

Apart from this, since the 2002 CFA, the LTTE has been attacking the Tamil groups who have fought against the LTTE alongside the government forces, like Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW), attacks against rival Tamil paramilitary groups had increased in May and June 2003, as a result of which around 51 people associated with the Tamil groups were reportedly killed or missing.⁴¹ Subsequently, the EPDP in July 2004 claimed that around 125 of its members were killed by the LTTE since the 2002 CFA. According to SLMM, this undeclared war has claimed the lives of more than 4,000 people and displaced more than 2 million people (as of February 2007).⁴²

Against this background of violent atmosphere, the NGOs are unable to carry out any humanitarian activities or peace building exercise, as always there are chances of sudden eruption of military clashes. Such clashes always lead to killing and displacement of innocent people and

³⁹ In the Hero’s day speech, Col. Karuna attacked the leadership of Prabhakaran as “unfit to lead the Tamils... and responsible for large scale killings of Tamils. Subsequently, questioned the LTTE as sole representative of Tamils and describes India as a better suited to resolve the conflict and to help the Tamils. V.S. Sambandan, “Another Heroes’ Day Speech”, *Frontline*, (31 December, 2004), p.54.

⁴⁰ Kristine Hoglund, “Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka”, *Civil Wars*, (Vol.7, No.2, Summer 2005), p.163.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.165.

⁴² B. Muralidhar Reddy, “Undeclared War”, *Frontline*, (18 May 2007), p.4.

ultimately stall the peace process. Thus, overcoming the above stated obstacles are the immediate concerns of the NGOs. Without overcoming these obstacles, the NGOs could hardly participate in the peace process meaningfully. The GOSL should, therefore, provide more space for NGOs so as to enabling them to contribute to the peace process meaningfully.

The Road Ahead

For the NGOs there is a bumpy road ahead and, in the present scenario, the NGOs are faced with many challenges and opportunities. Some of the main challenges are: the NGOs' activities are badly affected due to lack of funds, as the international assistance pledged for the conflict and *tsunami* relief operations has been slow to arrive due to the prevailing political uncertainty and the failure of the conflicting parties to resume peace talks. More importantly, the ongoing undeclared war remains a major obstacle for many NGOs to sustain their peace activities. Unfortunately, this war is showing no sign of ending, as the GOSL is bent upon weakening the LTTE militarily and then come to the negotiation table. In response, the LTTE is very reluctant to resume talks. The LTTE has even gone one step ahead by resoring to air raids that were carried out on 3 May 2007 by dropping four bombs, three of which exploded in the Aeronautical Engineering Wing of the air base, killing three airmen and injuring 16 others. This is a desperate act designed to display military strength of the LTTE. Hence, in these prolonging military confrontations, the innocent people are becoming the prime victims, while the NGO's peace activities are being affected severely.

Nevertheless, these circumstances can also be used as opportunity by the NGOs to work towards restoring peace in the Island. The local NGOs could cut across ethnic/party lines and mobilize the public for exerting pressure on the GOSL and LTTE to end the war and resume peace talks. The local as well as international NGOs may carry out a regress campaign to draw the attention of the International community, which has been lukewarm in committing itself to resolving the conflict and to take necessary steps to persuade the conflicting parties to work together towards creating conducive atmosphere for early resumption of peace talks. Moreover, the NGOs could also work towards winning the confidence of the public by addressing the basic needs of the people, which the GOSL and LTTE have failed to do. In the process, the NGOs

could also make the Sri Lankan civil society more vibrant. If the development of events in Sri Lanka does not move towards a direction as outlined above, the country could very much back to square one. Innocent people may continue to suffer as before. The role of NGOs in the peace process is likely to shrink further and the much desired peace could very well remain as elusive as ever.

Mohd Aminul Karim

CHINA AND THE WEST: EMERGENCE OF NEW SECURITY RELATIONS

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, through a gradual transition from bipolarity, the world power structure has been undergoing changes. The present structure is experiencing uni-multipolarity. U.S.A still remains the unquestionable super power. However, China is emerging as a new economic superpower which is buttressing its military wherewithal as well. Though, China stands far behind U.S.A. in terms of military modernization and technological sophistication and its area of interest remains confined to the Asia-Pacific and Central Asia, yet it has drawn the attention of the West and the world at large both in terms of economy and military. Linked to it, the close collaboration between China and Russia and interests of other actors like Japan, India, Pakistan and ASEAN countries have brought about a new game scenario in present day world power politics which intermingles geo-politics and geo-economics.

Introduction

After the demise of the Cold War, bipolarity has been overtaken by a 'lonely' super power, as Huntington called it. Prevailing system is a hybrid one with a single superpower at the top that is followed by a number of major powers. As seen thus, the prevailing system can be

Major General Mohd Aminul Karim, ndc, ldmc, psc, Ph. D., is presently the Military Secretary to the Honorable President of Bangladesh. His Email address is: mdaminulkarim@yahoo.com

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called a uni-multipolar system, though multi polarity *per se* does not exist. At the same time, prevailing situation also generated a crucial question: is there a power vacuum which fails to balance the system in the contemporary international relations? The answer is an emphatic yes. Now, such a vacuum has probably given rise to unbridled use of power to settle scores, rightly or wrongly, by one power i.e., the United States of America. Brzezinski foresees the United States would continue to be the lone super power of the world in the days to come. His forecast, in all probability, would turn out to be true. American geopolitics, as prescribed by its strategist Spykman, is to keep the Eastern hemisphere divided, so that America can dictate terms in this part of the world. America has greatly succeeded in fulfilling such a prescription especially after the Second World War; it continues almost unchecked till date.

Russia checked it to a great extent during the Cold War. Russia was contained by the application of the containment theory propounded by Kennan immediately after the Second World War. Kennan, an American diplomat working in Moscow, had even called the Soviet Union an 'impotent power'. Keeping the house divided or contained or encircled, applying those either singly or together, are some of the geopolitical imperatives of the United States even today. Added to it, America's unquestioned supremacy in power relations makes the scenario more complex and compounded. It has given rise to America's unilateral declaration of National Security Strategy Paper (NSSP), which authorizes it to take military action against any power preemptively or proactively if it is considered a threat, even without consulting the allies.

This self acquired right violates the Article 5 of the UN Charter which provides the right to act in self defense in case there is an actual armed attack and not to act proactively. But who cares? It has the wherewithal to dictate terms whenever it fits its national interests –both political and economic. However, there is something called 'imperial overstretch', Paul Kennedy has called so, which may imperil the American power in the long run. Some of the powers in the Eastern hemisphere are reasserting themselves probably to challenge the unquestionable power of the United States. Notable among those is China, modernizing its military to take care of some of the flashpoints in the Asia Pacific region. Russia follows suit, mainly because of the oil money flowing into its economy. Thus, a grouping called Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed, *inter alia* to challenge the

military presence of the United States in the Central Asia. A kind of Cold War is probably in the offing. However, its intensity and dimension would not be reminiscent of the Cold War the world witnessed during the later part of the twentieth century. A glance at the objectives of the actors in the power play would give us a somewhat realistic picture of as to what is happening in the new shape of power blocks that are emerging.

The paper attempts to delineate the power blocks that are emerging in the Asia-Pacific around China and, thereby, probe into the emerging scenario in the region. The paper's purview would be confined to the Asia-Pacific and Central Asia and would attempt to depict a scenario that is likely to emerge in the first quarter or, at most, the first half of the twenty first century. This scenario building exercise is, so to speak, a guesstimate and there is nothing sacrosanct about it. Balancing game is always in a state of uncertainty and flux. It creates a precarious stability and always in need of being restored.

Strategic Objectives

Presently, unipolarity is the name of the game, which is generally resented by the Chinese followed by the Russians. Henry Kissinger called the Chinese the cold blooded practitioners of power politics. The Chinese are still haunted by the memories of the Century of Humiliation that began with the Opium War imposed on them by the British in 1840. The Chinese are now trying to resurrect. They would like to get back the central place in the world politics reminiscent of their grandeur during the Middle Kingdom. In practice as well, the process of development in China is, perhaps, the most dynamic in the contemporary world. "In the last 30 years, China has changed faster than any nation in history. Economic growth has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and remade the cultural and political environment of the country. China is perhaps the most dynamic part of the international order at the moment, and that, to many people, makes it the most frightening."¹ Russians are also trying to reassert themselves especially after the spurt of hard currency flowing from the sale of energy.

China sees its security as the summation of the variables like military strength, domestic political stability, national unification, prosperous economy and world peace. China feels world peace depends on a strong

¹ *Newsweek*, (September 25, 2006), pp. 30 and 33.

China. China, at the moment, is looking for a peaceful surrounding and trying to mend fences, wherever they are, which would allow it to have a stronger economy, better technological strides, and a well groomed technologically advanced military, which can somewhat match the western militaries. China, as its pragmatic leader Deng Tsio Peng prescribed, should strive for all round national development, which would ensure better national and international security. Chinese military should fit into the overall national objectives of China. Two of the strategic objectives of China are to reunite the mainland China with the renegade province of Taiwan and to gain control over the Spratly and Parcel islands in the South China Sea. China's energy needs are on the rise and as such it has to keep its energy transportation lanes, from Persian Gulf through Malacca Strait to South-China Sea², secured; it has to, however, at the moment, depend on American security umbrella. Chinese blue water naval capability is still far from maturing or from developing into a full fledged self contained military machine capable of calling shots in the Asia-Pacific region. However, its efforts are on and it is in the process of acquiring the state-of-the-art equipments for its navy from different sources.

The moot point that comes to the fore: can China, at this point in time, afford to antagonize the Americans in this part of the world in order not-to-destabilize the region? This is also inextricably linked with China's relations with Japan. If America withdraws from the Asia Pacific, then Japanese militarism would revive and it would further inflame the China-Japan animosity. China-Japan animosity is an age old phenomenon deeply rooted in their history. Although Japanese security needs are primarily looked after by American Pacific Command, Japan is spending huge sum of money, US dollar 42 billion, sixth largest in the world, to beef up its military. Japanese Defense Agency has now been upgraded to a full-fledged ministry. Japan suspects that China could disrupt its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) only with a small blue water capability and through its assertions of territorial claims in the South China Sea. An American source mentions that Japan, for the first time, in its White Paper has identified China as a threat. The provision that concerned China most is: Taiwan being considered falling within

² 80% of the Chinese oil passes through the Malacca Straits.

Japanese security range.³ Japan has plans for military deployment in Okinawa Prefecture in the event of a Taiwan conflict to prevent the possibility of China attacking the islands to disrupt US-Japan military cooperation.⁴ The present Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), going on between America and Japan, is aimed to “assess the security environment in the region and bilaterally determine the required roles, missions, capabilities and force structure”. This will go a long way to “strengthen the alliance, ensure the defense of Japan and maintain immediately deployable forces...”.⁵ A question may be asked: is there a possibility that Japan may do away with its pacifist article in its constitution?

However, American sword and Japanese shield would keep the Japanese posture under lid. Given any scenario, Japanese military preparation and sophistication would go unabated. Recently, Japan has got embroiled, in the defense of Taiwan with America, which is definitely worrisome for China. This can also be called a hangover of Sato-Nixon joint communiqué of November 1969 where it was mentioned that South Korea and Taiwan were respectively ‘essential’ and ‘important’ factors for Japanese security. China cannot take it lightly since Taiwan is of vital national interest for China and Japan has, as already highlighted, age old bitterness in its relations with the China. Taiwan is an issue on which China would never compromise. There are enough reasons to contemplate America and Japan would get militarily involved in case there is a showdown by Chinese military to forcibly unite Taiwan. The scenario that is likely to unfold is quite disturbing and as such the strategic objectives of the players directly involved are loud and clear.

Russia, as a regional power, would continue to checkmate American ingress in Eurasia especially in Central Asia, a region of significant strategic importance and having huge reserves of gas and oil.⁶ The area is

³ “China and the Future of the World”, The University of Chicago, 2006; URL: <http://chicagosociety.uchicago.edu/china> accessed June 20, 2007

⁴ Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power”, *Adelphi Papes*, No.368-9.

⁵ Issak Zulkernaen, “US Pacific Forces Posture”, *Asian Defense Journal*, (November 2005), p.7.

⁶ As per western estimates, the hydrocarbon resource potential in Central Asia is almost equal to those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait taken together. The oil

called the strategic backyard of Russia; this is also true in respect of China greatly because of secessionist and fundamentalist tendencies.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is intended to bolster Russian-Chinese geopolitics to contain American geopolitics in the region. The Organization has greatly succeeded in its objectives of keeping the Americans at bay in Central Asia. It has already succeeded in uprooting the American bases in Uzbekistan.⁷ Coupled with it, Russia would continue to provide sophisticated military technology to China;⁸ China needs it badly since it is constrained in not being able to acquire state of the art technology from the western sources specially after the embargo imposed on China following the Tiananmen square episode of 1989. Russia would continue to provide such support since it fits into its strategic objective of building a multipolar world and containing American hegemony, as one tends to call it, in Eurasia. It appears, McInders' theory of 'he who controls Eurasia would control the world' is being replicated by the actors in the great game of power politics.

Of the other regional powers, India is playing a very matured and balanced game of geopolitics. It is apparently trying to mend fences with China and Pakistan. However, complete normalization of relations with these two countries is far from reality. It also goes against the grain of power politics. India, called a swing state along with Pakistan, is still having defense collaboration with Russia. Added to it is India's recent hobnobbing with America's military in terms of acquiring state of the art equipments, joint forces exercises and collaboration in civil nuclearization. Such posture does not bode well in the geopolitical game in the Asia Pacific. American strategic objectives would be to court India to contain or encircle China. However, the fallout of triangular

reserves in the Caspian shelf are estimated at 17 to 21 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 7 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. The total Central Asia is estimated to contain about 46% of the world's gas reserves. (Source: "US and Geostrategy of Central Asia" by Imtiyaz Shah of Centre of Central Asian Studies)

⁷ Russia has an operational air base in Kant in Kyrgyzstan. It reportedly houses Su series aircrafts along with rapid-deployment force drawn from Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. With Kazakhstan, Russia has a much deeper military relationship. Kazakhstan has extended the lease of the Baikonur space centre and ballistic test range to Russia for another fifty years. For details, see, *Strategic Analysis*, (January-March 2004), p.62.

⁸ However, Russia is unlikely to provide the most sensitive equipments to China.

relationship among Russia, China and India remains an enigma.⁹ The role of ASEAN countries and Australia would also influence the geopolitics of the region.

Evolving Security Relationships

Some of the key questions could be: would China change the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific or the world at large? Would China turn into a hegemon? Would China challenge the power of America? Would America exit from the Asia-Pacific? In case America exists from the Asia-Pacific, would China fill the void thus created? Would Japan be able to take over the responsibilities of America? How much of the stability in the *status quo* of the Asia-Pacific be disturbed in case America withdraws? In answering these or similar questions, an Australian security expert Michael Wesley visualizes three scenarios which may be worth mentioning here:

Vision 1: An Accelerating *Status Quo* where it sees the predominance of American power persists for the majority of the 21st century. Other powers like China, Japan and ASEAN countries will continue to grow in wealth and power, but, in the long run, there would not be any change in the status quo of the hierarchy of power.

Vision 2: It visualizes an emerging Asia-Pacific community where there would be better interdependent links through trade liberalization, greater liberalization, regional stability and greater understanding. In the process, the institutions like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference etc. would be further strengthened.

Vision 3: It visualizes a Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific where it foresees China to be the second biggest power.¹⁰ Sino-Russian Communiqué of December 1999 urging all nations to join a “balanced, multipolar world order” speaks for the expediency in balancing American power.

⁹ An analysis of the triangular relationship among Russia, China and India is done in, A. K. M. Abdus Sabur, “Sino-South Asian Relations: Evolving Trends”, *BISS Journal*, (Volume 26, No. 3, July 2005), pp.339-84.

¹⁰ Michael Wesley, “The Challenges of China: Australian Perceptions and Reactions”, in *Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China*, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C. 2001.

Brzezinski feels China is unlikely to challenge the U.S. militarily and would remain focused on economic development only. China would, however, look for an opportunity to be recognized as a great power. This conclusion is contradicted by John Mearsheimer of Chicago University who believes an increasingly powerful China will push America out of Asia as U.S.A. put out the European great power from the Western hemisphere as part of Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century. The Professor makes an unambiguous statement to substantiate his argument, "If China continues to grow economically and therefore militarily, there will be an intense security competition between the United States and China, with a serious possibility of war".¹¹

This reminds us of Spykman's theory that the old world i.e., the Eastern hemisphere should continually be kept divided in order to keep the American predominance intact in this part of the world. Here two factors are going to shape our perception about the co-relation of forces in the Asia-Pacific: first is the policies adopted by America resulting in what Paul Kennedy has called "imperial overstretch"; and, second, the Chinese power, both military and economic, that is likely to remain continually on the rise. The application of Nixon Doctrine is also relevant here; the doctrine had called for a post-Vietnam retrenchment of American power from regional centers of power. It emphasized on outsourcing. America, in fact, is trying so in Iraq and Afganistan where indigenous military forces are being groomed to take over more responsibilities. Can we, therefore, relate that American hegemon will be driven out by Chinese hegemon, if one tends to call it so, in this part of the world? Scenario, at this point in time, is definitely not that critical.

The Chinese, in their different pronouncements, have made it abundantly clear that they would not go for any imperialistic or hegemonistic approach in international relations. However, they would not mind using military might to reunite Taiwan or to get their hold on the areas claimed by the Chinese in the South China Sea. Now, this is the question of perception as to how you brand a nation given a particular scenario. When it comes to South China Sea, ASEAN countries may term it as imperialistic or when it comes to Taiwan, America or Japan may take it as a military intervention which will, in all probability, be repelled by military means. Again when it comes to the question of

¹¹ John J. Mearsheimer, The University of Chicago, 2006; URL: <http://chicagocity.uchicago.edu/china> accessed June 20, 2007

border demarcation with India or over ownership of *Arunachal Pradesh*, India may feel threatened, as it did in 1962 and it might lead to eyeball to eyeball contact of two militaries. Indians might then view it as hegemonistic or imperialistic tendencies by the Chinese. When it comes to the resources or geostrategic significance of Central Asia, China and Russia together try to repel the presence of American military. China is the second largest consumer of oil after the United States, depending on imports for two-thirds of its total consumption.¹² It is growing more and more energy hungry,¹³ due to its phenomenal development. Therefore, it is natural for China to try to have control over the resources of Central Asia as western powers and Russia are also reasserting their influence over the Central Asian resources like gas, oil, water, etc.

America is going ahead with National Missile Defense (NMD) in the mainland and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) in Japan or Taiwan. This scenario may be called core deterrence being extended to include extended deterrence. This is likely to create pressure on China for more sophistication of its offensive missile capability. China is already going for some MIRVs in its ICBMs. It is also going for cruise missiles against which, in fact, no defense mechanism exists. China's recent successful anti-satellite missile test has not only destroyed a satellite but also a myth that a new space arms race is not looming. There is, therefore, a possibility that bravado will be matched by bravado where the US is likely to pour resources into a space arms race. America's missile defense program also fueled argument in China and elsewhere that US is set to weaponize space.¹⁴ Recently concluded Indo-US nuclear deal (for civil nuclear energy), runs contrary to American policy of non-proliferation. The Indo-US deal may further fuel horizontal proliferation. The larger US geostrategic consideration of containing China had driven the current US administration to depart from its long-standing policy of promoting non-proliferation. One has to also keep in mind that the weapon grade plutonium used in Pokhran 1 (in 1974) came out from the


¹² Jing-dong Yuan, "Promises and Problems", *Asia Times*, (April 9, 2005); URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GD09Df05.html accessed May 16, 2005

¹³ China is the world's second largest importer of oil and it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand in 2004. See, "China's Global Hunt for Energy", *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 2005), p.25.

¹⁴ Joan Johnston, "America's China Worries", *The Daily Star*, (February 20, 2007).

40 mw CIRUS reactor supplied by Canada for ‘peaceful purpose’. Moreso, Indian fast breeder reactors, as reported, have been kept out of the deal. Such action–reaction cycle gives rise to more militarization in the region. Military alliances or alignments are palpable along with more sophistication in the military technology.

Taking into view the prevailing politico-strategic and military strategic trends, the following model synthesizes the likely scenario developing in the Asia Pacific region.



Model: Emerging Security Relations

Here, the case of Pakistan and Taiwan is rather peculiar. Militarily, Pakistan has a tilt towards both China and U.S.A. However, Pakistan’s swing state syndrome is responsible for this scenario. While militarily, Taiwan has a tilt towards the U.S., economically, it is tilted towards China. Taiwan has a huge investment, to the tune of US\$100-150 billion, in China. China is applying a ‘carrot and stick’ policy when it comes to the issue of the reunification of its renegade province Taiwan with the mainland. India, although having good military ties with Russia, is likely to court America when it comes to tackling China. The model shows the speculative idea of forming an eastern NATO since there is fluidity in the alignments that may emerge.

Concluding Remarks

Power politics is agog in the region. It does not, however, necessarily mean that power politics should always overtake the soft power i.e.,

diplomacy, dialogue, international and regional institutions, ethics, values, etc. As anywhere in the contemporary world, market forces as well as pluralist concepts are at play in the Asia-Pacific region. Economic interests of a nation, often, overtake the geopolitical compulsions of a nation. There is an interdependent economic linkage which can put a damper on the strategic compulsions of a nation, at least, for the time being. Soft power needs to be encouraged to play its due role to tame the chauvinistic aspirations of all the actors in the region. There should be more communication and dialogue among the actors. Institutions like the UN, ASEAN, ARF, WTO, APEC and North East Asian Security cooperation (if formed) should be given their free hands to tone down the divergent approaches of the regional actors and bring them to the negotiation table to sort out the outstanding issues in the region. It is expected that the soft power along with interdependence in economic linkages will ensure peace and stability in the region.